Chimenti v. Frank

1

SALVATORE CHIMENTI, Petitioner, v. FREDERICK K. FRANK, et al., Respondents.

CIVIL No. 2:98-cv-06151-JMG

United States District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania

August 30, 2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION

JOHN M. GALLAGHER, UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

Petitioner Salvatore Chimenti seeks relief under Rule 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Petitioner's motion is unopposed. Petitioner contends relief is warranted under Rule 60(b) and/or under Rule 60(d) because, Petitioner avers, the Philadelphia District Attorney's Office (DAO) committed fraud on the court before U.S. District Judge Clifford Scott Green when litigating Petitioner's federal habeas claims. More specifically, Petitioner contends the DAO withheld and misrepresented evidence to Judge Green, which prevented the fair proceeding of Petitioner's habeas claims and now warrants relief. Respondents agree relief is warranted under Rule 60 due to the DAO's past conduct.

Before the Court is Petitioner's “Application for a Certificate of Appealability and Consolidated Brief in Support” (COA Application) treated as a Rule 60(b) motion. Petitioner also moves for resolution of the pending Rule 60 motion. Because Petitioner's COA Application as a Rule 60(b) motion does not meet the demanding standard for relief under Rule 60(d), and is otherwise not timely under Rule 60(b), Petitioner's motion is denied. Accordingly Petitioner's Motion for Resolution is denied as moot.

I. FACTS

In front of the Court is Petitioner Chimenti's “Application for a Certificate of Appealability and Consolidated Brief in Support” (COA Application) treated as a Rule 60(b) motion. See generally Appellant's Appl. for a Certificate of Appealability, ECF No. 88. On January 13, 2023, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit directed “the Clerk to transfer Chimenti's ‘Application for a Certificate of Appealability and Consolidated Brief in Support” (COA Application) to the District Court for consideration as a motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b).” U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit Order, ECF No. 77 at 2 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1631). The Court of Appeals “note[d] that Chimenti's COA Application is essentially a ‘true' Rule 60(b) motion, as he argues, inter alia, that the integrity of the [Section] 2254 proceedings was ‘significantly flawed' because the Commonwealth withheld ‘internal files contain[ing] memoranda demonstrating that' it ‘had for years believed that [Chimenti's trial] counsel suborned perjury.'” Id. (internal citations omitted). The Court of Appeals “express[ed] no opinion on the timeliness or the merits of the claims raised in Chimenti's COA Application treated as a Rule 60(b) motion.” Id.

In his COA Application, Petitioner contends his Rule 60(b) motion^[1]is proper and warrants relief because Petitioner does not seek to establish a new ground of relief nor does Petitioner criticize Judge Green's resolution of the ineffectiveness ground that was before him in federal habeas proceedings; rather, Petitioner avers, the integrity of the federal habeas proceedings were flawed because of the Commonwealth's refusal to (1) provide evidence in its files relevant to the DAO's subornation of perjury and (2) to follow through on providing immunity to witnesses who would've testified to perjury.^[2] So, in sum, Petitioner avers the DAO's previous actions of withholding and misrepresenting evidence to Judge Green prevented the fair proceedings of Petitioner's habeas claims. See generally ECF No. 88 at 4-6.

Upon the Third Circuit's Order and direction to this Court, this Court held a status conference with the Parties. In the conference-and as provided in Respondents' briefs- Respondents did not dispute that Petitioner is warranted relief under Rule 60(b). See generally Resps.' Suppl. Br. on Timeliness, ECF No. 85; see also e.g., Resp. to Pet'r's Mot. for Relief from Final J. Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(B), ECF No. 66. This Court then directed the Parties to submit supplemental briefing on the following issue: whether Petitioner's Rule 60(b) motion is timely filed under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(c) and in accordance with case law within the Third Circuit. See Order, ECF No. 82.

The Parties then submitted briefing concerning the timeliness issue. First, Petitioner contends he brings a Rule 60(b) motion for relief from a judgment or order on the following grounds for relief: “(3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; . . . [and] (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3), (b)(6). Petitioner also contends his 60(b) motion is timely because “courts routinely treat Rule 60(b) motions as independent actions under Rule 60(d), and vice versa.” Pet'r's Suppl. Br., ECF No. 83 at 1 (internal footnote omitted). And, unlike motions brought under Rule 60(b), independent actions under Rule 60(d) do not have a limitations period. See id. So Petitioner contends that a one-year time limit is not applicable here because this action is not based on mere fraud but “fraud on the court”- claims of which can be brought indefinitely. See id. at 2. Although Petitioner moved under Rule 60(b), he thus avers it is proper for the Court to consider a 60(b) motion as an independent action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(d).

