Chrisman v. State

RICHARD LAWRENCE CHRISMAN, Appellant v. THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

No. 06-16-00179-CR

Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

Date Submitted: January 9, 2017

March 31, 2017

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5 Travis County, Texas

Trial Court No. C-1-CR-15-216169

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Justice Moseley MEMORANDUM OPINION

Richard Lawrence Chrisman was arrested for driving while intoxicated (DWI) following a traffic stop. Chrisman filed a motion to suppress evidence of his arrest. The sole issue at the suppression hearing was whether the officer who initiated the traffic stop had reasonable suspicion to detain Chrisman. The trial court overruled Chrisman's motion, after which he pled no contest to the DWI charge, was sentenced by the trial court to confinement in the Travis County Jail¹ for a period of one year, and was ordered to pay a fine of $4,000.00.² Chrisman contends the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress. Finding no error in the suppression ruling, we affirm the trial court's judgment.

I. The Suppression Hearing

When Chrisman departed from Woody's Tavern at approximately 2:28 a.m. in what the tavern bartender described as a state of intoxication, the bartender called the Bee Caves Police Department. The bartender—whose attempt to persuade Chrisman to take a cab was rebuffed—reported to dispatch that Chrisman was driving a silver Lexus. Officer Kevin Hendricks of the Bee Caves Police Department received the report from dispatch at 2:28:52 a.m. Hendricks was advised that an intoxicated person was leaving Woody's Tavern, that the bartender attempted toget the individual a cab, and that the individual got into a silver Lexus passenger car and left the tavern.

Hendricks, who regularly patrols that area, was aware of the fact that Woody's Tavern closes the kitchen at 11:00 p.m., after which time they only serve alcohol. After he received the dispatch, Hendricks drove west in the direction of Woody's Tavern, located at Shops Parkway, a local business park. Hendricks arrived at the intersection of Highway 71 and Shops Parkway approximately thirty to forty-five seconds after he received the call from dispatch. He observed a silver Lexus passenger car at the intersection which matched the description of the vehicle identified by the bartender. There were no other cars on the road, and Woody's Tavern was the only business open in the business district at 2:30 a.m.

The Lexus accelerated across Highway 71 and continued northbound onto Bee Caves Road. Hendricks followed the Lexus as it turned into a neighborhood, and he initiated a traffic stop for a welfare check. Prior to stopping the driver of the silver Lexus, Hendricks was made aware of the name of the person who was allegedly driving the car. After Hendricks activated his overhead lights, but prior to approaching the Lexus, he was advised by dispatch of the registration and insurance information previously requested. Hendricks did not observe any traffic violations prior to activating his overhead lights.

As he approached the Lexus driven by Chrisman, Hendricks detected a strong odor of alcohol from inside the car. Chrisman's speech was slurred, he was unsteady on his feet and held onto the car for balance, and his eyes were watery and bloodshot. Hendricks determined that Chrisman was a good candidate for field-sobriety tests, but Chrisman refused all tests. Hendricksthen placed Chrisman into custody and read him the DIC-24 form³ requesting a specimen of his breath, which was refused. After having interacted with Chrisman, Hendricks formed the opinion that Chrisman had lost the normal use of his mental and physical faculties and that he was driving while intoxicated.

Hendricks did not witness any erratic driving by Chrisman or see him commit any traffic offense prior to the stop. The sole basis for the stop was the information received in the call to dispatch.⁴ The Call Sheet Report, admitted as an exhibit at the suppression hearing, lists the caller's name as Tyler Wyatt. The report also lists the telephone number from which the call originated, and indicates that the call originated from "Little Woodrow," referred to at the hearing as Woody's Tavern.

