Christensen v. Bd. of Trs. for College

RENEE CHRISTENSEN, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES FOR ROCK VALLEY COLLEGE, andROCK VALLEY COLLEGE, in their official and individual capacities, Defendant.

3:17 C 50255

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS WESTERN DIVISION

March 17, 2020

Judge John Z. Lee

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Renee Christensen was fired in October 2014 from her faculty position at Rock Valley College. She filed this lawsuit alleging that the college terminated her because of her disability and failed to reasonably accommodate her, both in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12101, et seq; the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 701, et seq; and the Illinois Human Rights Act ("IHRA"), 775 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/1-101, et seq. The Defendants—Rock Valley College and its Board of Trustees (collectively, "Rock Valley" or "the college")—have moved for summary judgment as to both of Christensen's claims. For the following reasons, the motion is granted.

Background¹

Rock Valley hired Christensen in 1998 and at all relevant times employed her as a tenured, full-time faculty member in the college's Fitness, Wellness, and Sports Department. Defs.' L.R. 56.1 Statement of Facts ("DSOF") ¶ 7, ECF No. 51. Christensen taught lecture- and lab-based classes and was responsible for lesson planning, preparing class materials, grading, and evaluating students. Id. ¶ 9. Over the years, she was diagnosed with, and had a record of, various impairments, including an ankle injury, migraine headaches, and ADHD. Pl.'s L.R. 56.1 Statement of Additional Facts ("PSOAF") ¶ 39, ECF No. 59.

Rock Valley's administration received complaints from students about Christensen's punctuality, attendance, and the quality of her teaching. DSOF ¶ 11. During the Fall 2013 academic term alone, Christensen missed 23 classes. Id. ¶ 12. As a result, members of the administration, including Vice President of Academic Affairs Brian Sager and Dean of Social Science and Education and Humanities Ronald Geary, met with Christensen several times to discuss her performance issues, including her excessive absences. Id. ¶ 13.

As Christensen's tardiness and absenteeism continued, the administration also grew increasingly concerned about her mental state given what they perceived to be her unusual comments and behaviors. Id. ¶ 14. Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, Rock Valley decided to refer Christensen for a fitness-for-duty examination in the spring of 2014. Id. ¶¶ 14-15. The college selected andretained Dr. William Giakas to perform that examination. Id. ¶ 18. At Christensen's request, Rock Valley also allowed her treating doctor, Dr. Ramesh Vermuri, to perform a second evaluation at the college's expense. Id. ¶ 19. In keeping with the collective bargaining agreement, Rock Valley placed Christensen on paid administrative leave pending the examination results. Id. ¶ 21.

On April 8, 2014, Dr. Vermuri concluded that Christensen was able to perform the essential duties and responsibilities of her position. Id. ¶ 22. Two weeks later, Dr. Giakas performed a complete forensic psychiatric evaluation on Christensen; he spent 8.5 hours with her and reviewed her past medical history, performance evaluations, and job responsibilities. Id. ¶ 23. In the end, Dr. Giakas concluded that Christensen exhibited a mild to moderate degree of interrupted and disorganized thinking and a moderate degree of impairment in concentration and attention. Id. He further concluded, within a reasonable degree of medical certainty, that Christensen was unable to fulfill her job responsibilities and obligations. Id. Dr. Giakas's findings were memorialized in a ten-page report. Id.

Because Rock Valley found Dr. Giakas's analysis to be highly detailed and Dr. Vermuri's analysis to be brief and lacking in substance, it afforded Christensen an opportunity to have her doctors rebut the findings in Dr. Giakas's report and to provide any supplemental information she thought relevant, including any requests for accommodations. Id. ¶¶ 24, 27.

Christensen did provide Rock Valley with a letter from an internist, Dr. James Koepsell, but it is undisputed that the letter failed to address the medicalconcerns identified by Dr. Giakas and did not reference any neurological assessments. Christensen also provided an undated psychiatric evaluation from Dr. Vermuri where he asserted that Christensen's "cognition is intact," but he did not provide any evidence to support this contention. Finally, Christensen submitted a psychological evaluation from Dr. Robert Meyer, but it merely addressed whether Christensen's symptoms were related to her ADHD. Id. ¶ 28.

After considering the supplemental information, Rock Valley determined that Christensen had not rebutted Dr. Giakas's conclusion that she was unfit to fulfill her job responsibilities and obligations. Rock Valley also found that Christensen had not requested any accommodations, id. ¶ 29, although Christensen contends that she did, PSOAF ¶ 37.

