Chittenden v. Just. Ct. of Pahrump Twp.

544 P.3d 919

Jamie Marie CHITTENDEN, Appellant,

v.JUSTICE COURT OF PAHRUMP TOWNSHIP, Respondent.

No. 85383-COA

Court of Appeals of Nevada.

Filed January 25, 2024

Appeal from a district court order denying a petition for a writ of mandamus. Fifth Judicial District Court, Nye County; Kimberly A. Wanker, Judge.

The Law Firm of Nathan L. Gent, PLLC, and Nathan L. Gent, Pahrump, for Appellant.

Aaron D. Ford, Attorney General, Carson City; Brian Kunzi, District Attorney, and Bradley J. Richardson, Deputy District Attorney, Nye County, for Respondent.

BEFORE THE COURT OF APPEALS, GIBBONS, C.J., and BULLA and WESTBROOK, JJ.

OPINION

By the Court, WESTBROOK, J.:

In this decision, we address NRS 171.196(2)’s requirement that a preliminary hearing be set within 15 days of a criminal defendant’s initial appearance on a felony or gross misdemeanor charge unless good cause exists for the delay.¹ We conclude that when deciding whether good cause exists, the justice court must balance the defendant’s constitutional right to conditional pretrial liberty against the interests of the State and the needs of the court. Further, the court must make findings on the record to justify any delay of the preliminary hearing and undertake efforts to ensure that the hearing is held as soon as practicable.

In this case, appellant Jamie Marie Chittenden filed a petition for a writ of mandamus in the district court seeking dismissal of the charges against her because the justice court scheduled her preliminary hearing 76 days after her initial appearance, while she remained in custody. The district court denied her petition because it found that good cause existed for this extraordinary delay. Although we conclude that the district court abused its discretion when it found good cause for the extreme delay in this case, we nevertheless affirm the district court’s denial of Chittenden’s petition for extraordinary writ relief on other grounds.

PROCEDURAL AND FACTUAL HISTORY

In May 2022, a criminal complaint was filed against Chittenden and four other codefendants, and a warrant for Chittenden’s arrest was issued. She was eventually arrested, and on July 28, 2022, Chittenden was brought to appear before the Pahrump Justice Court. The complaint alleged a total of sixteen counts against all codefendants, with five of those counts against Chittenden. Specifically, she was charged with one count of forgery, three counts of using another person’s identifying information to harm or impersonate another person, and one count of conspiracy.

Chittenden, who appeared in custody for her initial appearance, requested an own recognizance release or reduction in bail, which was set in the warrant at $70,000. After the justice court denied these requests, Chittenden invoked her right to a preliminary hearing within 15 days. However, the justice of the peace set Chittenden’s preliminary hearing for October 12, 2022—76 days later.

Chittenden objected generally to the hearing setting as being outside of the 15-day window but did not request any specific form of relief. The justice court indicated that the October 12 date was "the soonest that we could put on a case of this magnitude, With this many [co]defendants" because otherwise,

this case is all gonna be bifurcated and you’re gonna have to have four separate or different judges, at least, to hear it., Because if I hear her case, then I can’t hear, any of the other ones, so that would have to go to another judge. And whatever case he hears, then he can’t hear any of the other ones, so that would have to go to another judge. Logistically, I don’t think that we can do it before then, because of those problems that would arise if we tried to bifurcate this case. And I’m not sure that the [district attorney’s] office wants to bifurcate this case and have to pay four or five different times for witnesses to appear.

The State opposed the bifurcation, and without further discussion, the justice court left the preliminary hearing date unchanged.

Approximately one month after her initial appearance, Chittenden petitioned the district court for a writ of mandamus, arguing that the justice court scheduled her preliminary hearing beyond 15 days without good cause in violation of NRS 171.196(2).² The writ petition requested that the district court compel the justice court to "follow the law as set forth by NRS 171.196" and to dismiss Chittenden’s case. Without requiring a response from the State or hearing any argument from the parties, the district court denied the petition. In its order, the district court cited Shelton v. Lamb, 85 Nev. 618, 460 P.2d 156 (1969), and noted that the court’s calendar, pendency of other cases, public expense, health of the judge, and convenience of the court are good causes for a continuance. Then, the court summarily concluded that "[i]n this case, the Justice of the Peace was within the parameters of the law to continue [Chittenden’s] preliminary hearing to October 12, 2022."

