Charles v. Commissioner of Correction

206 Conn.App. 341

261 A.3d 184

Jared CHARLES

v.COMMISSIONER OF CORRECTION

AC 43643

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 20, 2021

Officially released August 3, 2021

Kara E. Moreau, with whom was Richard A. Reeve, New Haven, for the appellant (petitioner).

Mitchell S. Brody, Rocky Hill, senior assistant state's attorney, with whom, on the brief, were Sharmese L. Walcott, state's attorney, and Tamara Grosso, assistant state's attorney, for the appellee (respondent).

Elgo, Alexander and DiPentima, Js.

ALEXANDER, J.

The petitioner, Jared Charles, appeals from the judgment of the habeas court denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On appeal, the petitioner claims that the court improperly concluded that he failed to prove ineffective assistance of counsel. The petitioner argues that his trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate and to assert a claim of self-defense and that the habeas court made clearly erroneous factual findings in its memorandum of decision. We affirm the judgment of the habeas court.

This court set forth the following facts in the petitioner's direct appeal. "In the late afternoon of September 25, 2004, the victim, Dennis Faniel, and his cousin, [Jayquan], were riding bicycles in a residential area on Deerfield Avenue in Hartford. The [petitioner], who was close friends with the victim, was driving in the area, and the victim signaled for him to stop. The [petitioner] parked his car a short distance from where the victim and [Jayquan] were then standing and exited his vehicle. While [Jayquan] remained with the bicycles at the end of a driveway, the [petitioner] and the victim began talking and walked up that driveway, toward the rear of a house. The victim demanded a cellular telephone that the victim's brother, then incarcerated, had entrusted to the [petitioner]. The victim's brother had instructed the [petitioner] to keep it away from the victim. The cellular telephone was valuable because it was used in the illegal drug business and contained the contact numbers of numerous customers. When the [petitioner] refused to give it to the victim, the two men began arguing, and the victim made a fist with his right hand as if preparing to hit the [petitioner]. At that point, [Jayquan] moved away from the bicycles. The [petitioner] fired one gunshot, and the victim was hit in the abdomen with a bullet from a nine millimeter semiautomatic firearm. He later died from his injuries.

"The [petitioner] fled the scene with a silver gun in his hand. [Jayquan] ran to the victim, who had fallen to the ground on his knees, and took the victim's .38 caliber revolver from him. He chased the [petitioner] and fired five gunshots at him. After he failed to hit the [petitioner], [Jayquan] threw the revolver in a trash can behind one of the neighborhood houses and went home. The [petitioner], while being pursued by [Jayquan], caught his gray shirt on a fence as he jumped over the fence. He managed to slide out of the shirt and left it behind. The police later retrieved the .38 caliber revolver, the gray shirt with cocaine in one of its pockets and a cellular telephone within the area traveled by [Jayquan] and the [petitioner]. The police did not find a nine millimeter weapon.

"During the investigation, the police interviewed a witness to the incident. Natasha Walker, a former girlfriend of the victim, was standing outside of her grandfather's house on Deerfield Avenue when she saw the victim and [Jayquan] riding up the street on their bicycles. She also saw the [petitioner], wearing a gray shirt, approach them when they left their bicycles at the end of the driveway. Because the [petitioner] and the victim walked to the rear of the yard, she did not see the shooting but she did hear the gunshot. She stated that [Jayquan] was still at the end of the driveway with the bicycles when the gun was fired. She then saw the [petitioner] run from behind the house with a gun in his right hand, and she heard an additional four or five gunshots shortly after the [petitioner] and [Jayquan] fled the scene." State v. Charles , 134 Conn. App. 242, 244–45, 39 A.3d 750, cert. denied, 304 Conn. 930, 42 A.3d 392 (2012).

