§11.7SIGNIFICANT AUTHORITIES
This section provides a brief overview of significant cases that apply CR 11 and FED. R. CIV. P. 11.
(1)Washington
Bryant v. Joseph Tree, Inc., 119 Wn.2d 210, 829 P.2d 1099 (1992). This case contains the most thorough and frequently cited examination of CR 11. The Supreme Court explained that the purpose of CR 11 is not to chill an attorney's enthusiasm or creativity. To justify sanctions, pleadings must lack a legal or factual basis and must be filed without a reasonable inquiry. Loss on the merits is not dispositive, as CR 11 is not a fee-shifting device. An objective standard of reasonableness, not a subjective standard based on hindsight, should be applied. Washington's notice pleading rule does not require the absence of factual errors and deficiencies in the initial complaint, and sanctions on this basis are, therefore, inappropriate before there has been an opportunity for discovery. Prompt notice should be given to the court and to opposing counsel upon discovery of sanctionable conduct. CR 11 should not be the basis for sanctions when other court rules more properly apply.
Biggs v. Vail, 124 Wn.2d 193, 876 P.2d 448 (1994) (Biggs II). The trial court improperly imposed CR 11 sanctions but did not make findings concerning the sanctionable conduct. Consequently, the Supreme Court remanded for further proceedings. The court rejected the argument that counsel had insufficient notice of sanctions because his opponent's original motion sought sanctions under RCW 4.84.185 rather than CR 11. The court adopted the suggestion in the FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee's note that informal notice is generally required before proceeding with a motion for sanctions, but reasoned that the "deterrent function of the rule would be vitiated were [counsel] allowed to avoid sanctions simply because opposing counsel mislabeled his request." 124 Wn.2d at 199.
State ex rel. Quick-Ruben v. Verharen, 136 Wn.2d 888, 969 P.2d 64 (1998). Quick-Ruben, the losing candidate in an election for superior court judge, alleged (through an action quo warranto) that he was entitled to the office because his opponent, Verharen, did not meet all of the preconditions for the office. The Supreme Court affirmed sanctions imposed by the trial court on the theory that any "reasonable inquiry would have shown" Quick-Ruben that he lacked standing to maintain his quo warranto action. And even if he had standing, he initiated his action prematurely. Id. at 904. The court found it significant that Quick-Ruben had been warned by opposing counsel that his action was premature and was offered the opportunity to dismiss and refile after Verharen had taken office. Id. at 901. In dissent, Justice Sanders argued that Quick-Ruben's claim was "of constitutional magnitude, debatable, and a matter of first impression for this state, and thus could not be ‘frivolous' as that term has been previously defined." Id. at 907 (Sanders, J., dissenting).
In re Recall of Lindquist, 172 Wn.2d 120, 258 P.3d 9 (2011). The Supreme Court held that monetary sanctions were not warranted against a pro se plaintiff in an action to recall the Pierce County prosecutor. The court emphasized that CR 11 "requires consideration of both its intent to deter baseless legal claims, as well as the potential chilling effect sanctions may have on meritorious claims." Id. at 142. The trial court failed to consider those factors on the record. Given the Washington constitutional provision that "the right of petition ... should never be abridged," WASH. CONST. ART. I, §4, the award of monetary sanctions had the strong potential to chill meritorious claims.
Miller v. Badgley, 51 Wn.App. 285, 753 P.2d 530, review denied, 111 Wn.2d 1007 (1988). Sanctions were upheld because a party and his attorney represented that property offered in lieu of supersedeas bond was sufficiently unencumbered to protect judgment, when in fact its encumbrances far exceeded the property's value. The court reasoned that when the underlying facts are not complex, are relatively easy to ascertain, and are within the moving party's control, lack of reasonable inquiry justifies an award of sanctions. Bad faith is not required, but the trial court retains broad latitude to fashion an appropriate sanction based on the conduct. In general, however, "the least severe sanctions adequate to serve the purpose should be imposed." Id. at 304.
Suarez v. Newquist, 70 Wn.App. 827, 855 P.2d 1200 (1993). Sanctions were appropriate because counsel amended the complaint to allege new facts without any additional inquiry, merely to avoid the sovereign immunity bar, and attempted to file successive affidavits of prejudice without legal basis in an effort to avoid a hearing for which he was unprepared.
MacDonald v. Korum Ford, 80 Wn.App. 877, 912 P.2d 1052 (1996). The court held that sanctions were appropriate for continuing an action after deposition testimony demonstrated that plaintiff 's sexual harassment claims lacked a legal or factual basis. The court stated, however, that the attorney seeking sanctions had a duty to mitigate costs in responding to claims, and monetary sanctions should not exceed the amount spent responding specifically to the baseless filings, nor should they include the costs of getting a second attorney up to speed.
Madden v. Foley, 83 Wn.App. 385, 922 P.2d 1364 (1996). The court used agency principles to hold the signer's law firm liable for CR 11sanctions because the signature block indicated that "the individual attorney who signed the pleading did so as an agent of the law firm." Id. at 392.
Manteufel v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 117 Wn.App. 168, 68 P.3d 1093, review denied, 150 Wn.2d 1021 (2003). The court upheld the imposition of sanctions against Manteufel for bringing baseless claims against Safeco's attorney, the attorney's spouse, and the attorney's law firm. Id. at 176-77. The court emphasized that Manteufel had been warned three times that the facts on which his claims were based were incorrect, and that he had misread the primary case on which he was relying. Moreover, in any event, that case had been overruled. Id. at 177.
Skimming v. Boxer, 119 Wn.App. 748, 82 P.3d 707, review denied, 152 Wn.2d 1016 (2004). The court upheld the trial court's denial of a motion for CR 11 sanctions filed by Snohomish County and its chief executive officer. The court explained that sanction decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion because of the trial court's "personal and sometimes exhaustive contact with the case." Id. at 754. The court reiterated, among other things, that baselessness of a claim is based on an objective standard; courts do not need to enter findings when they deny CR 11 sanctions; CR 11 is not designed as a fee-shifting device; and the threshold for imposing CR 11 sanctions is high. Id. at...
