Choi v. Brown Univ.

594 F.Supp.3d 452

Hyun CHOI, Anna House, and Amy Pham, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiffs,

v.BROWN UNIVERSITY, Defendant.

C.A. No. 20-cv-191-JJM-LDA

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island.

Signed March 22, 2022

Daniel J. Kurowski, Pro Hac Vice, Whitney Siehl, Pro Hac Vice, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Chicago, IL, David J. Strachman, Strachman Law, Stephen M. Prignano, McIntyre Tate LLP, Providence, RI, Steve W. Berman, Pro Hac Vice, Hagens Berman Sobol Shapiro LLP, Seattle, WA, for Plaintiffs.

Angelica H. Nguyen, Pro Hac Vice, Amanda M. MacDonald, Pro Hac Vice, Mark S. Levinstein, Pro Hac Vice, Williams & Connolly LLP, Washington, DC, Joseph D. Whelan, Robert Clark Corrente, Whelan Corrente & Flanders LLP, Providence, RI, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

John J. McConnell, Jr., United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant Brown University's Motion for Summary Judgment. According to Brown's Motion, the three named Plaintiffs¹ cannot sustain a claim for breach of contract because of a failure to refund fees they paid, and therefore Brown is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The claims pertain to four classes of fees and charges: a Student Activity Fee, a Health Services Fee, a Nonresident Fee, and Room and Board Charges.² Plaintiffs oppose this Motion on grounds that each plaintiff, in one way or another, has lost the benefit of their contractual bargain, and there are disputes as to material facts whether Brown provided the services for which the Plaintiffs contracted.

I. BACKGROUND

The COVID-19 pandemic has been a global tragedy. It has fundamentally and permanently altered the lives of individuals and their families. It has forced organizations and institutions to adapt in ways that they could not have anticipated. It has forced this country to take drastic measures to meet the ever-changing disruptions posed by a constantly evolving virus.

In March 2020, the pandemic became the focal point for Brown and its students. Early that month, Brown President Christina H. Paxson emailed all members of the Brown community informing them that Brown was cancelling classes for the week of March 16 and would resume in an online format beginning on March 30. See ECF No. 59-6 at 2. President Paxson added that if students resided in either on campus or Brown-owned housing, they would have to vacate their residence by March 22. Id. Brown moved this date up to March 17 when it reported its first COVID case among students. ECF No. 22 at ¶ 67.

The three Plaintiffs were all Brown undergraduates at the time. Anna House was a senior in her last semester in March 2020. ECF No. 55 at ¶ 51. Ms. House had received a Federal Pell Grant and therefore did not pay tuition or fees for the semester out of pocket. See ECF No. 59 at 3, n.1.

Plaintiff Amy Pham was a first-year student when the pandemic struck. She received a partial scholarship for the Spring 2020 semester. ECF No. 55 at 11, ¶ 66. Part of her cost of attending for this semester included a $4,710 Room Charge and a $2,956 Board Charge, the latter of which included a meal plan. Id. ¶ 64. Indeed, because Ms. Pham was the only plaintiff to live on campus, she is the only plaintiff who paid a Room and Board Charge along with a Health Services Fee and a Student Activities Fee.

The final plaintiff, Hyun Choi, was a sophomore during the 2019–2020 academic year. Because Mr. Choi did not live on campus, Brown charged him a Nonresident Fee, along with the Health Services Fee and Student Activities Fee. Mr. Choi is the only plaintiff who remained at Brown after the start of the pandemic due to an inability to safely return to his home overseas. Id. at ¶ 77. And he is the only plaintiff who used Brown's Health Services during the pandemic, as he filled prescriptions many times. Id. at ¶ 80.

All three Plaintiffs allege that, because of their rapid and forced departure from Brown's campus, they paid for services that Brown did not deliver, thereby breaching contractual obligations.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 controls in deciding whether a party is entitled to summary judgment, "The court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56. More particularly,

the plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When deciding whether the Court should grant summary judgment, the Court must "view the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, drawing all reasonable inferences in that party's favor." Barbour v. Dynamics Rsch. Corp. , 63 F.3d 32, 36 (1st Cir. 1995).

