Chapman v. Warden, FCC Petersburg-Medium

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Steven M. Chapman, Petitioner, v. Warden, FCC Petersburg-Medium, Respondent.

No. 21cv535 (LO/TCB)

United States District Court, E.D. Virginia, Alexandria Division

November 10, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Lian O'Grady, United States District Judge.

Petitioner Steven M. Chapman is a dishonorably discharged, former member of the U.S. Air Force, who is serving two life sentences imposed by a court-martial. He currently is incarcerated at FCC Petersburg-Medium, pursuant to a Memorandum of Agreement between the Department of the Army and the Federal Bureau of Prisons (BOP). He has petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, challenging his conviction and life sentence for premeditated murder-a crime he committed while serving a previously imposed life sentence for burglary, attempted premeditated murder, rape, and forcible sodomy, at the U.S. Disciplinary Barracks at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas (the “USDB”). Respondent moves to dismiss the petition under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), but the supporting memorandum addresses only six of the eight claims raised in the petition. See Dkt. No. 14. Because those six claims are either unviewable or meritless, the motion to dismiss will be granted. Respondent will be directed to file a supplemental motion with respect to the remaining two claims.

I. Background & Procedural History

During a recreational softball game at the USDB on July 24,2010 Chapman struck inmate Michael Fricke twice in the head with an aluminum softball bat after Fricke, who was playing umpire, warned the coach of Chapman's team that the pitcher might be ejected from the game for unsportsmanlike conduct. See DEX 13 ¶ 6. Fricke later was airlifted to Kansas University Medical Center, where he underwent surgery to relieve swelling and internal bleeding in his cranium; was declared braindead five days later; and ultimately died of the injuries sustained from the blunt force trauma to his head. Id. ¶¶ 13, 21.

Chapman was charged with premeditated murder in violation of Article 118 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). DEX 1. A general court-martial was convened at Fort Leavenworth on July 1, 2011. DEX 4, at p. 4. There, defense counsel argued a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. Id., at p. 15. Counsel asserted that, because Chapman and the victim had already been formally discharged from the armed forces at the time of the murder, subjecting Chapman to court-martial jurisdiction would violate his right to equal protection of the laws in relation to similarly situated civilians prosecuted in Article III courts. See DEX 15. Counsel urged in particular that Chapman would not receive the due process afforded to other civilians, especially with respect to the rights afforded in death penalty cases. See id.

During a hearing on July 30, 2012, the military judge (MJ) denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that the “defense has not persuaded this court that the accused has suffered a loss of equal protection by being subject to that jurisdiction sufficient to cause this lowly court to declare an act of Congress unconstitutional and overrule over 100 years of case law in this area.” Id., at pp. 26-27. The MJ first observed that Article 2(a)(7) of the UCMJ provides that “persons in the custody of the armed forces serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial” are subject to court-martial jurisdiction. Id., at p. 25. “There's nothing in the statute,” the MJ continued, “that would cause anyone to even remotely believe that there was some unspoken exception for those who received their punitive discharge before they are released from confinement.” Id. The MJ further opined that “a long line of cases have held that military jurisdiction over former military persons serving a sentence imposed by a court-martial is constitutional because such jurisdiction does not bring civilians under military control, but merely continues existing military jurisdiction.” Id. Concerning the equal-protection argument, the MJ explained that, subsequent to the cases relied on by defense counsel there have been “changes in the military justice system” that “have proven that we can protect the constitutional rights of Soldiers, including their death penalty due process rights ... and still do the nation's business of defending this country and its citizens.” Id., at p. 26.

After the MJ denied the motion to dismiss, the parties prepared for Chapman to enter a guilty plea. See id., at p. 27. The MJ admonished Chapman that the plea “will not be accepted unless you realize that by your plea, you admit every act or omission and every element of the offense to which you're pleading guilty, and that you're pleading guilty because you actually are, in fact, guilty.” Id., at p. 28. Chapman confirmed that he understood. Id. Next, Chapman confirmed that he had “voluntarily enter[ed] into the [fact] stipulation because [he] believefd] it [was] in [his] best interest to do that.” Id., at p. 31. The MJ told Chapman that the fact stipulation would be used for the purposes of deciding whether he was actually guilty and to determine an appropriate sentence. Id. The MJ then gave Chapman an opportunity to “clear up any contradictions” in the fact stipulation and to declare “right now if there's anything whatsoever you disagree with or feel is untrue.” Id. Chapman confirmed that “everything in the stipulation of fact [is] true.” Id., at p. 32.