The trial court overruled Chrisman's motion to suppress and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law.⁵

II. Analysis

A. Standard of Review

"We review a trial court's ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of discretion." State v. Molden, 484 S.W.3d 602, 606 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016, pet. ref'd) (citing Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 662 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)). Our standard of review is bifurcated—we accord almost total deference to the trial court's determination of historical facts that turn on credibility and demeanor, but review questions of law de novo. Delafuente v. State, 414 S.W.3d 173, 177 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). We likewise review de novo any application-of-law-to-fact issues or mixed questions of law and fact which do not turn on witness credibility and demeanor. Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Consequently, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's ruling. Molden, 484 S.W.3d at 606 (citing State v. Robinson, 334 S.W.3d 776, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). We will uphold the trial court's ruling "if it is supported by the record and is correct under any theory of applicable law." Absalon v. State, 460 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015).

B. Applicable Law

Here, the trial court specifically concluded that Hendricks had a reasonable suspicion that Chrisman was driving while intoxicated sufficient to support the investigative detention. Chrismanclaims, however, that this finding is incorrect because the caller's report of an intoxicated person leaving Woody's Tavern was too conclusory and required further corroboration to support an investigative detention.⁶

Because a routine traffic stop implicates the United States and Texas Constitutions, the traffic stop must be reasonable. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 436-37 (1984); see U.S. CONST. amend. IV; TEX. CONST. art. I, § 9; Bobo v. State, 843 S.W.2d 572, 574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) ("Circumstances short of probable cause for an arrest may justify a temporary investigation or detention because investigation is a lesser intrusion on personal security than an arrest.") (quoting Fatemi v. State, 558 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)). "A police officer has reasonable suspicion to detain if he has specific, articulable facts that, combined with rational inferences from those facts, would lead him reasonably to conclude that the person detained is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity." Derichsweiler v. State, 348 S.W.3d 906, 914 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21-22 (1969)). "In determining whether an officer has reasonable suspicion to detain, we look at the totality of the circumstances through an objective lens, disregarding the officer's subjective intent." Matthews v. State, 431 S.W.3d 596, 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

C. Reasonable Suspicion

1. Reliability and Corroboration

Chrisman complains that Hendricks failed to corroborate the 9-1-1 caller's tip and did not observe Chrisman commit a traffic violation before the detention. Therefore, Chrisman contends, Hendricks lacked sufficient reasonable suspicion to detain him. We disagree.

Hendricks testified that he did not observe Chrisman commit a traffic offense prior to the stop. Nevertheless, "The factual basis for stopping a vehicle need not arise from the officer's personal observation, but may be supplied by information acquired from another person." Brother v. State, 166 S.W.3d 255, 257 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)). Indeed, the factual basis for stopping a vehicle "may be based on an informant's tip that bears sufficient 'indicia of reliability' to justify a stop." Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000); see State v. Fudge, 42 S.W.3d 226 (Tex. App.—Austin 2001, no pet.). Here, the factual basis for Hendricks' stop arose from the information received from the 9-1-1 call to dispatch by the bartender at Woody's Tavern, who identified himself as Tyler Wyatt, stated that he was the bartender at Woody's Tavern, and provided his telephone number. Consequently, we consider as reliable the information Wyatt provided to the dispatcher. Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at 914-15 ("[I]information provided to police from a citizen-informant who identifies himself and may be held to account for the accuracy and veracity of his report may be regarded as reliable.") Yet, Chrisman complains that Hendricks did not adequately corroborate this information.

"[C]orroboration refers to whether the police officer, in light of the circumstances, confirms enough facts to reasonably conclude that the information given to him is reliable and a temporary detention is thus justified." Brother, 166 S.W.3d at 259 n.5. "An inverse relationship exists between the reliability of the informant and the amount of corroborated information required to justify the police intrusion; the less reliable the tip, the more information is needed." Martinez v. State, 348 S.W.3d 919, 923 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). Where, as here, the informant identifies himself and makes himself "accountable for the intervention," his degree of reliability "significantly improves," thereby requiring a lesser degree of corroboration. Id. at 923-24.

We further recognize that the law imputes to Hendricks the entirety of the information Wyatt relayed to the 9-1-1 dispatcher. "[T]he detaining officer need not be personally aware of every fact that objectively supports a reasonable suspicion to detain; rather, 'the cumulative information known to the cooperating officers at the time of the stop is to be considered in determining whether reasonable suspicion exists.'" Derichsweiler, 348 S.W.3d at...