Chatman v. Perdue

NADINE CHATMAN, Plaintiff, v. SONNY PERDUE, SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17-1826 (JEB)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

October 15, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Pro se Plaintiff Nadine M. Chatman, a Black woman over the age of 40, held a temporary-employment position at the United States Department of Agriculture from 2011 to 2015. Unhappy with the environment there and the agency's refusal to extend her stint, she brought this suit alleging a hodgepodge of discriminatory and retaliatory actions by her various supervisors in violation of Title VII and the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. She further contends that she was subjected to a hostile workplace at USDA, and that she is entitled to relief on several common-law tort claims.

Defendant Sonny Perdue, Secretary of Agriculture, now moves for summary judgment, contending that no reasonable jury could find that Plaintiff suffered discrimination or retaliation or experienced a hostile environment, and that the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider her remaining claims. Agreeing that her accumulation of perceived slights is both legally insufficient and factually unsupported, the Court will grant Defendant's Motion.

I. Background

A. Factual Background

In assessing motions for summary judgment, courts must set out the facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Talavera v. Shah, 638 F.3d 303, 308 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A principal mechanism is the comparison of the parties' statements of disputed or undisputed material facts. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); LCvR 7(h)(1). While Chatman here challenges many of the Government's facts, her "Statement Regarding Disputed Issues" is entirely devoid of the record citations that Federal Rule 56(c)(1) requires. See ECF No. 38 (Pl. Opp.) at 2-3. Similarly, her more general statement of facts contains few citations and digresses to various topics bearing little relevance to her legal claims. Id. at 3-11. Although the Court will not "accept facts that do not cite support from the record or conclusions masquerading as facts," Johnson v. Wash. Metro. Area Transit Auth., 314 F. Supp. 3d 215, 216 (D.D.C. 2018), it nevertheless endeavors here to set out the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. A brief overview will suffice, as more details about the specific incidents underlying her claims — to the extent the Court can discern them — appear in the Analysis. See infra Section III.

Chatman began working at USDA in October 2011 as a temporary employee with a set term of up to four years. See ECF No. 35 (Def. SMF), ¶¶ 2, 5-6; ECF No. 39 (Def. Reply), Exh. 2 (Documents) at ECF p. 8 (5/8/14 EEO Investigative Report). After starting as a Program Specialist in the agency's Equal Employment Opportunity Conflict Office, she was reassigned in October 2012 to the Corporate Services Division (CSD) in the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights (OASCR), where she remained until the expiration of her appointment in September 2015. See Def. SMF, ¶¶ 1-2, 10. In that role, Plaintiff informed aggrieved individuals of their rights and obligations under equal-employment laws, performed complaintintake, and attempted to effect informal resolutions between the individuals and the agency. See ECF No. 35 (MSJ), Exh. 16 (Documents) at ECF pp. 71-73 (Chatman EEO Affidavit); U.S. Equal Emp't Opportunity Comm'n, Equal Employment Opportunity Pre-Complaint Processing (Feb. 20, 2020), https://bit.ly/3lnsCl4.

According to Chatman, her work environment became increasingly hostile beginning in February 2013, when her first-level supervisor, Barbara Moore, implied that she was mentally disabled and made a handful of other comments that Plaintiff found intimidating and harassing. See Pl. Opp., Exh. 12 (5/7/13 EEO Complaint) at ECF p. 32; MSJ, Exh. J (11/6/19 Chatman Depo.) at 36-37, 41, 43-44. That same month, her fourth-level supervisor, Joe Leonard, accused a group of employees including Plaintiff of stealing and hiding EEO complaint files. See Def. Reply, Exh. 2 at ECF pp. 2-3 (Jackson EEO Affidavit); 5/8/14 EEO Investigative Report at ECF pp. 20, 22; Def. SMF, ¶ 12. She also points to an undefined "relationship" between Leonard and Candace Glover — who supervised Plaintiff in her final year of employment, see Def. SMF, ¶ 11; Def. Reply, Exh. 1 (Documents) at ECF p. 23 (Glover EEO Affidavit) — as well as a "sexually charged" culture within OASCR that further contributed to a hostile working environment. See Pl. Opp. at 20, 34-35; Chatman EEO Affidavit at ECF p. 54.

