Choate v. Runion

WILLIAM CLAYTON CHOATE PLAINTIFF v. SHERIFF JACKIE RUNION; CAPTAIN GOLDEN ADAMS; NURSE STEPHEN KING; WARDEN JEFFIE WALKER; DR. KEVIN MCCAIN; and AL LANDRETH formerly John Doe Officer Admin. G. DEFENDANTS

CIVIL No. 4:20-cv-04109

United States District Court, W.D. Arkansas, Texarkana Division

August 30, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION

HON BARRY A. BRYANT UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

This is a civil rights action filed pro se by Plaintiff William Clayton Choate, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On February 10, 2021, the parties consented to have the undersigned conduct all proceedings in this case including a jury or nonjury trial and to order the entry of a final judgment in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 73. (ECF No. 16).

Before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendants Adams, Runion, Walker, and Landreth (“County Defendants”). (ECF No. 118). Plaintiff has filed a Response in opposition to the motion (ECF No. 139) and the County Defendants have filed Replies. (ECF No. 145 147).^[1]

I. FACTUAL BACKROUND

Plaintiff is no longer incarcerated and now resides in El Dorado, Arkansas. His claims in this action arise from alleged incidents which occurred while he was incarcerated in the Miller County Detention Center (“MCDC”) in Texarkana, Arkansas.

At all times relevant to the instant lawsuit, Defendant Walker was the Warden at the MCDC, Defendant Runion was the Sheriff of Miller County, Arkansas, Defendant Adams was a Captain at the MCDC, and Defendant Landreth was the Jail Administrator at the MCDC. (ECF Nos. 118-1, 118-4).

On March 7, 2020, Plaintiff was booked into the custody of the MCDC where he remained until he was transferred to the Arkansas Department of Corrections (“ADC”) on February 24, 2021. (ECF No. 118-1).

Defendants state Plaintiff did not report that he suffered from any serious medical needs when he was booked into the MCDC but did inform them he was taking and abusing Klonopin -a benzodiazepine medication used to treat anxiety. (ECF No. 115-1). However, Plaintiff states he informed Defendants that he suffered from hypertension. (ECF No. 140).

On March 8, 2020, Plaintiff was placed on a benzodiazepine detoxification regiment. (ECF No. 115-1). On March 23, 2020, the MCDC promulgated the Standard Operating Procedure 05.00 Pandemic and Public Health Emergency. Procedure 05.00 applies to all MCDC staff and sets out guidance for the use of Personal Protective Equipment (“PPE”), isolation, and quarantine of inmates. (ECF No. 118-1). The policies implemented were designed to educate staff on CDC, State, and Local Department of Health Guidelines; appropriate quarantine and isolation of inmates; appropriate use of PPE; implementation of temperature checks; cleaning and disinfecting of jail surfaces; and limiting the transmission of Covid-19 by suspending fingerprinting, property releases, and lobby visitation. Id.

These policies were to be implemented by phases, depending on the ebb and flow of the pandemic. Phase One was implemented on April 30, 2020. Phase Two was implemented on May 27, 2020. Phase One was reactivated on June 17, 2020. Phase Two was reactivated on September 10, 2020. (ECF No. 118-1).

The policies and procedures, as promulgated, were based on the evolving science as it was understood at the time and the policies and procedures represent a goodfaith effort to limit the spread of the Covid-19 virus within the MCDC. Id.

Defendant Walker states the MCDC had a contract with Southern Health Partners, Inc. (“SHP”) to provide health services to the inmates and the MCDC relied upon SHP “in this regard”. (ECF No. 118-1, p. 1).

On June 22, 2020, Plaintiff complained of chills, body aches, dizziness, and slight chest pains. He was seen on June 24, 2020, and prescribed Tylenol and Ibuprofen for 14 days. At that time, Plaintiff's temperature was 98.1 degrees. (ECF No. 115-1).

On June 24, 2020, Plaintiff was moved from Max Bravo pod to West Echo quarantine pod due to a possible Covid-19 infection. (ECF No. 115-1). That same day, Plaintiff was seen by the medical staff for body aches, shivering, and chest pains. Plaintiff was instructed to increase his fluid intake. At that time, Plaintiff's temperature was 97.3 degrees. Id.