The petitioner was convicted of murder in violation of General Statutes § 53a-54a, carrying a pistol without a permit in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2004) § 29-35, criminal possession of a pistol in violation of General Statutes (Supp. 2004) § 53a-217c, and possession of narcotics in violation of General Statutes (Rev. to 2003) § 21a-279 (a). Id., at 243–44, 39 A.3d 750. This court affirmed the judgment of conviction rendered by the trial court. Id., at 252, 39 A.3d 750.

On March 8, 2013, the self-represented petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. On April 1, 2019, with the assistance of counsel, the petitioner filed an amended petition containing two counts. In the first count, the petitioner alleged ineffective assistance of criminal trial counsel, Walter Hussey, for failing to investigate the viability of self-defense as a defense strategy. In the second count, the petitioner alleged that Hussey was ineffective for failing to assert a claim of self-defense at trial.

A trial on the habeas petition was held on May 23 and 30, 2019. On September 25, 2019, the habeas court issued a memorandum of decision denying each of the petitioner's claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The court concluded that the petitioner had failed to establish that Hussey's performance was deficient and therefore did not address the issue of prejudice. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington , 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984). The court determined that Hussey had fully investigated the petitioner's case prior to trial. The court found that there was no reasonable basis for Hussey to pursue a self-defense claim and that it was not "objectively unreasonable" for Hussey to focus on the defense of third-party culpability instead of a self-defense claim. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a petition for certification to appeal from the judgment denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The habeas court granted the petition for certification to appeal. This appeal followed. Additional facts will be set forth as necessary.

On appeal, the petitioner claims that Hussey provided ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to investigate and to assert a claim of self-defense. The respondent, the Commissioner of Correction, counters that the habeas court properly concluded that the petitioner failed to establish his claims of ineffective assistance of criminal trial counsel. We agree with the respondent.

We first set forth the legal principles applicable to the petitioner's appeal. "Our standard of review of a habeas court's judgment on ineffective assistance of counsel claims is well settled. The habeas court is afforded broad discretion in making its factual findings, and those findings will not be disturbed unless they are clearly erroneous. ... The application of the habeas court's factual findings to the pertinent legal standard, however, presents a mixed question of law and fact, which is subject to plenary review. ... Therefore, our review of whether the facts as found by the habeas court constituted a violation of the petitioner's constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel is plenary." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Kellman v. Commissioner of Correction , 178 Conn. App. 63, 68, 174 A.3d 206 (2017).

A criminal defendant is entitled to effective assistance of counsel under both the United States constitution and the Connecticut constitution. Gaines v. Commissioner of Correction , 306 Conn. 664, 677–78, 51 A.3d 948 (2012). "To succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a habeas petitioner must satisfy the two-pronged test articulated in Strickland v. Washington , [supra, 466 U.S. at 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052 ]. Strickland requires that a petitioner satisfy both a performance prong and a prejudice prong. To satisfy the performance prong, a claimant must demonstrate that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel guaranteed ... by the [s]ixth [a]mendment. ... To satisfy the prejudice prong, a claimant must demonstrate that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. ... Although a petitioner can succeed only if he satisfies both prongs, a reviewing court can find against the petitioner on either ground." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Davis v. Commissioner of Correction , 198 Conn. App. 345, 352–53, 233 A.3d 1106, cert. denied, 335 Conn. 948, 238 A.3d 18 (2020).

"In any case presenting an ineffectiveness claim, the performance inquiry must be whether counsel's assistance was reasonable considering all the circumstances. Prevailing norms of practice as reflected in American Bar Association standards and the like ... are guides to determining what is reasonable .... Nevertheless, [j]udicial scrutiny of counsel's performance must be highly deferential. It is all too tempting for a defendant to second-guess counsel's assistance after conviction or adverse sentence, and it is all too easy for a court, examining counsel's defense after it has proved unsuccessful, to conclude that a particular act or omission of counsel was unreasonable. ... A fair assessment of attorney performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct from counsel's perspective at the time. Because of the difficulties inherent in making the evaluation, a court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the [petitioner] must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action might be considered...