Chatman v. Jeffreys

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PAUL CHATMAN, Plaintiff, v. ROB L. JEFFREYS, Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, et al. Defendants.

No. 1:22-1314-MMM

United States District Court, C.D. Illinois, Peoria Division

February 14, 2023

OPINION AND ORDER

Michael M. Mihm United States District Judge.

Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Paul Chatman's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis. ECF No. 2. Plaintiff brought suit against Defendants Rob L. Jeffreys, the Director of the Illinois Department of Corrections, Brendan E. Kelly as the Director of the Illinois State Police, and Craig Findley, Chairman of the Illinois Prisoner Review Board. For the reasons stated below, Plaintiff's Motion to Proceed in forma pauperis is DENIED and his Complaint is DISMISSED.

BACKGROUND

In the Complaint, Plaintiff asserts that he was convicted of First-Degree Murder in 1983 and that he was 17 years old when he committed the offense. ECF No. 1 at 3. Plaintiff states that he was released from state custody on June 24, 2020.

While he was incarcerated, a law that Plaintiff refers to as the “Murder and Violent Offender Against Youth Registration Act” was passed. Id. (citing 730 ILCS 154/1). Plaintiff asserts that despite him being 17-years old at the time of the offense, and the victim being an adult, he is now required to register with the Illinois State Police and provide photographs, his address, and employment information for the purposes of registering. Id. at 4. He argues that he will be closely monitored during his 10-year registration period and may be arrested if he happens to inadvertently fall short of the reporting requirements. Id.

Plaintiff already brought suit against the State of Illinois on largely the same issues presented here. Plaintiff named only the State of Illinois but served the notice of lawsuit on the same three Defendants named here. He brought the case in the Circuit Court of Cook County for a temporary restraining order exempting him from registering under the Registration Act. Chatman v. People, 2022 WL 6126027 (Ill.App.Ct. 2022). The lower court held an oral argument where the state officials were given the opportunity to present their arguments on the motion to dismiss. Id. at 2. The lower court dismissed the case on the basis of sovereign immunity finding that Plaintiff technically only named the State of Illinois in the Complaint, despite serving the lawsuit on the three Defendants named here. Id. The lower court also otherwise observed that the Registration Act was not an unconstitutional ex post facto law. Id. The lower court denied Plaintiff the opportunity to replead because Plaintiff would be unable to plead facts that would entitle him to relief. Id. The Illinois Court of Appeals found that it was appropriate to reach the merits because Plaintiff could have just amended to name the state officials. Id. at 4. The Appellate Court therefore addressed the merits of Plaintiff's claims. Id. The Court found that the law did not violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution and did not violate the single subject Rule of the Illinois Constitution. The Illinois Supreme Court denied his petition for appeal. Chatman v. People, 193 N.E.3d 8 (Ill. 2022).

Plaintiff has now brought suit in federal court arguing that the registration law violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment, the due process rights of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment, and the single subject rule found in the Illinois Constitution. Plaintiff does not seek any money damages but instead seeks an injunction to stop Defendants from enforcing the registration requirements.

LEGAL STANDARD

Federal courts may authorize a litigant to proceed in an action without prepaying fees if two conditions are met: (1) the litigant is unable to pay the costs of commencing the action and (2) the action is not frivolous nor malicious, does not fail to state a claim on which relief may be granted, and does not seek monetary relief against a defendant that is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(a) and (e)(2). Regardless of plaintiffs' ability to pay, they must assert a claim upon which relief may be granted.

To state a claim upon which relief can be granted, the complaint need contain only enough factual matter, accepted as true, to allow the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the alleged conduct. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). Plausibility means alleging factual content that allows a court to reasonably infer that the defendant is liable for the alleged misconduct. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 547 (2007). A plaintiff's claim must “give enough details about the subject matter of the case to present a story that holds together,” to be plausible. Swanson v. Citibank, N.A., 614 F.3d 400, 404 (7th Cir. 2010). A court must draw all inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Bontkowski v. First Nat'l Bank of Cicero, 998 F.2d 459, 461 (7th Cir. 1993).

