Chien v. U.S. Sec. Exch. Comm'n

ANDREW CHIEN, pro se, Plaintiff, v. U.S. SECURITIES EXCHANGE COMMISSION and the UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Defendants.¹

Civil Action No. 17-2334 (CKK)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

September 28, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION

The Court has previously outlined the background of this case in its prior September 23, 2019 Memorandum Opinion, which it expressly incorporates here. See Sept. 23, 2019 Mem. Op., ECF No. 52, at 3-7. The Court has now received Plaintiff's Motion for Reconsideration Due to Rule 59(e), ECF No. 57. Plaintiff filed an "Amendment of Motion for Reconsideration Due to Rule 59(e)," ECF No. 60, approximately twenty-four days later. He further filed a "Second Amendment of Motion for Reconsideration Due to Rule 59(e) by Adding Hester M. Peirce, Elad L Roisman, and Allison Herren Lee, as Defendants for Rule 57 Declaratory Judgment Based on Rule 15(d)," ECF No. 63, approximately six months later. Although it is far from clear that Plaintiff has complied with either the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or the Local Rules, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 15; Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e), because Defendants had the opportunity to file oppositions to Plaintiff's first and third filings, see ECF Nos. 58 and 65, and in light of Plaintiff's pro se status, the Court will exercise its discretion and at least consider each of Plaintiff's three filings in rulingon his motion for reconsideration.² Upon consideration of the pleadings,³ the relevant legal authorities, and the record as a whole, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions for reconsideration.⁴

I. LEGAL STANDARD

Rule 59(e) permits a party to file a motion to alter or amend a judgment within twenty-eight days of the entry of that judgment. Fed. R. Civ. P. 59(e). Motions under Rule 59(e) are "disfavored," and the moving party bears the burden of establishing "extraordinary circumstances" warranting relief from a final judgment. Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F. Supp. 2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001). Rule 59(e) motions are "discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice." Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks omitted). Rule 59(e) does not provide a vehicle "to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment." Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting C. Wright & A. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed.1995)).

II. DISCUSSION

Plaintiff presents three primary arguments in support of his motions for reconsideration. His last motion also seeks to add several Defendants and causes of action to his First Amended Complaint, which the Court dismissed on September 23, 2019. The Court now considers each argument in turn.

A. Service of Then-Defendants Ransom and Stein

First, Plaintiff argues that the Court should reconsider its finding that Plaintiff failed to properly serve then-Defendants Ransom and Stein under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4. All of Plaintiff's arguments raised in relation to this finding are either not new or could have previously been raised. None of them present extraordinary circumstances warranting relief from the prior order dismissing his claims. Regardless, the Court will consider them here.

The Court's previous finding that Plaintiff had failed to serve then-Defendants Ransom and Stein in their individual capacities⁵ was based on the reasoning that under Rule 4(i)(3), a United States officer or employee sued in their individual capacity in this context must be served under Rule 4(e). Sept. 23, 2019 Mem. Op. at 11-12. Pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2), an individual may be served by doing any of the following:

(A) delivering a copy of the summons and of the complaint to the individual personally; (B) leaving a copy of each at the individual's dwelling or usual place of abode with someone of suitable age and discretion who resides there; or (C)delivering a copy of each to an agent authorized by appointment or by law to receive service of process.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(e)(2). The Court found that there was no evidence that either then-Defendant was served in person, or at home, or through an authorized agent pursuant to Rule 4(e)(2). Sept. 23, 2019 Mem. Op. at 12.