On June 27, 2020, Plaintiff put in a request to see the medical staff. On June 28, 2020, medical staff attempted to see Plaintiff, but he refused to take his medications. (ECF No. 115-1). Plaintiff states he did not take his medication because it was causing severe stomach pain. (ECF No. 140).

On July 1, 2020, the population at the MCDC underwent mass testing for Covid-19. The testing was performed as soon as practicable after it became available through the Arkansas Department of Health. (ECF No. 115-1). Nasal swabs were collected from the inmates and employees and the samples were sent to the Arkansas Department of Health for testing. The results showed Plaintiff tested positive for Covid-19. Id.

On July 10, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by the medical staff for shortness of breath and chest pain. At that time his lungs were noted to be clear bilaterally and his temperature was 97.9 degrees. On that date, Plaintiff again refused to take his medications. (ECF No. 115-1).

On July 11, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by the medical staff after he complained of “not feeling better.” (ECF No. 115-1). At that time Plaintiff's temperature was 97.9 degrees and a chest x-ray was ordered and performed that same day. The x-ray showed no evidence of acute cardiopulmonary disease, communicable disease, or active tuberculosis. Id.

Defendant Walker states in her affidavit, “There is no evidence to suggest that any staff member of MCDC was deliberately indifferent to the needs of Plaintiff or failed to protect him.” (ECF No. 118-1, p. 3). She also states, “All inmates were given cleaning supplies on a daily basis to allow them to clean their cells and mats. During COVID-19, this included cleaning supplies that had bleach in them.” Id.

Defendant Landreth states in his affidavit, “There are times that inmates with mental illnesses are housed at MCDC and that is unavoidable even with all resources exhausted. There are times that inmates make noise while housed at MCDC and that is unavoidable even with all resources exhausted.” (ECF No. 118-4, pp. 1-2).

In addition, Defendant Landreth states, “When Choate was transferred to ADC from Miller County, all mail, including any newspapers, that he did not receive while in custody was given to him.” (ECF No. 118-4, p 2).

II. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiff filed his verified Complaint pro se on December 22, 2020, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. (ECF No. 1). He asserts the following claims in the Complaint: Claim 1 - Future Harm; Claim 2 - Denial/Refusal Medical Care; and Claim 3 - Deliberate and Reckless Indifference to an Imminent threat. (ECF No. 1, pp. 6, 8, 11). He is suing Defendants in both their individual and official capacities. Id.

On February 25, 2021, Plaintiff filed a Supplement to the Complaint asserting four additional claims: Claim 4 - Failure to Protect or Intervene and Future Harm; Claim 5 - Prolonged exposure to severely mentally-Inmate (excessive noise/sleep deprivation unsanitary living conditions); Claim 6 - Retaliation; and Claim 7 - Denial of Newspapers. (ECF No. 21). The Court notes this Supplement is not verified.

On March 8, 2022, the County Defendants filed a Motion for Summary Judgment, Brief in Support, and Statement of Facts. (ECF Nos. 118, 119, 120). They argue Plaintiff's claims are without merit and they are entitled to summary judgment.

Plaintiff filed Responses to the motion and statement of facts. (ECF Nos. 139, 141). He also submitted a Notice of Other Arguments and a Supplement with 238 pages of exhibits. (ECF Nos. 142, 143). However, none of these responses were verified. Plaintiff argues summary judgment is not appropriate because there are material facts in dispute.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment is appropriate if, after viewing the facts and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the record "shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Once a party moving for summary judgment has made a sufficient showing, the burden rests with the non-moving party to set forth specific facts, by affidavit or other evidence, showing that a genuine issue of material fact exists.” Nat'l Bank of Comm. v. Dow Chem. Co., 165 F.3d 602, 607 (8th Cir. 1999).

The non-moving party "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita, 475 U.S. at 586. "They must show there is sufficient evidence to support a jury verdict in their favor." Nat'l Bank, 165 F.3d at 607 (citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986)). "A case founded on speculation or suspicion is insufficient to survive a motion for summary judgment." Id. (citing, Metge v. Baehler, 762 F.2d 621, 625 (8th Cir. 1985)). “When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for summary judgment.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007).

Under § 1983, a defendant may be sued in either his personal capacity, or in his official capacity, or claims may be stated against a defendant in both his personal and his official capacities. Gorman v. Bartch, 152 F.3d 907 914 (8th Cir. 1998). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff must allege that the defendant acted...