Charles v. United States

1

NATHAN M.F. CHARLES, Plaintiff v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 21-0864 (CKK)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

February 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

COLLEEN KOLLAR-KOTELLY United States District Judge.

In this defamation case, Plaintiff Nathan M.F. Charles, previously employed as an attorney at the National Security Division of the United States Department of Justice (“NSD”) seeks damages from two of his former coworkers and supervisors who, he alleges, uttered defamatory statements that caused his separation from NSD. Pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2671 et seq. (“FTCA”), the United States of America, through the Attorney General of the United States, removed the case from the District of Columbia Superior Court and moved to dismiss Plaintiff's complaint on jurisdictional grounds. In an effort to moot Defendant's motion to dismiss Plaintiff moved for leave to file an amended complaint. As Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint would not remedy the jurisdictional deficiencies of the first, and upon consideration of the pleadings, ^[1] the relevant legal authorities, and the entire record, the Court shall DENY Plaintiff's [19] Motion for Leave to File Amended Complaint and GRANT Defendant's [3] Motion to Dismiss.

I. BACKGROUND

On February 25, 2021, Plaintiff, previously employed as an attorney at the National Security Division of the United States Department of Justice, filed a complaint for defamation against two of his coworkers in the District of Columbia Superior Court. Notice of Removal at ¶ 2. Plaintiff's operative complaint is threadbare; it characterizes his coworkers' statements as “false” and made to “Plaintiff's direct supervisor and other managerial officials of [NSD].” Compl. at ¶¶ 3-4. The complaint's only other factual allegation is that, “[a]s a result of [his coworkers'] publication of these defamatory statements, [] Plaintiff was suspended from his position as a federal prosecutor, ” resulting in lost wages. See Id. at ¶ 5. On March 31, 2021, Defendant filed their notice of removal, arguing that it was the true party in action as Plaintiff's former coworkers were acting in their official capacity when they uttered the allegedly defamatory statements. Id. at ¶ 5. Defendant relies on 28 U.S.C. §§ 1442(a)(1); 1446, and 2679(d)(2) in support of removal jurisdiction. Notice of Removal at ¶ 3.

A week after removal, Defendant filed its motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. In support thereof, Defendant argues: (1) the Court does not have derivative jurisdiction because federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction over claims arising under the FTCA; (2) contrarily, Plaintiff cannot bring an FTCA claim because the FTCA does not waive sovereign immunity for intentional torts; and (3) Plaintiff had yet to effect proper service. MTD. at 1.

It was not until Plaintiff's opposition^[2] that Plaintiff offered some factual development in response to Defendant's jurisdictional arguments. Broadly, Plaintiff alleges that his supervisors ignored concerns he raised about (XXXXX). Pl.'s Opp. at 4-6. Plaintiff alleges that he submitted a draft report on the subject to his supervisor, that she directed him not to share the draft outside of the Department of Justice, and when he did, she reported his actions to upper management within NSD. Id. at 9-10. An admonishment followed, which Plaintiff describes as baseless. Id. at 12. After several other meetings with senior NSD leadership, Plaintiff submitted a complaint to the Inspector General for the Department of Justice alleging “gross mismanagement” on the part of his two supervisors. Id. at 25.

Plaintiff's proposed amended complaint reiterates some of the factual allegations in his opposition. The amended complaint states that the admonishment, later shared among other NSD leadership, charged Plaintiff with “failure to follow instructions.” Am. Compl. at ¶ 17. That statement, Plaintiff pleads, forms the basis for his defamation claim. Id. at ¶¶ 17-20. Additionally, Plaintiff proposes adding a second claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress (“IIED”) based on the same allegations. Am. Compl. at ¶ 25-29. In its opposition to Plaintiff's motion for leave to amend, Defendant argues that: (1) Plaintiff has not exhausted his administrative remedies on his IIED claim, (2) the FTCA does not waive immunity for IIED claims as an intentional tort (and insofar as the alleged statements were made within the course of Plaintiff's supervisors' employment), and (3) the proposed amended complaint does not state a claim for IIED. With the two motions fully briefed, the Court turns to their resolution.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Motion to Amend

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2), “a party may amend its pleading only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave” after 21 days from service. “Leave to amend a complaint is within the court's discretion and ‘should be freely given unless there is a good reason . . . to the contrary.'” Klayman v. Judicial Watch, Inc., 288 F.Supp.3d 314, 317 (D.D.C. 2018) (CKK) (quoting Willoughby v. Potomac Elec. Power Co., 100 F.3d 99, 1003 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). “When evaluating whether to grant leave to amend, the Court must consider (1) undue delay; (2) prejudice to the opposing party; (3) futility of the amendment; (4) bad faith; and (5) whether the plaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” Id. (internal quotation marks removed). With respect to futility, “a district court may properly deny a motion to amend if ‘the amended pleading would not survive a motion to dismiss.'” Id. (quoting In re Interbank Funding Corp. Sec. Litig., 629 F.3d 213, 218 (D.C. Cir. 2010)).

B. Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Jurisdiction

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the court has subject matter jurisdiction over its claim. See Moms Against Mercury v. FDA, 483 F.3d 824, 828 (D.C. Cir. 2007). In determining whether there is jurisdiction, the Court may “consider the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus the court's resolution of disputed facts.” Coal. for Underground Expansion v. Mineta, 333 F.3d 193, 198 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). “Although a court must accept as true all factual allegations contained in the complaint when reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1), ” the factual allegations in the complaint “will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6) motion for failure to state a claim.” Wright v. Foreign Serv. Grievance Bd., 503 F.Supp.2d 163, 170 (D.D.C. 2007) (citations omitted).

C. Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim

Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), a party may move to dismiss a complaint on the grounds that it “fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain “‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,' in order to ‘give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon which it rests.'” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)). “[A] complaint [does not] suffice if it tenders ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557). Rather, a complaint must contain sufficient factual allegations that, if true, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. In evaluating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all reasonable factual inferences drawn from well-pleaded factual allegations. See In re United Mine Workers of Am. Employee Benefit Plans Litig., 854 F.Supp. 914, 915 (D.D.C. 1994).

III. DISCUSSION

Because the Court lacks jurisdiction over Plaintiff's defamation claim, even as amended, and his IIED claim, it shall deny Plaintiff's motion to amend as futile and grant Defendant's motion to dismiss.

A. Derivative Jurisdiction

Defendant first argues that the complaint should be dismissed on the grounds that the Court lacks derivative jurisdiction over the complaint. Defendant points to 28 U.S.C. § 1442 as the basis for the Court's removal jurisdiction in this case and notes that, unlike § 1441, it requires the Court to have had jurisdiction over the claims in the complaint in the first instance. Compare § 1441(f) with § 1442. Section 1442, however, is relevant to any constitutional claim made against a federal law enforcement officer in connection with their law enforcement duties. See Id. (a)(1). Here, it is undisputed that Plaintiff's supervisors were not acting in a law enforcement capacity when they uttered the alleged defamatory statements. As a result, the government removed not on that basis, but on the basis that Plaintiff's claims were, in effect, claims against the United States under the FTCA.

For such a claim, the FTCA provides for a more specific removal jurisdiction over any claim against an individual defendant whom the Attorney General certifies was acting within the course of their employment. 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d)(2). Indeed, if derivative jurisdiction were required...