Chavez v. Capitol View Ii, LLC

VIVIAN K. CHAVEZ, et al. v. CAPITOL VIEW II, LLC, et al.

No. 2026

COURT OF SPECIAL APPEALS OF MARYLAND

September Term, 2016

March 5, 2018

Circuit Court for Prince George's County

Case No. CAL 15-04208

UNREPORTED

Eyler, Deborah S. Friedman, Battaglia, Lynne A. (Senior Judge, Specially Assigned), JJ.

Opinion by Friedman, J.

*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.

The Circuit Court for Prince George's County granted summary judgment for Capitol View, the owner and operator of a Clarion Hotel, after determining that the tort claims brought by Vivian Chavez as the representative of the estate of Jesse Chavez were barred by the exclusivity provision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Jesse Chavez worked as a restaurant supervisor in a restaurant attached to the Clarion Hotel National Harbor, which is owned and operated by Capitol View II, LLC. On the night of his death, Jesse was working in the restaurant when he heard screaming from the lobby. He ran to the lobby and encountered an armed robber demanding money from the Hotel's concierge at gunpoint. Jesse confronted the armed robber, but after a brief struggle, the robber shot and killed him.

Following Jesse's death, Vivian filed a lawsuit against Capitol View in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County alleging negligence, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, survival, and wrongful death. Vivian generally argued that the hotel was located in a dangerous neighborhood and that, had Capitol View implemented heightened security measures similar to those adopted by other hotels in the area, Jesse's death could have been prevented.

Capitol View filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that because Jesse was an employee of Capitol View and his death occurred while he was at work, Vivian could only pursue a remedy under the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act. In support of its motion, Capitol View attached an affidavit from J. Raphael Della Ratta, President ofCapitol View's management company. The affidavit established that Capitol View owned and operated the Clarion Hotel and its attached restaurant at all relevant times. It also established that Jesse was a long-term employee on Capitol View's payroll, that Capitol View set Jesse's wages, work schedule, and oversaw his work, and that Jesse was working a scheduled shift at the time of his death. Vivian did not provide an affidavit of her own to contradict the facts presented by Capitol View.¹

The circuit court held a hearing on the motion for summary judgment in which it concluded that Vivian had failed to establish any dispute of material fact. The circuit court found that Capitol View was Jesse's employer and that Jesse's death occurred in the course of his employment with Capitol View. Therefore, the circuit court concluded that the Workers' Compensation Act provided Vivian's exclusive remedy. Vivian noted this timely appeal.

DISCUSSION

Vivian raises three challenges to the circuit court's grant of summary judgment. First, Vivian argues that no employer-employee relationship existed between Capitol View and Jesse, and therefore that the exclusivity provision of the Maryland Workers' Compensation Act does not apply. Second, Vivian argues that, even if an employer-employee relationship did exist, Jesse's death did not occur in the course of his employment, and thus is not a compensable accidental personal injury under the Workers'Compensation Act. Finally, Vivian argues that the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act, as applied in this case, violates Article 19 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights.

I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

We review an order granting a motion for summary judgment without deference to the circuit court. Todd v. Mass Transit Admin., 373 Md. 149, 154 (2003). A grant of summary judgment is proper when the circuit court determines that there is no dispute of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Md. Rule 2-501(f). A motion for summary judgment that is based on facts not contained in the record must be supported by an affidavit. Md. Rule 2-501(a). Likewise, "a response asserting the existence of a material fact or controverting any fact contained in the record shall be supported by an affidavit or other written statement under oath." Md. Rule 2-501(b). Appropriate affidavits must be (1) "made upon personal knowledge;" (2) "set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence;" and (3) "show affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated." Md. Rule 2-501(c). We construe the facts properly before the court as contained in either the record or a supporting affidavit, along with any inference that may reasonably be drawn from them, in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Laing v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 180 Md. App. 136, 152-53 (2008). Here, if we conclude that no dispute of material fact exists, we must then determine whether the circuit court properly granted judgment to Capitol View as a matter of law. See Todd, 373 Md. at 155.

