Chavez v. State

1

JOE D. CHAVEZ, Petitioner, v. STATE OF NEW MEXICO, Respondents.

No. CIV 19-00496 MV/JFR

United States District Court, D. New Mexico

July 30, 2024

ORDER ADOPTING MAGISTRATE JUDGE'S PROPOSED FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDED DISPOSITION

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Petitioner Joe D Chavez's Amended Petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in State Custody [Doc. 7] and United States Magistrate Judge John F. Robbenhaar's May 28, 2023 Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (“PFRD”) [Doc. 24]. In his PFRD, Magistrate Judge Martinez recommended that the Court deny Petitioner's Amended Petition with prejudice and that the Court decline to issue a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”). On July 24, 2023, Petitioner timely filed his Objections to the Magistrate Judge's Proposed Findings and Recommended Disposition (Doc. 34). On April 9, 2024, this Court entered an Order directing Respondents to file a response to Petitioner's Objections (Doc. 35). On May 29, 2024 Respondents timely filed their response (Doc. 36). Plaintiff's Objections are now before the Court.

Under the legal standards described below, the Court has considered Petitioner's Amended Petition, the Magistrate Judge's PFRD, Petitioner's objections, and Respondents' response to those objections, and has conducted a de novo review. Based on the Court's de novo review, the Court finds that Petitioner's objections to the Magistrate Judge's PFRD are not well-taken and therefore will be overruled.

BACKGROUND

Petitioner was convicted of various offenses in the Twelfth Judicial District Court (Otero County), State of New Mexico, in April 2014. Doc. 19-1 at 130-148. He was convicted of all counts except Count 3 (trafficking - methamphetamine) and Count 5 (trafficking- marijuana). Id. In October 2018, the New Mexico Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentence. Id. at 251-272. The New Mexico Supreme Court denied Petitioner's petition for a writ of certiorari. Id. at 288-89. Petitioner's subsequent request for state habeas relief was dismissed and his attempts to appeal the denial of such habeas relief were unsuccessful. Id. at 429-30, 446, 611. Petitioner then commenced the present federal habeas proceeding. Doc. 7.

STANDARD

District courts may refer dispositive motions to a magistrate judge for a recommended disposition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636 and Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B); Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(1). “Within 14 days after being served with a copy of the [magistrate judge's] recommended disposition, a party may serve and file specific written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(2); 28 U.S.C § 636(b)(1). When resolving objections to a magistrate judge's proposal, “[t]he district judge must determine de novo any part of the magistrate judge's disposition that has been properly objected to. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b)(3); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). The Court may place on the PFRD whatever reliance the Court, “in the exercise of sound discretion,” deems appropriate, see United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676 (1980), but “must . . . modify or set aside any part of the [PFRD] that is clearly erroneous or is contrary to law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(a). A finding is “clearly erroneous” if (1) it is without factual support in the record, (2) the reviewing court is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been made, or (3) the finding is neither plausible nor permissible in light of the entire record on appeal. Stouffer v. Duckworth, 825 F.3d 1167, 1179 (10th Cir. 2016).

“[A] party's objections to the magistrate judge's report and recommendation must be both timely and specific to preserve an issue for de novo review by the district court or for appellate review.” United States v. One Parcel of Real Prop., 73 F.3d 1057, 1060 (10th Cir. 1996). Further, “[i]ssues raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's recommendation are deemed waived.” Marshall v. Chater, 75 F.3d 1421, 1426 (10th Cir. 1996); see also United States v. Garfinkle, 261 F.3d 1030, 1031 (10th Cir. 2001) (“In this circuit, theories raised for the first time in objections to the magistrate judge's report are deemed waived.”). Relatedly, a party's objections must be “sufficiently specific to focus the district court's attention on the factual and legal issues that are truly in dispute[.]” Leal v. United States, 2023 WL 6360864, at *2 (D.N.M. Sept. 29, 2023).

This current stage of the litigation, involving Petitioner's objections, occurs against the backdrop that federal habeas relief is not proper when the petitioner shows only a possible state law error, and not a violation of federal law. See Swarthout v. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011) (reversing federal district court's grant of habeas relief because district court apparently assumed either that federal habeas relief is available for a state law error, or that the federal due process clause requires a “correct” application of a state law rule, when neither assumption is correct). For purposes of a § 2254 proceeding, a petitioner is only entitled to relief if he demonstrates that the state court's adjudication of his claims “resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States” or “resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.” 8 U.S.C. § 2254(d); see Welch v. Workman, 639 F.3d 980, 991-92 (10th Cir. 2011) (after confirming the existence of clearly established federal law, the court can only grant relief if the state court decision is “diametrically different” and “mutually opposed” to that established law).

When petitioners proceed pro se, the court generally construes their pleadings liberally, holding them to a less stringent standard than those that a party represented by counsel files. Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). In so doing, the court makes allowance for pro se litigants' “failure to cite proper legal authority, [their] confusion of various legal theories, [their] poor syntax and sentence construction, or [their] unfamiliarity with pleading requirements.” Id. The court will not, however, construct arguments or search the record for the pro se party. Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005). Issues will be waived if the pro se party's briefing “consists of mere conclusory allegations with no citations to the record or any legal authority for support.” Id.

DISCUSSION

Petitioner presents four arguments in support of his Objections: (1) the federal government's seizure of his property and his state criminal prosecution resulted in a violation of his double jeopardy rights; (2) insufficient evidence supported his convictions for racketeering, money laundering, and related conspiracies; (3) erroneous jury instructions deprived him of a fair trial; and (4) he received ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court addresses these arguments in turn.

I. Double Jeopardy

In his Objections, Petitioner states that he “agrees” with the Magistrate Judge that the State “may not” have violated double jeopardy because the federal government's property seizure was filed under “dual sovereignty[.]” Doc. 34 at 1. Petitioner thus appears to acknowledge the principle that federal and state prosecutions generally will not violate double jeopardy because the federal government and a particular state are considered separate sovereigns. United States v. Barrett, 496 F.3d 1079, 1118-19 (10th Cir. 2007). Nonetheless, Petitioner, asserts that the property was “seized arbitrarily” by the State, and notes that he was acquitted of two trafficking counts. Neither of these assertions establishes a double jeopardy issue. Nor does Petitioner explain how the PFRD contains legal error in its conclusion that there was no double jeopardy violation. Id. at 1-2. Accordingly, the Court will overrule Petitioner's objection to the PFRD's recommendation that this Court deny his claim for relief based on double jeopardy.

II. Sufficiency of the Evidence to Support Petitioner's Convictions

Petitioner next argues that “due to the acquittals of counts 3 and 5 of the indictment, the evidence is insufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that petitioner committed at least two crimes that constitute racketeering” because, according to Petitioner, counts 3 and 5 were the only two possible offenses that could constitute racketeering. Doc. 34 at 3-4. This is not an accurate statement of the law. See United States v. Johnson, 911 F.3d 1394, 1403-04 (10th Cir. 1990) (government established predicate acts of racketeering sufficient to justify defendant's conviction on RICO charge, noting that defendant must have “committed” at least two racketeering-related crimes, not that he must have been convicted of such). Petitioner's acquittal on the trafficking counts does not, in and of itself, negate the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his racketeering convictions.

As the Magistrate Judge explained, evidence is sufficient to support a conviction so long as “after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). “[W]hile the evidence supporting the conviction must be ‘substanti...