Chisom v. Smith

DONDRE M. CHISOM, Petitioner v. BARRY SMITH, et al., Respondents

No. 1:21-cv-773

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

July 12, 2021

(Judge Rambo)

MEMORANDUM

On March 29, 2021, pro se Petitioner Dondre M. Chisom ("Petitioner"), who is presently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution in Houtzdale, Pennsylvania ("SCI Houtzdale"), initiated the above-captioned action by filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. (Doc. No. 1.) In an Order dated April 20, 2021, that court transferred the matter to this Court for further proceedings. (Doc. No. 3.) Following an Order to show cause (Doc. No. 8), Respondents filed their response on June 3, 2020 (Doc. No. 9). After receiving an extension of time to do so (Doc. Nos. 10, 11), Petitioner filed his traverse on July 6, 2021 (Doc. No. 12). Accordingly, Petitioner's § 2254 petition is ripe for disposition.

I. BACKGROUND

A. Procedural History

On June 19, 2017, in the Court of Common Pleas for Dauphin County, Pennsylvania, Petitioner pled guilty to third-degree murder and prohibited possession of a firearm and was sentenced to an aggregate sentence of 25-50 years' incarceration. See Commonwealth v. Chisom, Docket No. CP-22-CR-0005714-2015 (Dauphin Cty. C.C.P.).¹ The Superior Court of Pennsylvania set forth the background of the case as follows:

On the night of July 2, 2015, a verbal altercation between [Petitioner] and 34 year-old Christopher Williams, who allegedly cut to the front of a convenience store checkout line, culminated with [Petitioner] shooting Williams to death in claimed self defense. Charged with criminal homicide, persons not to possess firearms, and related offenses, [Petitioner] entered a counseled negotiated guilty plea to third-degree murder and persons not to possess firearms in exchange for an agreed-upon sentence of 25 to 50 years' incarceration and payment of fines totaling $75,000.00. On June 19, 2017, the trial court imposed an aggregate sentence in accordance with the plea agreement.

Commonwealth v. Chisom, No. 915 MDA 2020, 2021 WL 672920, at *1 (Pa. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2021). Petitioner did not file post-trial motions or a direct appeal. Id.

Between sentencing and when Petitioner filed a pro se Post Conviction Relief Act ("PCRA") petition, Petitioner and counsel "each filed several pertinent motions or correspondences with the trial court, as well as with one another." Id. In his correspondence with the trial court and counsel, Petitioner expressed confusion as to why counsel had not filed post-sentence motions or an appeal like he had requested. Id. On December 14, 2017, Petitioner subsequently filed a pro se motionto modify and reduce sentence, alleging "ineffective assistance of plea counsel for failing to file both pre-sentence and post-sentence motions" and asserting that "his plea had been coerced." Id.

On December 28, 207, Petitioner filed a pro se PCRA petition, asserting that: (1) counsel failed to file post-conviction motions on his behalf; (2) counsel coerced him to plead guilty; (3) counsel didn't raise mitigating factors regarding the brain surgery Petitioner had three (3) weeks prior to the homicide; and (4) newly discovered evidence in the form of a video became available after trial and would have changed the outcome had it been introduced. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 1-9.) Petitioner also requested that his appellate rights be reinstated. (Id. at 4.) Counsel was appointed to represent Petitioner, and on January 23, 2020, counsel filed a motion to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988), alleging that there was no merit to Petitioner's PCRA petition. (Doc. No. 9-2 at 55-69.) On April 22, 2020, the PCRA court granted counsel's motion to withdraw and issued a notice that it intended to dismiss Petitioner's PCRA petition. (Id. at 70-75.) Petitioner filed a response, in which he requested an evidentiary hearing, on June 10, 2020. (Id. at 76-80.) On June 10, 2020, the PCRA court dismissed Petitioner's PCRA petition for the reasons set forth in its notice of intent to dismiss. (Id. at 81.)