On September 30, 2014, Rock Valley sent Christensen a written Notice of Charges for Recommendation for Dismissal. DSOF ¶ 31. The college allowed Christensen and her union representative an opportunity to appear before the Board of Trustees to contest the dismissal recommendation. Id. ¶ 32. On October 28, 2014, Rock Valley's Board of Trustees approved Christensen's dismissal. Id. ¶ 33.

Christensen subsequently brought this action under the ADA, the Rehabilitation Act, and the IHRA. Compl., ECF No. 1. Following the college's successful partial motion to dismiss, Christensen's remaining claims are that Rock Valley (1) wrongfully fired her based on her disability and (2) failed to reasonablyaccommodate that disability.² See 2/15/18 Order, ECF No. 29. Rock Valley moves for summary judgment as to these claims. See Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 49; Mem. in Supp. of Summ. J., ECF No. 50.

Legal Standard

"The Court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). To survive summary judgment, the nonmoving party must "do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986), and instead must "establish some genuine issue for trial such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in her favor." Gordon v. FedEx Freight, Inc., 674 F.3d 769, 772-73 (7th Cir. 2012).

In reviewing a motion for summary judgment, the Court gives the nonmoving party "the benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences that could be drawn from it." Grochocinski v. Mayer Brown Rowe & Maw, LLP, 719 F.3d 785, 794 (7th Cir. 2013). The Court must not make credibility determinations or weigh conflicting evidence. McCann v. Iroquois Mem'l Hosp., 622 F.3d 745, 752 (7th Cir. 2013).Analysis

I. Christensen's Disparate-Treatment Claim

"A claim for disparate treatment based on disability under the ADA . . . requires proof ([A]) plaintiff was disabled; ([B]) plaintiff was qualified to perform essential functions with or without reasonable accommodation; and ([C]) disability was the 'but for' cause of adverse employment action." Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 541 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Monroe v. Ind. Dep't of Transp., 871 F.3d 503-04 (7th Cir. 2017)). Christensen's disparate-treatment claim fails because she cannot show that she was qualified for her position.

A. Christensen was not a "qualified individual."

"The Seventh Circuit has repeatedly held that an employee who does not come to work cannot perform the essential functions of [her] job [and is thus not a 'qualified individual' under the ADA]." Moore-Fotso v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of Chicago, 211 F. Supp. 3d 1012, 1025 (N.D. Ill. 2016); accord, e.g., Basden v. Prof. Transp., Inc., 714 F.3d 1034, 1037 (7th Cir. 2013) ("An employer is generally permitted to treat regular attendance as an essential job requirement and need not accommodate erratic or unreliable attendance."); Byrne v. Avon Prods., Inc., 328 F.3d 379, 381 (7th Cir. 2003); Amadio v. Ford Motor Co., 238 F.3d 919, 927-28 (7th Cir. 2001).

"This regular attendance requirement applies . . . to teachers." Moore-Fotso, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1025; see Nowak v. St. Rita High Sch., 142 F.3d 999, 1003 (7th Cir. 1998) ("[A teacher] who does not come to work cannot perform the essentialfunctions of [her] job."); Preddie v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 814 (7th Cir. 2015); Tyndall v. Nat'l Educ. Ctrs., Inc. of California, 31 F.3d 209, 213 (4th Cir. 1994).

In the Fall 2013 academic term alone, Christensen missed twenty-three classes due to various physical and mental ailments.³ DSOF ¶ 12; see, e.g., Preddie, 799 F.3d at 814 (plaintiff's "twenty-three absences [during a single school year] prevented him from performing the essential functions of his teaching position," and as a result, "he [was] not a qualified individual"); Jovanovic v. In-Sink-Erator Div. of Emerson Elec. Co., 201 F.3d 894, 899-900 (7th Cir. 2000) (plaintiff's twenty-four absences over a twelve-month period disqualified him as a "qualified individual" under the ADA).

Moreover, the record indicates that Christensen's attendance issues were longstanding. See Moore-Fotso, 211 F. Supp. 3d at 1026 ("Given Plaintiff's longstanding history of absences . . . there was literally nothing in the record to suggest that the future would look different from the past and Plaintiff would reliably attend work in the future." (citation omitted)). For instance, when asked about accommodations she requested from Rock Valley, Christensen testified thatduring a semester "three to five years" before she was terminated—and every semester thereafter, until her termination—she requested an improved system for notifying her students when she would cancel class. See Defs.' Ex. A, Christensen Dep. at 69:10-71:16, ...