II. WORKERS' COMPENSATION ACT

To qualify for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, an individual must be a "covered employee." Md. Code Labor and Employment ("LE") § 9-202. The act provides that "[a]n individual ... is presumed to be a covered employee while in the service of an employer under an express ... contract of ... hire." LE § 9-202(a). If a covered employee suffers a work-related injury that is eligible for compensation under the Act, "the compensation provided under [the Workers' Compensation Act] to a covered employee or the dependents of a covered employee is in place of any right of action against any person." LE § 9-509(b). This exclusivity provision, therefore, bars a covered employee, or his or her estate, from pursuing any legal remedy for the injury outside of workers' compensation benefits.

In light of the Workers' Compensation Act's exclusivity provision, to review whether the circuit court erred in granting Capitol View's motion for summary judgment, we must first consider if a dispute of material fact existed as to whether there was an employer-employee relationship between Capitol View and Jesse. If, as we conclude, there is no dispute, we must then determine whether the circuit court erred in its legal conclusion that Jesse's death was an accidental injury that occurred in the course of his employment with Capitol View and was thus compensable under the Workers' Compensation Act.

1. Employer-Employee Relationship

Vivian argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that an employer-employee relationship existed between Jesse and Capitol View. Specifically, she contends that there are two legal entities that go by the name "Capitol View:" a limited partnership (the "LP"),and a limited liability company (the "LLC"). She argues that Jesse was employed by the LP, rather than the LLC, because the LP's signature appeared on Jesse's paychecks, tax documents, and unemployment forms. Because she alleges that the LP and LLC are separate, distinct, entities, Vivian argues that the circuit court erred in concluding that there was no dispute of material fact as to the existence of an employer-employee relationship between Jesse and Capitol View.

According to the facts produced in the affidavit that accompanied Capitol View's motion for summary judgment, when Capitol View was formed in 1982, it registered as a limited partnership and did business under the name Capitol View, LP. Capitol View then converted from a limited partnership to a limited liability company in 1999. The conversion, Capitol View's affidavit explains, involved a full transfer of property and assets from the LP to the LLC, the drafting and signing of an operating agreement, and registry with the State of Maryland. Since 1999, the affidavit states that Capitol View has exclusively held itself out to the public as an LLC. Capitol View has, however, continued to file tax documents under the tax ID number originally assigned to it by the IRS when it first formed as an LP.²

The affidavit of Della Ratta submitted by Capitol View states that the LP and LLC successfully merged in 1999 and that since that time, the entities are effectively one and the same, doing business as the LLC. Based on these facts, the LLC was, at all relevant times, Jesse's employer. Though Vivian could have opposed Della Ratta's affidavit with facts admissible in summary judgment proceedings, see Md. Rule 2-501(b), Vivian conducted no discovery and did not submit an affidavit of her own. Capitol View's factual allegations, therefore, went uncontradicted. In our review of a motion for summary judgment, we are confined to the facts contained in the summary judgment record. Prince George's Cnty. v. The Washington Post Co., 149 Md. App. 289, 305 (2003). As a result, there is no dispute of any material fact with respect to the employer-employee relationship between Capitol View and Jesse because the summary judgment record established that the LLC was Jesse's employer at the time of his death. Md. Rule 2-501(f).³

2. Accidental Personal Injury In the Course of Employment

Vivian argues next that Jesse's death was not an accidental work injury suffered in the course of his employment, and therefore his death is not covered under the Workers'Compensation Act. To qualify for benefits under the Workers' Compensation Act, a covered employee must suffer an "accidental personal injury." LE § 9-501(a). The definition of "accidental personal injury" includes "an injury caused by a willful or negligent act of a third person directed against a covered employee in the course of the employment of the covered employee." LE § 9-101(b)(2). There is no dispute...