Petitioner timely appealed to the Superior Court, arguing that (1) the PCRA court erred in determining that trial counsel was not ineffective and (2) that the state and federal courts actions in similar cases "have created a precedent that the State Courts should follow in ineffective assistance of counsel claims." Chisom, 2021 WL 672920, at *3. On February 22, 2021, the Superior Court affirmed the dismissal of Petitioner's PCRA petition. Id. at *4. Petitioner did not file a petition for allowance of appeal with the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

B. Habeas Claims Presented

Petitioner raises the following claims for relief in his § 2254 petition:

1. Trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Petitioner to accept an induced plea agreement after new evidence was produced;

2. Trial counsel was ineffective for allowing Petitioner to plea to an illegally prescribed sentence; and

3. Trial counsel was ineffective for not filing a post-sentence motion.

(Doc. No. 1 at 19-24.)

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Habeas corpus is an "'extraordinary remedy' reserved for defendants who were 'grievously wronged' by the criminal proceedings." See Dunn v. Colleran, 247 F.3d 450, 468 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Calderon v. Coleman, 525 U.S. 414, 146 (1998)). The exercise of restraint by a federal court in reviewing and granting habeas relief is appropriate due to considerations of comity and federalism. See Engle v.Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 128 (1982). "The States possess primary authority for defining and enforcing the criminal law. In criminal trials they also hold the initial responsibility for vindicating constitutional rights. Federal intrusions into state criminal trials frustrate both the States' sovereign power and their good-faith attempts to honor constitutional law." Id. States also have a recognized interest in the finality of convictions that have survived direct review within the state court system. See Brecht v. Abrahamson, 507 U.S. 619, 620 (1993).

A district court may entertain an application for a writ of habeas corpus filed by a person in state custody "only on the ground that he is in custody in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). If a claim presented in a § 2254 petition has been adjudicated on the merits in state court proceedings, habeas relief cannot be granted unless:

the adjudication of the claim - (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established [f]ederal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

Id. § 2254(d).

For claims of ineffective assistance of counsel raised in a habeas petition, the Court must consider the two components to demonstrating a violation of the right to effective assistance of counsel as set forth by the Supreme Court in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). First, the petitioner must show that counsel'sperformance was deficient. This requires showing that "counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." See id. at 688; see also Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 390-91 (2000). Second, under Strickland, the petitioner must show that he was prejudiced by the deficient performance. "This requires showing that counsel's errors were so serious as to deprive the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. To establish prejudice, the defendant "must show that there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome." See id. at 694. The Strickland test is conjunctive and a habeas petitioner must establish both the deficiency in the performance prong and the prejudice prong. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687; Dooley v. Petsock, 816 F.2d 885, 889 (3d Cir. 1987). As a result, if a petitioner fails on either prong, he loses. See Holladay v. Haley, 209 F.3d 1243, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000) ("Because both parts of the test must be satisfied in order to show a violation of the Sixth Amendment, the court need not address the performance prong if the defendant cannot meet the prejudice prong, or vice versa.") (citation omitted); Foster v. Ward, 182 F.3d 1177, 1184 (10th Cir. 1999) ("This court may address the performance and prejudice components in any order, but need not address both if Mr. Foster fails to make a sufficient showing of one.").

The two-pronged test established in Strickland "qualifies as 'clearly established Federal law'" for purposes of the AEDPA. See Rainey v. Varner, 603 F.3d 189, 197 (3d Cir. 2010) (quoting Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 391 (2000)). Therefore, under § 2254(d)(1), the relevant inquiry in assessing ineffectiveness claims that have been adjudicated on the merits is whether the state court's decision involved an unreasonable application of Strickland or are based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. See Jacobs v. Horn, 395 F.3d 92, 107 n.9 (3d Cir. 2005). Moreover, Pennsylvania's three-pronged test for ineffective assistance claims, see Commonwealth v Pierce, 515 Pa. 153, 527 A.2d 973, 975-77 (Pa. 1987), is not contrary to Strickland, see Jacobs, 395 F.3d at 107 n.9.

III. DISCUSSION

A. Exhaustion and Procedural Default

The Court must first determine whether Petitioner's grounds for relief presented in his § 2254 petition have been exhausted in the state courts and, if not, whether circumstances exist to excuse Petitioner's procedural default of his claims. Respondents...