Next, the MJ explained each element of the offense to which Chapman was pleading guilty.

Element number one, that Inmate Michael W. Fricke is dead;

Element number two, that his death resulted from your act in striking Inmate Michael W. Fricke in the head with a baseball bat at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, on or about 24 July 2010; Element number three, that the killing of Inmate Michael W. Fricke by you was unlawful; and

Element number four, that at the time of the killing, you had the premeditated design to kill Inmate Michael W. Fricke.

Id., at pp. 33-34. The MJ next explained premeditated design to kill.

“Premeditated design to kill” means the formation of a specific intent to kill and consideration of the act intended to bring about death. The premeditated design to kill does not have to exist for any measurable or particular length of time. The only requirement is that it must precede the killing.

Id., at p. 34.

Then, Chapman explained in his own words why he is guilty of premeditated murder.

I'm guilty of premeditated murder of Mr. Michael Fricke because on 24 July 2010,1 was the third base coach for my softball team and Mr. Fricke was the home plate umpire. Before the game started, Mr. Fricke came and gave us a briefing, basically, how the game would go. He stated in the interest of time he was going to call a “hitter's game,” meaning that any ball that came across the plate was going to be a strike.

... [T]his pretty much didn't happen for our team. It happened for the other team, but it was pretty evident by the third inning; and just as everyone else on the team was, I was getting heated as well.

Mr. Fricke started back to home plate and I started back for the coach's box on the third base line. When I got back to the third base area, I saw that Mr. Fricke was at the fence halfway between home plate and the on-deck circle calling for the head coach.

... [A]s the third base assistant coach, I started over to see what the issue was. As I got close enough to hear what was being said, I heard Mr. Fricke say something to the effect of, “If your pitcher berates me or accuses me of being unfair one more time, I will eject him.” When I heard this ... I got pissed and thought, “I'm going to jack this guy up.”

I also thought, “this is a big guy,” so ... I walked to the guy on the on-deck circle to get the bat. As I got the bat in my hand, I thought, “so I'm going to kill this guy.” I turned around, walked a couple steps, and hit him in the back of the head with the bat. When he fell forward, he landed with his head - with his face turned to the left. I then hit him again with the bat on the left side of his head. Once I saw blood running out of his left ear, I figured he was dead, so I threw the bat down.

Id., at pp. 36-37.

Chapman further declared that “[a]t no time on” the date of the murder “did I consume any intoxicating substance,” and that he “was not suffering any mental disease or defect and was able to fully appreciate the nature, quality, and wrongfulness of my acts.” Id., at p. 37. Chapman added that he “knew what [he] was doing was a horrible thing, and [he] did it anyway.” Id. Finally, Chapman admitted that he “had the specific intent to kill Mr. Fricke before [he] swung that bat at his head.” Id., at p. 38. Chapman told the MJ that although he was reading from a written document, he wrote the whole colloquy himself without the assistance of his lawyer and that he understood all of the concepts he discussed. Id., at p. 40. Later, the MJ asked Chapman if he was “satisfied that [his] defense counsels' advice is in [his] best interest”; Chapman said yes. Id., at p. 60.

Finally, Chapman pleaded guilty to committing premeditated murder, and the MJ found him guilty of the offense. Id., at p. 61. The next day, on July 31,2012, the MJ imposed a sentence of life imprisonment without eligibility for parole. DEX 5.

Chapman's case was subject to mandatory review by the Army Court of Criminal Appeals (ACCA). See 10 U.S.C. § 866(b); United States v. Chin, 75 M.J. 220, 223 (C.A.A.F. 2016).^[1] He was represented by two new military defense attorneys, who submitted the case to the ACCA “upon its merits” without “admitting] that the findings and sentence are correct in law and fact.” DEX 6. Appended to the request for review is Chapman's list of issues that he, not his attorneys,...