Chidume v. Greenburgh-N. Castle Union Free Sch. Dist.

PATRICK CHIDUME, Plaintiff, v. GREENBURGH-NORTH CASTLE UNION FREE SCHOOL DISTRICT;CAROLYN MCGUFFOG, SUPERINTENDENT OF SCHOOLS;ROBIN LEVINE, DIRECTOR OF PUPIL PERSONNEL;ROBERT HENDRICKSON, FORMER INTERIMPRINCIPAL OF CLARK SCHOOL/BOARD PRESIDENT, Defendants.

18-cv-01790 (PMH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

May 4, 2020

OPINION AND ORDER

Defendants Greenburg-North Castle Union Free School District (the "District") and three individual defendants Superintendent of Schools Carolyn McGuffog ("McGuffog"), Director of Pupil Personnel Robin Levine ("Levine"), and former Interim Principal of Clark School Board/current Board President Robert Hendrickson ("Hendrickson") (collectively, "Defendants"), move to dismiss plaintiff Patrick Chidume's ("Plaintiff") Second Amended Complaint dated October 11, 2018. (Doc. 24, "SAC"). Plaintiff's SAC alleges that while he was a teacher in the District, he was subjected to race and national origin discrimination, retaliation, constructive discharge, defamation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress by Defendants.¹ This is the Defendants' second motion to dismiss the SAC pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. Rules 12(b)(2) and 12(b)(6).² For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion to dismiss is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. The claims against McGuffog, Levine and Hendricksonare dismissed in their entirety. The only claims that remain are Plaintiff's Title VII claims of retaliation and violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 insofar as asserted against the District, as more specifically set forth herein.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is plausible on its face "when the pleaded [facts] allow[] the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id. The factual allegations pled "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

"When there are well-pleaded factual allegations [in the complaint], a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the court must "take all well-plead factual allegations as true, and all reasonable inferences are drawn and viewed in a light most favorable to the plaintiff[]." Leeds v. Meltz, 85 F.3d 51, 53 (2d Cir. 1996). However, the presumption of truth does not extend to "legal conclusions, and threadbare recitals of the elements of the cause of action." Harris v. Mills, 572 F.3d 66, 72 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662). A plaintiff must provide "more than labels and conclusions" to show entitlement to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555.

ANALYSIS

As an initial matter, with regard to Defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2), Plaintiff had until September 30, 2019 to effectuate service on Defendants. (See, Docs. 34, 41). AsDefendants indicate in their moving papers, at the time of their service of the instant motion, all Defendants except for Levine had been served with process. (See Doc. 46, "Defs.' Mem. of Law in Support" at 10; Docs. 36-39). As demonstrated by proof of service, Levine was personally served within the deadline set by the Court (see Doc. 42), and therefore this Court has personal jurisdiction over all Defendants. Accordingly, the branch of Defendants' motion seeking dismissal pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) is denied. The Court will thus proceed with an analysis of the remaining branch of Defendants' motion pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).

I. Plaintiff's First Claim for Relief (Title VII)

Defendants argue that the first claim for relief alleging a violation of Title VII by the District for race and national origin discrimination and for retaliation should be dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.

A. Race and National Origin Discrimination

Annexed to Defendants' motion is the EEOC Notice of Charge of Discrimination and Plaintiff's verified complaint to the State Division of Human Rights ("NYSDHR") ("EEOC Charge"). (See, Doc. 45 "McGuffog Aff.", Ex. B).

In situations where exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to bringing suit, a court may take judicial notice of the records and reports of the relevant administrative bodies, as well as the facts set forth therein. Wilson v. New York City Police Dep't, 09-CV-2632, 2011 WL 1215031, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 4, 2011), report and recommendation adopted, 2011 WL 1215735 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 25, 2011); see also, Smart v. Goord, 441 F.Supp.2d 631, 637-38 (S.D.N.Y.2006) (Sweet, D.J.), amended in part, 04-CV-8850, 2008 WL 591230 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2008); Dutton v. Swissport USA, Inc., 04-CV-3417, 2005 WL 1593969 at *1 n. 1 (E.D.N.Y. July 1, 2005). Thus, the EEOC Charge may properly be considered by the Court on this motion, as this is a situationwhere exhaustion of administrative remedies is a prerequisite to bringing suit, and these documents are integral to Plaintiff's SAC. See Wilson, 2011 WL 1215031, at *6.