Respondents agree with Petitioner that Petitioner's motion is timely under Rule 60(d), which has no time limit for bringing such actions. ECF No. 85 at 1-2 (citing In re Bressman, 874 F.3d 142, 149 (3d Cir. 2017); also citing Averback v. Rival Mfg. Co., 809 F.2d 1016, 1020 (3d Cir. 1987)). Respondents further contend an action under 60(d) is “well suited to this matter-a practically sui generis case marred by years of ‘egregious misconduct' on the part of the attorneys representing the Commonwealth.” Id. at 2 (citing Bressman, 874 F.3d at 150). Respondents assert “[h]ere, the Commonwealth, through its attorneys, misled Petitioner and the Court, causing serious harm to Petitioner and undermining the integrity of the judicial proceedings.” Id. (citing Resp. to Pet'r's Rule 60(b) Mot., ECF No. 66, at 17) (acknowledging that “[t]he Commonwealth misrepresented the scope and validity of the DAO's promise of non-prosecution” and that “Chimenti was unable to rebut those misrepresentations because the Commonwealth did not disclose the [immunity] letters to the defense or acknowledge their existence.”). So Respondents contend “Petitioner's motion, although styled as a Rule 60(b) motion, falls with[in][sic] Rule 60(d) and is appropriately treated as such.” Id. (citing Advanced Multilevel Concepts, 2014 WL 6907973, at *3 n.4).

On June 9, 2023, following the Parties' submission of supplemental briefing, Petitioner filed a Motion for Resolution seeking resolution of his pending motion for relief under Rule 60. See generally Pet'r's Mot. for Resolution, ECF No. 87.

II. LEGAL STANDARDS

Petitioner seeks relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)-specifically subsections 60(b)(3) and 60(b)(6)-as well as Rule 60(d). First, “Rule 60(b) allows a party to seek relief from a final judgment, and request reopening of his case, under a limited set of circumstances including fraud, mistake, and newly discovered evidence.” Lazar v. Little, 623 F.Supp.3d 518, 523 (E.D. Pa. 2022) (quoting Gonzalez v. Crosby, 545 U.S. 524, 528, (2005); and citing Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949) (finding Rule 60(b)(6), “the ‘other reason' clause, for all reasons except the five particularly specified, vests power in courts adequate to enable them to vacate judgments whenever such action is appropriate to accomplish justice.”)). Grounds for relief from a final judgment, order, or proceeding may be based on the following reasons, inter alia: “(3) fraud . . ., misrepresentation, or misconduct by an opposing party; . . . (6) any other reason that justifies relief.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(3), (b)(6).

The type of fraud contemplated by Rule 60(b)(3) is “conduct [that] prevented the moving party from fully and fairly presenting his case.” Stridiron v. Stridiron, 698 F.2d 204, 207 (3d Cir. 1983). The movant carries a heavy burden under Rule 60(b)(3) and must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the adverse party engaged in the type of fraud contemplated by the Rule. United States v. Morgan, No. 12-23, 2018 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 126426, at *13 (E.D. Pa. July 27, 2018).

Furthermore, “Rule 60(b) motions are viewed as extraordinary relief which should be granted only where extraordinary justifying circumstances are present.” Id. (quoting Kiburz v. Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of the Navy, 446 Fed.Appx. 434, 436 (3d Cir. 2011)). “Failure to disclose or produce evidence requested in discovery can constitute Rule 60(b)(3) misconduct.” Stridiron, 698 F.2d at 207.

Next, “Rule 60(b)(6) is a catch-all provision that authorizes a court to grant relief from a final judgment for ‘any . . . reason' other than those listed elsewhere in the Rule.” Cox v. Horn, 757 F.3d 113, 120 (3d Cir. 2014) (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 60(b)(6)). And “courts are to dispense their broad powers under 60(b)(6) only in ‘extraordinary circumstances where, without such relief, an extreme and unexpected hardship would occur.'” Id. (quoting Sawka v. Healtheast, Inc., 989 F.2d 138, 140 (3d Cir. 1993)).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure also govern the timeliness of claims under Rule 60(b). Rule 60(c) provides that Rule 60(b) motions “must be made within a reasonable time-and for reasons (1), (2), and (3) no more than a year after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding.” FED. R. CIV. P. 60(c). Here, Petitioner moves for relief under Rule 60(b)(6), a catch-all provision extending beyond the explicit circumstances listed under Rule 60(b)(1-5) and...