Chatman v. Super 8 Motel

ERIC CHATMAN, CDCR #BD-5474, Plaintiff, v. SUPER 8 MOTEL, Oceanside, Defendant.

Case No.: 3:17-cv-02517-DMS-JMA

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

February 15, 2018

ORDER:

1) DENYING MOTION TO PROCEED IN FORMA PAUPERIS [ECF No. 2]

AND

2) DISMISSING CIVIL ACTION FOR FAILING TO STATE A CLAIM PURSUANT TO 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)

ERIC CHATMAN ("Plaintiff"), currently incarcerated at California State Prison Substance Abuse Treatment Facility ("SATF") in Corcoran, California, and proceeding pro se, has filed a five-page Complaint in this Court alleging personal injury, general negligence, and intentional tort claims on a form provided by the Judicial Council of California, and against the Super 8 Motel in Oceanside, California. See ECF No. 1.

Plaintiff has not prepaid the $400 filing fee required to commence civil action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a), instead has he filed a Motion to Proceed In Forma Pauperis ("IFP") pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See ECF No. 2.

I. Motion to Proceed IFP

All parties instituting any civil action, suit or proceeding in a district court of the United States, except an application for writ of habeas corpus, must pay a filing fee of $400. See 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a). An action may proceed despite a plaintiff's failure to prepay the entire fee only if he is granted leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a). See Rodriguez v. Cook, 169 F.3d 1176, 1177 (9th Cir. 1999). However, if the plaintiff is a prisoner at the time of filing, he may be granted leave to proceed IFP, but he nevertheless remains obligated to pay the entire fee in "increments," see Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1185 (9th Cir. 2015), regardless of whether his action is ultimately dismissed. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1) & (2); Taylor v. Delatoore, 281 F.3d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 2002). A "prisoner" is defined as "any person" who at the time of filing is "incarcerated or detained in any facility who is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h); Taylor, 281 F.3d at 847.

In order to comply with the PLRA, prisoners seeking leave to proceed IFP must also submit a "certified copy of the[ir] trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). From the certified trust account statement, the Court assesses an initial payment of 20% of (a) the average monthly deposits in the account for the past six months, or (b) the average monthly balance in the account for the past six months, whichever is greater, unless the prisoner has no assets. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1), (4); see Taylor, 281 F.3d at 850. Thereafter, the institution having custody of the prisoner collects subsequent payments, assessed at 20% of the preceding month's income, in any month in which the prisoner's account exceeds $10, and forwards them to the Court until the entire filing fee is paid. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

While Plaintiff has filed a Motion to Proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), he has not attached a certified copy of his SATF trust account statements for the 6-monthperiod immediately preceding the filing of his Complaint. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2); S.D. CAL. CIVLR 3.2. Section 1915(a)(2) clearly requires that prisoners "seeking to bring a civil action ... without prepayment of fees ... shall submit a certified copy of the trust fund account statement (or institutional equivalent) ... for the 6-month period immediately preceding the filing of the complaint." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2) (emphasis added).

Without Plaintiff's trust account statements, Plaintiff's IFP Motion is incomplete and must be DENIED because the Court is unable to assess the appropriate amount of the initial filing fee statutorily required to initiate the prosecution of this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1).

II. Screening of Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)

In addition, while the Court would ordinarily grant Plaintiff leave to correct his IFP Motion's deficiencies, it instead finds it appropriate to screen his Complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) because at the time of filing Plaintiff was, and remains, "incarcerated or detained in any facility [because he] is accused of, convicted of, sentenced for, or adjudicated delinquent for, violations of criminal law or the terms or conditions of parole, probation, pretrial release, or diversionary program." Olivas v. Nevada ex rel. Dept. of Corr., 856 F.3d 1281, 1284 (9th Cir. 2017) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1915(h), 1915A(c); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(h)).

A. Standard of Review

If a prisoner's complaint "seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity," the Court "shall review" the pleading "as soon as practicable after docketing," and "dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if [it] ... is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted." 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (b)(1); Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 907 n.1 (9th Cir. 2014).

Here, Plaintiff claims he was "jumped and robbed" "by a few guys" while he was recycling on the property of the Super 8 Motel in Oceanside, California sometime"around 2016-2017." See Compl., ECF No. 1 at 4-6. He seeks $370,000,000 in damages against the "[w]hole motel," "plus 100%" of the "company" for his personal injuries and medical expenses based on claims of negligence and premises liability under California law. Id. at 4. Plaintiff does not seek redress from or name governmental actors as Defendants. Id. at 1-2. Therefore, § 1915A(a)'s screening provisions do not apply. See Chavez v. Robinson, 817 F.3d 1162, 1168 (9th Cir. 2016) ("Section 1915A mandates early review ... for all complaints 'in which a prisoner seeks relief from a governmental entity...") (quoting § 1915A(a)); see also Thompson v. Hicks, 213 Fed. Appx. 939, 2007 WL 106785 at *3 (11th Cir. 2007) (noting that because a private defendant was not a "governmental entity" as described in § 1915A, prisoner's complaint as to that defendant was not subject to dismissal under § 1915A).

However, because Plaintiff has filed a motion requesting leave to proceed IFP pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a), his Complaint is still subject to a sua sponte review, and mandatory dismissal, if it is "frivolous, malicious, fail[s] to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek[s] monetary relief from a defendant immune from such relief," regardless of whether he seeks redress from a "governmental entity." See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B); Coleman v. Tollefson, 135 S. Ct. 1759, 1763 (2015) (pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) "the court shall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—(A) the allegation of poverty is untrue; or (B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or] (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted."); Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1127 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) ("[S]ection 1915(e) not only permits, but requires a district court to dismiss an in forma pauperis complaint that fails to state a claim.").

"The standard for determining whether a plaintiff has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standard for failure to state a claim." Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012).

/// To survive a motion to dismiss, the complaint must contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Detailed factual allegations are not required, but "[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). "Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief [is] . . . a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Id. The "mere possibility of misconduct" falls short of meeting this plausibility standard. Id.; see also Moss v. U.S. Secret Service, 572 F.3d 962, 969 (9th Cir. 2009).

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity, and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; see also Resnick v. Hayes, 213 F.3d 443, 447 (9th Cir. 2000) ("[W]hen determining whether a complaint states a claim, a court must accept as true all allegations of material fact and must construe those facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff."). However, while the court "ha[s] an obligation where the petitioner is pro se, particularly in civil rights cases, to construe the pleadings liberally and to afford the petitioner the benefit of any doubt," Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th Cir. 2010) (citing Bretz v. Kelman, 773 F.2d 1026, 1027 n.1 (9th Cir. 1985)), it may not "supply essential elements of claims that were not initially pled." Ivey v. Board of Regents of the University of Alaska, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982).

B. Plaintiff's Allegations

As noted above, Plaintiff seeks to sue the Super 8 Motel in Oceanside, based on allegations that he was attacked on their property sometime "around 2016-2017." See ECF No. 1 at 5. Plaintiff has since submitted several letters addressed to the Court in an attempt to "explain the details," increase his request for damages to reimburse his ex-wife for alimony, see ECF No. 4 at 2-3, and to re-iterate that he was "helping out the U.S. soldiers" at the time he was attacked, and "could have died" as the result of the"excessive force" used by the "four guys" who jumped him. See ECF No. 6 at 1-2; ECF No. 8 at 1.

C. 42 U.S.C. § 1983

Section 1983 is a "vehicle...