§15.3 WASHINGTON STATE STATUTES
Courts have reviewed several state laws invoked as other statutes exempting records from the PRA. In Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 580 P.2d 246 (1978), the agency invoked RCW 84.40.020 as an exemption. The court held that, when interpreting the other statute to determine if it exempted records, "the overall policy" of the PRA "must be read into" the other statute. Id. at 139. This is consistent with RCW 42.56.030, which provides that exemptions to the PRA (including non-PRA "other statutes") must be narrowly construed in favor of disclosure. This approach is also consistent with the conflicts clause in the last sentence of RCW 42.56.030, declaring that the PRA controls when a statute conflicts with the PRA. In Fisher Broadcasting-Seattle TV LLC v. City of Seattle, 180 Wn.2d 515, 525, 326 P.3d 688 (2014), the court cited Hearst Corp., 90 Wn.2d at 138-39, in support of its observation that "[a]ll exceptions, including 'other statute' exceptions, are construed narrowly." One notable Washington Supreme Court decision on the issue of "other statutes" involved the application of attorney-client privilege to records held by government agencies. (See generally Chapter 14 (Attorney-Client Privilege and Other Discovery Exemptions) of this deskbook.) The court held that the attorney-client privilege statute, RCW 5.60.060(2), was incorporated in the PRA as an "other statute" exempting records from disclosure. Hangartner v. City of Seattle, 151 Wn.2d 439, 453, 90 P.3d 26 (2004). The court rejected arguments that the privilege statute did not apply to agencies but instead only to attorneys and that the statute did not specifically exempt information from disclosure. The court observed that an "other statute" need not mesh with the PRA and could overlap an existing PRA exemption (here, the controversy exemption in RCW 42.56.290). Because the attorney-client privilege statute existed at the time the legislature adopted the "other statute" amendment to the PRA, the court observed that the legislature could have expressly stated that this law was not incorporated as an "other statute" if that was its intent. Hangartner, 151 Wn. 2d at 453; see also Sanders v. State, 169 Wn.2d 827, 853-54, 240 P.3d 120 (2010) (applying the "common interest doctrine," protecting confidentiality of attorney-client communications among parties sharing a common claim or defense, in a PRA context); Morgan v. City of Fed. Way, 166 Wn.2d 747, 755, 213...