Plaintiff's first argument is that serving the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC"), and not the individual Defendants, was sufficient here. Pl.'s First Mot. at 1. However, as Rules 4(i) and 4(e) demonstrate, to the extent that Plaintiff intended to sue Defendants Ransom and Stein in their individual capacities, that is, in fact, insufficient. Plaintiff provides no authority suggesting otherwise. He also claims that Rule 4(e)(1) justified the use of certified mail here, as he served then-Defendants in accordance with the D.C. Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Pl.'s First Mot. at 2. Plaintiff previously advanced both of these arguments in relation to the earlier Motion. See Obj. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 41, at 11-12; Suppl. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 46, at 7. Even so, Plaintiff overlooks that D.C. Superior Court Rule of Civil Procedure 4(i)(3) mirrors Federal Rule 4(i)(3), and requires service under Superior Court Rule 4(e), (f), and (g) which mirror Federal Rules 4(e), (f), and (g), and thus the D.C. Superior Court Rules do not allow service via certified mail as Plaintiff claims. Plaintiff's reliance on this Court's decision in another case, Electronic Privacy Center v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Case No. 19-cv-279, see Pl.'s First Mot. at 2, is also unavailing as it is inapposite; there were no individual defendants being sued in their individual capacities in that case, see Electronic Privacy Center v. U.S. Customs and Border Protection, Case No. 19-cv-279, ECF No. 1, at ¶ 7 (naming only a federal agency as a defendant). Lastly, Defendants did not waive their jurisdictional defenses bymaking an appearance in this matter.⁶ See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b); Hook & Ackerman v. Hirsh, 98 F. Supp. 477, 478 (D.D.C. 1951) ("[R]ule 12(b) permits the joinder of the defense of lack of jurisdiction with any defense on the merits and therefore a party although actually before the court does not waive his jurisdictional defenses.").

Accordingly, Plaintiff has not met the standard for reconsideration here. He has not presented any intervening change in law or new evidence and has not identified any clear error or need to prevent manifest injustice. The Court DENIES his motions as to these arguments.

B. Reiteration of Allegations

Plaintiff next reiterates several merits arguments from his original briefing and his First Amended Complaint in this litigation. First, he goes into detail about his allegations regarding Mr. Richard J. Freer's alleged violation of the "Exchange Act and Securities Act." Pl.'s First Mot. at 2-4; Pl.'s Second Mot. at 2-4. Second, he claims that "SEC employees involved money laundering" and/or "has fiduciary duty to prevent employees from involved money laundering." Pl.'s First Mot. at 4; Pl.'s Second Mot. at 3-4. Third, Plaintiff discusses in more depth his allegations regarding Mr. Freer's alleged "falsified corporation registration." Pl.'s First Mot. at 4-5; Pl.'s Second Mot. at 4-5. Fourth, Plaintiff alleges that SEC employees engaged in "false corporation identity." Pl.'s First Mot. at 5-6; Pl.'s Second Mot. at 5-6. In particular, he alleges that the SEC had a fiduciary duty to monitor and/or supervise SEC employees' actions related to the EDGAR codes. Pl.'s First. Mot. at 5-7; Pl.'s Second Mot. at 5-7.

All of these arguments appear primarily to be recitations of Plaintiff's allegations in his First Amended Complaint, see First Am. Compl., ECF No. 29, which he also raised in relation toDefendants' motion to dismiss, see Obj. of Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 41, at 1-11; Suppl. Opp'n to Defs.' Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 46, at 1-6. And, as the Court noted above, on a motion for reconsideration "the movant must not 'relitigate old matters, or raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.'" Walsh v. Hagee, 316 F.R.D. 1, 2 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colls., 226 F.R.D. 7, 8 (D.D.C. 2005)), aff'd, No. 14-5058, 2014 WL 4627791 (D.C. Cir. July 11, 2014).

Moreover, Plaintiff does not explain how these allegations support his motion for reconsideration, as he does not present any new evidence or precedent, nor does he explain how the prior dismissal involved a clear error or would result in manifest injustice. This is especially the case in light of the fact that the Court previously dismissed his claims on jurisdictional grounds and did not reach the merits of his claims that he raises here. See Sept. 23, 2019 Mem. Op. at 13-25 (dismissing Plaintiff's claims because he failed to exhaust administrative remedies and because Counts 1 through 6 of his First Amended Complaint were barred by intentional torts and/or discretionary function exceptions of the Federal Tort Claims Act). In short, Plaintiff has not met the standard for reconsideration under Rule 59(e) on these arguments. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's motions as to these grounds as well.

C. Striking of Plaintiff's Supplemental Filings

Plaintiff subsequently argues that the Court improperly struck two of Plaintiff's supplemental filings, his "Supplementary to Support Chien's Pleadings from Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," ECF No. 49, and his "Supplementary (2) to Support Chien's Pleadings from Fair Debt Collection Practices Act," ECF No. 50. See Pl.'s Second Mot. at 7. Plaintiff argues it was improper because "it is important to list the circumstances how Freer's stock certificate was forged." Id. However, Plaintiff provides no new evidence, arguments, or intervening law...