Defendants argue that Plaintiff merely checked off the boxes for race and national origin discrimination in the EEOC Charge, but in the factual recitation submitted in support of the charges, Plaintiff did not charge any of the Defendants with engaging in any acts of race or national origin discrimination. The Court agrees. The facts submitted by Plaintiff in support of the EEOC Charge solely assert that McGuffog had discriminated and retaliated against plaintiff for his exercise of his right as a union president to submit the group grievance which he had submitted to McGuffog on or about July 1, 2017. See, McGuffog Aff. Ex. B. No allegations of race or national origin discrimination are forthcoming (except insofar as those boxes are checked) and the thrust of the EEOC Charge sounds in anti-union animus. See, id. Indeed, Plaintiff's EEOC Charge states, in relevant part, as follows:

4. The preponderance reason for this instant transmogrification lies in the fact that on June 1st, 2017, I did file a grievance on behalf of the 42 teaching assistants that she unlawfully terminated on May 9, 2017...

10. I am alleging that Ms. McGuffog has, for all intensive [sic] and practical purposes, engaged in acts of discrimination, harassment and retaliation against me for administering the collective bargaining agreement as union president. Moreover, she has engaged in "union busting" tactics with the explicit intention to intimidate, instill fears, discourage, punish and prevent me from exercising the right of an organized labor union. These unprofessional acts are in violation of both the school district policy #0111 (ANTI-HARASSMENT IN THE SCHOOL DISTRICT AND RETALIATION) and ARTICLE III (UNION RIGHTS), Item # "C" of the Collective Bargaining Agreement.

Id.

Exhaustion of administrative remedies "is ordinarily 'an essential element' of a Title VII claim," although "[c]laims not raised in an EEOC complaint ... may be brought in federal court if they are 'reasonably related' to the claim filed with the agency." Williams v. N.Y.C. Hous. Auth.,458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Legnani v. Alitalia Linee Aeree Italiane, S.P.A., 274 F.3d 683, 686 (2001)); Butts v. City of New York Dep't of Hous. Pres. & Dev., 990 F.2d 1397, 1401 (2d Cir. 1993), superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Hawkins v. 1115 Legal Serv. Care, 163 F.3d 684, 693 (2d Cir. 1998); see also Amin v. Akzo Nobel Chem., Inc., 282 F. App'x 958, 960-61 (2d Cir. 2008). As the Second Circuit has recognized, "[a] claim is considered reasonably related if the conduct complained of would fall within the scope of the EEOC investigation which can reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge that was made." Fitzgerald v. Henderson, 251 F.3d 345, 359-60 (2d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The "central question" is whether the EEOC Charge gave that "agency adequate notice to investigate discrimination on" the bases alleged. Mathirampuzha v. Potter, 548 F.3d 70, 77 (2d Cir. 2008); Williams v. New York City Hous. Auth., 458 F.3d 67, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Deravin v. Kerik, 335 F.3d 195, 202 (2d Cir. 2003). "Generally, courts dismiss claims that are so qualitatively different from the allegations contained in an EEOC charge that an investigation would not likely encompass the new allegations." Senno v. Elmsford Union Free Sch. Dist., 812 F. Supp. 2d 454, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2011) (citing Mathirampuzha, 548 F.3d at 74-78).

"In this inquiry, 'the focus should be on the factual allegations made in the [EEOC] charge itself, describing the discriminatory conduct about which a plaintiff is grieving.'" Williams, 458 F.3d at 70 (citing Deravin, 335 F.3d at 201).

As the Court further explained in Wilson:

[I]t is well-settled that merely checking a box, or failing to check a box does not necessarily control the scope of the charge. The more critical analysis is whether there is any explanation or description supporting a particular claim. Just as a plaintiff would not be precluded from bringing a retaliation claim simply because he checked the wrong box on his administrative charge (provided that he alleged facts supporting such a claim), the fact that [plaintiff] checked the box for retaliation does not mean that he can now bring such aclaim in this action even though he alleged no facts in his administrative charge related to retaliation.

Wilson, 2011 WL 1215031, at *9.

Accordingly, Plaintiff's Title VII claims of discrimination based upon race and national origin are dismissed for failing to exhaust administrative...