Chenari v. George Wash. Univ.

847 F.3d 740

Sina CHENARI, Appellant

v.GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY, Appellee

No. 16-7055

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit.

Argued January 11, 2017

Decided February 10, 2017

Jason J. Bach argued the cause and filed the briefs for appellant. Tracy D. Rezvani, Washington, DC, entered an appearance.

Nicholas S. McConnell, Washington, DC, argued the cause for appellee. With him on the brief was James N. Markels, Washington, DC.

Before: Tatel, Millett, and Wilkins, Circuit Judges.

Tatel, Circuit Judge:

After George Washington University Medical School expelled appellant for cheating on an exam, he brought suit in federal court for breach of contract and discrimination based on disability. The district court granted summary judgment to the University, deferring to its view that appellant broke its honor code and finding no violation of the relevant disability statutes. For the reasons set forth in this opinion, we affirm.

I.

On December 14, 2012, appellant Sina Chenari, a third-year medical student at George Washington University, took the Step 1 Surgery Shelf Exam, a standardized test published by the National Board of Medical Examiners (NBME). Before the exam, the proctor read aloud the instructions from NBME's official Chief Proctor's Manual, including that students must complete the exam in two and a half hours and that "[n]o additional time [would] be allowed for transferring answers" from the test booklet to the answer sheet. Chenari also received a copy of the "Exam Guidelines," which contained a similar warning.

In his deposition, Chenari explained that when the proctor called time, he discovered that he had failed to transfer some twenty or thirty answers from the test booklet to the front side of the answer sheet. According to Chenari, he "panicked" and "continued to transfer my answers." Chenari Dep. 267:7–:9. The proctor "asked me to stop," but "I continued to bubble in [the answer sheet]." Id. at 269:6–:18. When the proctor then "reached over me to try to get the exam, I just put my hand over the booklet and the exam and just continued to bubble in my answers." Id. at 270:3–:6. Once Chenari finished, he "sat back" and the proctor "picked [the exam] up." Id. at 278:21–280:11. As Chenari concedes, he ended up taking an additional "90 seconds to two minutes." Id. at 271:12–:13.

The proctor reported Chenari to the medical school's administration, as did another student present at the exam. In response, Associate Dean for Students Rhonda Goldberg met with Chenari to discuss the incident. According to Goldberg's deposition, Chenari told her that he "needed to" finish bubbling in his answers but "probably made a mistake" by doing so. Goldberg Dep. 23:1–:3.

Pursuant to University procedures, Goldberg formed an Honor Code Council subcommittee to investigate. After holding a hearing, the subcommittee issued a report recommending Chenari's dismissal for academic dishonesty. The subcommittee forwarded its recommendation to the Medical Student Evaluation Committee, and in a written statement to that Committee Chenari took responsibility for his "deplorable behavior" toward the proctor, acknowledging his "clear violation of the most basic rules of th[e] University." Chenari Dep. Ex. 37 at 1. He nonetheless asked for leniency because, he insisted, his "behavior did not involve deception" and he had no prior disciplinary infractions. Id. After a hearing, the Committee unanimously recommended Chenari's dismissal. The Medical School Dean then reviewed the reports, met with Chenari, and upheld the recommendation of dismissal. Now represented by counsel, Chenari appealed to the Provost, arguing in a written submission that his conduct lacked "an element of deceit" like "cheat[ing]" or "l[ying]." Chenari Dep. Ex. 40 at 1. Rather, his "mistake" was "completely out in the open." Id. at 2. The Provost denied the appeal, and the University dismissed Chenari from the medical school.

On May 30, 2014, Chenari filed this action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia seeking reinstatement and damages. He alleged several theories of relief. First, he argued that he never violated the University's Honor Code, so the University's decision to dismiss him breached its contract with him and the contract's implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Second, he claimed that he has a disability, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD), which he alleged the University failed to accommodate in violation of the Rehabilitation Act ("Rehab Act"), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a), and the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Although Chenari also claimed that he suffered from anxiety, he never argued, either here or in the district court, that his anxiety qualified as a disability under the disability statutes. See Adams v. Rice , 531 F.3d 936, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (describing "disability" as a "term of art under the statute[s]"). Finally, Chenari argued that the University discriminated against him for his ADHD and retaliated against him "when he began to advocate for his rights," claims he does not pursue on appeal. Compl. ¶¶ 44, 55. The University moved for summary judgment, which the district court granted. Chenari v. George Washington University , 172 F.Supp.3d 38 (D.D.C. 2016).