Aggrieved by these and other incidents, Chatman states that she filed her first EEO complaint in April 2013 (though Defendant suggests her initial filing did not actually come until May). Compare Pl. Opp. at 23; 11/6/19 Chatman Depo. at 82, with MSJ at 3; 5/8/14 EEO Investigative Report at ECF p. 39. As the perceived transgressions accumulated over the ensuing two years, Plaintiff was not shy about registering her unhappiness, filing a host of additional EEO complaints alleging discrimination, retaliation, and harassment, along with an August 2014 complaint with the Office of Special Counsel regarding poor management and insufficientoversight within OASCR. See MSJ at 2-5 (citing seven EEO complaints); Chatman EEO Affidavit at ECF p. 100; id. at pp. 144-49 (final OSC report).

Chatman's situation, however, did not improve. She contends that management began attempting to reassign her in mid-2013, pointing in particular to one proposed transfer to another division within USDA, though no reassignment ultimately occurred. See Def. Reply, Exh. 1 at ECF p. 154 (3/15/16 Chatman Depo.); 5/8/14 EEO Investigative Report at ECF pp. 195, 200; Pl. Opp. at 22-24. She also indicates that her 2014 performance-evaluation rating was suddenly adjusted from "Outstanding" to the lower level of "Superior." MSJ, Exh. L (2014 Performance Appraisal) at ECF pp. 2-3; id., Exh. 14 (2014/2015 Report of Investigation) at 116-17. Further, she objects to the process surrounding her 2015 application — and ultimate non-selection — for a permanent position as an equal-employment specialist within OASCR. See Glover EEO Affidavit at ECF p. 44; Pl. Opp. at 30-31.

Chatman's employment at USDA concluded on September 29, 2015, pursuant to the terms of her initial appointment. See Def. SMF, ¶ 17.

B. Procedural Background

As a result of the aforementioned episodes — as well as a series of others, which the Court will describe in due course — Plaintiff brought suit in this Court on September 7, 2017, filing an Amended Complaint on July 2, 2018. See ECF No. 1 (Compl.); ECF No. 15 (Am. Compl.). Although somewhat difficult to decipher, as it touches on an abundance of incidents with varying degrees of relevance, her pleading chiefly asserts discrimination based on race, sex, and age; retaliation for her protected activity; and a hostile work environment. See Am. Compl. at 30-40. Discovery complete, the agency now moves for summary judgment, as well as to dismiss several of Plaintiff's claims for lack of jurisdiction.

II. Legal Standards

Summary judgment may be granted if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986); Holcomb v. Powell, 433 F.3d 889, 895 (D.C. Cir. 2006). A fact is "material" if it is capable of affecting the substantive outcome of the litigation. See Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 248; Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. A dispute is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007); Holcomb, 433 F.3d at 895. "A party asserting that a fact cannot be or is genuinely disputed must support the assertion" by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record" or "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).

When a motion for summary judgment is under consideration, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Liberty Lobby, 477 U.S. at 255; see also Mastro v. PEPCO, 447 F.3d 843, 850 (D.C. Cir. 2006); Aka v. Wash. Hosp. Ctr., 156 F.3d 1284, 1288 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (en banc). On a motion for summary judgment, the court must "eschew making credibility determinations or weighing the evidence." Czekalski v. Peters, 475 F.3d 360, 363 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The non-moving party's opposition, however, must consist of more than mere unsupported allegations or denials and must be supported by affidavits, declarations, or other competent evidence, setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324 (1986). The non-movant, in other words, is required to provideevidence that would permit a reasonable jury to find in her favor. See Laningham v. U.S. Navy, 813 F.2d 1236, 1242 (D.C. Cir. 1987).

Separately, and in addition, Defendant moves to dismiss several of Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(1). In considering such a motion, a court must "treat the complaint's factual allegations as true . . . and must grant plaintiff 'the benefit of all inferences that can be derived from the facts alleged.'" Sparrow v. United Air Lines, Inc., 216 F.3d 1111, 1113 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (quoting Schuler v. United States, 617 F.2d 605, 608 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). It is the plaintiff, however, who bears the burden of proving that the court has subject-matter jurisdiction to hear her claims. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 561 (1992); U.S. Ecology, Inc. v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 231 F.3d 20, 24 (D.C. Cir. 2000). The court has an "affirmative obligation to ensure that it is acting within the scope of its...