As alluded to, there must first be no genuine issues of material fact. "[M]ere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (emphasis in original). Thus, the issue must be genuine and material. See id. "In this context, ‘genuine’ means that the evidence about the fact is such that a reasonable jury could resolve the point in favor of the nonmoving party.... ‘Material’ means that the fact is one that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Morris v. Gov't Dev. Bank of Puerto Rico , 27 F.3d 746, 748 (1st Cir. 1994) (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).

Additionally, the moving party must be entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The moving party is "entitled to a judgment as a matter of law because the nonmoving party has failed to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of her case with respect to which she has the burden of proof." Celotex , 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The Court decides this latter element of the summary judgment standard by evaluating "whether there is [evidence] upon which a jury can properly proceed to find a verdict for the party producing it, upon whom the onus of proof is imposed." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 (emphasis in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

The basic principles of contract law govern Plaintiffs’ claims. In Rhode Island, as is true in many other jurisdictions, "a student and private university relationship is essentially contractual in nature." Gorman v. St. Raphael Acad. , 853 A.2d 28, 34 (R.I. 2004). The Court must, therefore, establish the landscape of contract law to determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude that there was a breach of contract.

Contract law is a state law doctrine. See Ogden v. Saunders , 25 U.S. 213, 325, 12 Wheat. 213, 6 L.Ed. 606 (1827). "[T]he remedy for a breach of a contract is governed by the lex fori," or the law of the forum. Nowell v. Waterman , 53 R.I. 16, 163 A. 402, 403 (1932). The Court will therefore look to Rhode Island law for this landscape.

"A contract is an agreement which creates an obligation. Its essentials are competent parties, subject matter, a legal consideration, mutuality of agreement, and mutuality of obligation." Lamoureux v. Burrillville Racing Ass'n , 91 R.I. 94, 161 A.2d 213, 215 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted). "Under traditional contract theory, an offer and acceptance are indispensable to contract formation, and without such assent a contract is not formed." Smith v. Boyd , 553 A.2d 131, 133 (R.I. 1989). The Rhode Island Supreme Court "has established that for parties to form a valid contract, each must have the intent to be bound by the terms of the agreement." Weaver v. American Power Conversion Corp. , 863 A.2d 193, 198 (R.I. 2004) (citing Rhode Island Five v. Medical Assocs. of Bristol County, Inc. , 668 A.2d 1250, 1253 (R.I. 1996) ).

Together with offer and acceptance, there must be consideration. "To determine consideration, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 71 (1981) employs a bargained-for exchange test. Under this test, something is bargained-for ‘if it is sought by the promisor in exchange for his promise and is given by the promisee in exchange for that promise.’ " Filippi v. Filippi , 818 A.2d 608, 624 (R.I. 2003). This constitutes a mutuality of obligation, which is fundamental in bilateral contracts. See JPL Livery Servs., Inc. v. Rhode Island Dep't of Admin. , 88 A.3d 1134, 1143 (R.I. 2014). Of note, "termination clauses supported by adequate consideration are not illusory," and are therefore enforceable. See id.

If a party does not fulfill their contractual obligations, they have breached the contract, and the nonbreaching party may sue for the breach. See Rendine v. Catoia , 52 R.I. 140, 158 A. 712, 713 (1932). To determine whether there has been a breach, the Court must look to the contractual obligations, which are illustrated by the plain language of the agreement. See Zarrella v. Minnesota Mut. Life Ins. Co. , 824 A.2d 1249, 1259 (R.I. 2003). "If the terms are found to be unambiguous, however, the task of judicial construction is at an end and the parties are bound by the plain and ordinary meaning of the terms of the contract." Id. "[W]hether a party has substantially performed or materially breached its contractual obligations is usually a question of fact to be decided by the jury. However, if the issue of materiality admits ... only one reasonable answer, then the court should intervene and resolve the matter as a question of law." Women's Dev. Corp. v. City of Cent. Falls , 764 A.2d 151, 158 (R.I. 2001) (citations omitted).

As shown above, there are four fees and charges in...