II.

We review an order granting summary judgment de novo , viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Foster v. Sedgwick Claims Management Services, Inc. , 842 F.3d 721, 725 (D.C. Cir. 2016). Summary judgment is appropriate if the movant, here the University, "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). "A dispute about a material fact is ‘genuine’ if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Johnson v. Perez , 823 F.3d 701, 705 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (alteration, internal quotation marks, and citation omitted). We begin with Chenari's contract claims.

A.

Under District of Columbia law, which governs here, " ‘the relationship between a university and its students is contractual in nature.’ " Manago v. District of Columbia , 934 A.2d 925, 927 (D.C. 2007) (quoting Basch v. George Washington University , 370 A.2d 1364, 1366 (D.C. 1977) (per curiam)). In breach of contract cases against a university, "a judgment by school officials that a student has not performed adequately to meet the school's academic standards is a determination that usually calls for judicial deference."

Alden v. Georgetown University , 734 A.2d 1103, 1108 (D.C. 1999). This rule stems from the principle that a diploma publicly signals a school's confidence in a student's knowledge and skills, so the " ‘decisions surrounding the issuance of these credentials [should] be left to the sound judgment of the professional educators who monitor the progress of their students on a regular basis.’ " Id. at 1109 (quoting Olsson v. Board of Higher Education , 49 N.Y.2d 408, 426 N.Y.S.2d 248, 402 N.E.2d 1150, 1153 (1980) ). A university "will be entitled to summary judgment unless the plaintiff can provide some evidence from which a fact finder could conclude that there was no rational basis for the decision or that it was motivated by bad faith or ill will unrelated to academic performance." Id. (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Similarly, to show that a university breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, a plaintiff must allege "either bad faith or conduct that is arbitrary and capricious" and, in resolving such cases, courts must not "substitut[e] their judgment improperly for the academic judgment of the school." Wright v. Howard University , 60 A.3d 749, 754–55 (D.C. 2013) (alteration and internal quotation marks omitted) (citing Allworth v. Howard University , 890 A.2d 194, 202 (D.C. 2006) ; Alden , 734 A.2d at 1111 n.11 ). True, all these cases involve decisions about academic performance, not honor code violations, but Chenari does not argue—nor do we decide—that a different standard should apply here. Cf. Hajjar – Nejad v. George Washington University , 37 F.Supp.3d 90, 116–18 (D.D.C. 2014) ("[C]ourts have concluded that, particularly for medical students , professional comportment issues fall under the umbrella of deference to academic decisions."). Because the standards for breach of contract and implied covenant cases overlap, we address Chenari's two claims together.

The University dismissed Chenari for violating its Honor Code. Section F(2)(a) of that Code prohibits students from "giv[ing] or receiv[ing]" unpermitted aid on tests and assignments, plagiarizing, falsifying reports, infringing on the rights of other students, or "violat[ing] any other commonly understood principles of academic honesty." Goldberg Decl. Ex. A at 8. The University concluded that Chenari violated the Code's "any other" clause by "knowingly continu[ing] to fill in his answers on his answer sheet after time was called and until he completed his answer sheet despite having been instructed by a university proctor three times to stop doing so." Chenari Dep. Ex. 37 at 4. We agree with the district court that this represents a perfectly "rational basis" for disciplining Chenari. Alden , 734 A.2d at 1109. As the district court explained, Chenari "stole time," gaining "an unfair advantage over the peers who adhered to the rules"—an obvious breach of an Honor Code that prohibits violation of "commonly understood principles of academic honesty." Chenari , 172 F.Supp.3d at 49 ; see Alden, 734 A.2d at 1111 ("Far from lacking a rational basis for dismissal, the Committee on Students had sufficient academic evidence in the record from which to determine that Alden should be dropped from the school's rolls.").

Chenari nonetheless argues, for four separate reasons, that the University's decision lacked a rational basis. First, he points out that the proctor...