§60.7 SIGNIFICANT AUTHORITIES
There are a few hundred published decisions in Washington that discuss CR 60 and its application. The majority of these decisions focus on the 11 different grounds for relief identified in CR 60(b). The following is a brief summary of some of the significant Washington court decisions.
(1) Washington
(a)Federal cases are persuasive authority
To the extent that CR 60 parallels Fed. R. Civ. P. 60, Washington courts will look for guidance to federal decisions interpreting the federal rule. Harding v. Will, 81 Wn.2d 132, 500 P.2d 91 (1972).
(b)Grounds not raised in motion will not be considered on appeal
Appellate courts will not consider any grounds for vacation other than those raised before the trial court. In re Marriage ofWherley, 34 Wn.App. 344,348,661 P.2d 155, review denied, 100 Wn.2d 1013 (1983).
(c)Clerical mistakes
Under CR 60(a), a court may correct clerical mistakes in the record even after appellate review has been accepted. Marquis v. City of Spokane, 76 Wn.App. 853,862,888P.2d753 (1995), aff'd, 130 Wn.2d 97, 922P.2d43 (1996). In Marquis, the plaintiff argued that the trial court erred when it allowed the defendant to correct the trial court record by supplementing documents that were inadvertently admitted. The court noted that, pursuant to RAP 7.2(e), once appellate review has been accepted, the appellate court's permission to correct a clerical mistake must be obtained before formal entry of the trial court's order only if the trial court's ruling changes the decision that was appealed. Id. The court held that the order did not change the issue on appeal, and thus the appellate court's permission was not required and the correction was properly made. Id.
(d)The White v. Holm framework for default judgments
White v. Holm, 73 Wn.2d 348, 352, 438P.2d581 (1968), is the seminal case on motions to vacate a default judgment. Under White, the moving party must demonstrate that (1) there is substantial evidence extant to support, at least prima facie, a defense to the claim asserted by the opposing party; (2) the moving party's failure to timely appear in the action, and answer the opponent's claim, was occasioned by mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (3) the moving party acted with due diligence after notice of entry of the default judgment; and (4) no substantial hardship will result to the opposing party. The relative importance of the four factors varies depending on the particular facts of the case. See §60.6(3)(a), above. In White, the Supreme Court reversed the trial court's denial of a motion to vacate a default judgment because the defendant had presented a prima facie defense and demonstrated that, although he had not timely responded to the complaint, he had diligently tendered the claim to his insurer and had received assurances that the case would be timely defended.
The White framework was discussed in detail in TMT Bear Creek Shopping Center, Inc. v. PETCO Animal Supplies, Inc., 140 Wn.App. 191, 165 P.3d 1271 (2007), a case in which a default judgment was entered after the defendant failed to answer because of an error by one of its administrative employees. In affirming the trial court's refusal to vacate the default judgment, the Court of Appeals explained the differing standards for determining whether the moving party has a strong or conclusive defense versus a prima facie defense.
(e) Excusable neglect
When determining excusable neglect under CR 60(b)(1), Washington courts have repeatedly held that if a company's failure to respond to a properly served summons and complaint was due to a breakdown of internal office procedure, the failure was not excusable. For example, failure to calendar a response date and the departure of a lead attorney are evidence of a company's own failure to set in place proper procedures and do not constitute excusable neglect. Puget Sound Med. Supply v. Dep't ofSoc. & Health Servs., 156 Wn.App. 364, 234 P.3d 246 (2010).
In Little v. King, 160 Wn.2d 696, 161 P.3d 345 (2007)...