On the day of her scheduled preliminary hearing, out of the five codefendants charged in the case, only Chittenden appeared in the justice court. She then unconditionally waived her preliminary hearing and agreed to plead guilty to one count of forgery—a category D felony—and to pay $2,950 in restitution. The parties also expressly stipulated on the record that Chittenden had preserved for appellate review the issues raised in her mandamus petition. She was then released on her own recognizance. Chittenden now appeals from the district court’s order denying, mandamus relief.

ANALYSIS

At the outset, we note that this case presents an unusual procedural history. After the district court denied Chittenden’s pretrial petition for a writ of mandamus, she unconditionally waived her preliminary hearing pursuant to negotiations but expressly reserved her right to appeal the issue in her writ regarding the delay in her preliminary hearing. Before her sentencing hearing and before any judgment of conviction was entered, Chittenden filed a timely notice of appeal that challenged only the district court’s order denying her writ petition. Neither party challenges appellate jurisdiction in this case, but before we can address the merits of Chittenden’s appeal, we must first determine if the matter is properly before us. See Mazzan v. State, 109 Nev. 1067, 1075, 863 P.2d 1035, 1040 (1993) ("Where no court rule or statute provides for an appeal, no right to appeal exists.").

This court has jurisdiction over Chittenden’s appeal, and the issue is capable of repetition, yet evading review

[1] We first conclude that this court has jurisdiction over Chittenden’s appeal from the district court’s order denying mandamus.

See Ashokan v. State, Dep’t of Ins., 109 Nev. 662, 665-66, 856 P.2d 244, 246 (1993) (providing that an appeal from a district court order denying a pretrial petition for a writ of mandamus is the proper remedy). NRS 2.090(2) provides that the Nevada Supreme Court "has jurisdiction to review upon appeal … an order granting or refusing to grant an injunction or mandamus in the case provided for by law." NRS 177.015(3) states that "[t]he defendant only may appeal from a final judgment or verdict in a criminal case," and an order of the district court denying a writ of mandamus is a final judgment within the meaning of NRS 177.015(3). Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 665, 856 P.2d at 246; see also Round Hill Gen. Improvement Dist. v. Neuman, 97 Nev. 601, 604, 637 P.2d 534, 536 (1981) ("When disputed factual issues are critical in demonstrating the propriety of a writ of mandamus, the writ should be sought in the district court, with appeal from an adverse judgment to this court." (citing NRS 34.160, NRS 34.220, and NRS 34.310)). Therefore, both NRS 2.090(2) and NRS 177.015(3) confer upon this court appellate jurisdiction over the district court’s order denying Chittenden’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Ashokan, 109 Nev. at 666, 856 P.2d at 246; Nev. Const. art. VI, § 4.

[2] However, Chittenden’s appeal challenges the delay of her preliminary hearing without good cause, and a violation of NRS 171.196(2) would have resulted in her unlawful confinement. See Shelton, 85 Nev. at 619, 460 P.2d at 157. We note that Chittenden’s unconditional waiver of her preliminary hearing and subsequent plea rendered any pretrial detention issue moot. See generally Valdez-Jimenez v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 136 Nev. 155, 156, 460 P.3d 976, 980 (2020); see also Sheriff, Washoe Cnty. v. Myles, 99 Nev. 817, 818, 672 P.2d 639, 639 (1983) (agreeing with the petitioner that "any illegality in the [defendant’s] detention was moot upon the finding of probable cause and bind-over at the preliminary hearing"). Further, insofar as Chittenden sought writ relief directing the justice court to "follow the law" and hold her preliminary hearing within 15 days, this relief is no longer available.

[3, 4] Nonetheless, where an appeal is moot, this court may still consider it "if it involves a matter of widespread importance that is capable of repetition, yet evading review." Personhood Nev. v. Bristol, 126 Nev. 599, 602, 245 P.3d 572, 574 (2010). The party seeking to overcome mootness must show "that (1) the duration of the challenged action is relatively short, (2) there is a likelihood that a similar issue will arise in the future, and (3) the matter is important." Bisch v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 129 Nev. 328, 334-35, 302 P.3d 1108, 1113 (2013); see also Valdez-Jimenez, 136 Nev. at 158, 460 P.3d at 982.

[5] The parties did not address mootness in their briefing. However, "[b]ecause mootness is an element of justiciability and raises a question as to our jurisdiction, we consider the matter sua sponte." Aguirre v. S.S. Sohio Intrepid, 801 F.2d 1185, 1189 (9th Cir. 1986). In doing so, we conclude that, although Chittenden’s appeal is moot, the issue presented here is within the exception to the mootness doctrine,

[6, 7] As to the first, factor, the 15-day window provided...