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff's claims center on the Murder Registration Act, effective January 1, 2012, which sets forth registration requirements for individuals convicted of first-degree murder of an adult as follows:

A person who is convicted or adjudicated delinquent of first degree murder of an adult shall be required to register for a period of ten years after conviction or adjudication if not confined to a penal institution, hospital, or any other institution or facility, and if confined, for a period of ten years after parole, discharge, or release from any such facility.

730 ILCS 154/5(c-6). For the purposes of 154/5, first degree murder of an adult “means first degree murder under Section 9-1 of the Criminal Code of 1961 or the Criminal Code of 2012 when the victim was a person 18 years of age or older at the time of the commission of the offense.” 730 ILCS 154/5(b-5) .

In his complaint, Plaintiff states that he was convicted of first-degree murder of an individual who was an adult. Plaintiff argues that he should be exempt from the act based upon paperwork that he received when he was released, and he alleges the language of the statute otherwise does not apply to him. He further argues that as applied to him, the law violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution, the Eighth Amendment, and his Due Process Rights under the Constitution. The Supreme Court and Seventh Circuit have repeatedly denied similar challenges to similar registration laws. Accordingly, as explained below, it is clear that Plaintiff has not stated a basis for relief.

1. The registration requirements do not violate the ex post facto clause of the Constitution.

Plaintiff argues that since the law requiring registration was passed over twenty years after he committed his crime, the law violates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The ex post facto clause prohibits the enactment of a “law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a greater punishment, than the law annexed to the crime, when committed.” U.S. v. Lopez, 222 F.3d 428, 440 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. 386, 390 (1798)); see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3. “For a law to violate this protection, it must be retroactive and punitive.” Koch v. Hartland, 43 F.4th 747, 750 (7th Cir. 2022). A civil sanction implicates the ex post facto clause of the Constitution “only if it can be fairly characterized as punishment.” Bae v. Shalala, 44 F.3d 489, 492 (7th Cir. 1995). A civil regulatory scheme that is not punitive in nature does not raise ex post facto concerns. See Vasquez v. Foxx, 895 F.3d 515, 520 (7th Cir. 2018) (abrogated on other grounds in Koch v. Hartland, 42 F.4th 747 (7th Cir. 2022)). A significant factor in determining whether a statute is punitive is the legislation's purpose. Gilbert v. Peters, 55 F.3d 237, 238 (7th Cir. 1995) (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 96 (1958)). If the purpose was to impose punishment “that ends the inquiry.” United State v. Hook, 471 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001)(quoting Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 92 (2003)). If the purpose is “civil and nonpunitive” the court must examine whether the “statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect as to negate [the State's] intention to deem it civil.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Smith, 538 U.S. at 92).

Both the Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court have upheld various laws requiring that certain types of offenders register despite challenges under the ex post facto clause of the Constitution. The Seventh Circuit and Supreme Court have determined that registering on a list is a “nonpunitive civil regulation” that did not raise any ex post facto concerns. Vasquez, 895 F.3d at 520 (citing Smith, 538 U.S. at 105-106; see also United States v. Leach, 639 F.3d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 2011)).^[1]The Supreme Court explained that “our criminal law tradition insists on public indictment, public trial, and public imposition of a sentence” and that the criminal system “does not treat dissemination of truthful information in furtherance of a legitimate governmental objective as punishment.” Smith, 538 U.S. at 99. The Supreme Court further reasoned that registering does not impose “physical restraints” and is “less harsh than the sanctions of occupational debarment, which we have held to be nonpunitive.” Id. Finally, the Court reasoned that landlords and employers could conduct background checks on the criminal records of prospective tenants or employees, undermining an argument that the registry will make registrants unemployable or less able to access housing. Id. The Supreme Court summarized that any negative consequences “flow not from the Act's registration and dissemination provisions, but from the fact of conviction, already a matter of public record.” Id. at 101. While the Supreme Court was...