Christie v. Commonwealth

JOSHUA NATHAN CHRISTIE v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 1048-20-3

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

JULY 20, 2021

UNPUBLISHED

Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Humphreys and O'Brien

Argued by videoconference

MEMORANDUM OPINION^* BY CHIEF JUDGE MARLA GRAFF DECKER

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF BEDFORD COUNTY

James W. Updike, Jr., Judge

Morgan W. Hollister, Senior Trial Attorney (Office of the Public Defender, on briefs), for appellant.

Liam A. Curry, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

Joshua Nathan Christie appeals his conviction for possession of methamphetamine in violation of Code § 18.2-250. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred by ruling that his prior receipt of a deferred disposition for a charge of marijuana possession barred the court from granting his subsequent request for a deferred disposition on the methamphetamine charge. We hold that the plain meaning of the applicable version of the deferred disposition statute, Code § 18.2-251, supports the trial court's ruling. Consequently, we affirm the appellant's conviction.

I. BACKGROUND¹

On September 9, 2019, the appellant was stopped for speeding. During the course of the traffic stop, the officer smelled marijuana, and the appellant volunteered that he hadmethamphetamine in his vehicle. The officer seized the substance, and subsequent laboratory analysis confirmed that it was 5.5 grams of methamphetamine.

In July 2020, the appellant was indicted for possession of a Schedule II controlled substance based on the methamphetamine recovered during the 2019 traffic stop. On August 25, 2020, he entered into a plea agreement with the Commonwealth, and pursuant to that agreement, he pleaded guilty to violating Code § 18.2-250. That same day, after conducting a plea colloquy, the court found that the appellant had entered the plea "freely and voluntarily." It accepted the plea and the prosecutor's proffer of supporting evidence.

The appellant then asked the court to defer disposition pursuant to Code § 18.2-251. He conceded that he had received a prior deferred disposition for possession of marijuana, charged as a violation of Code § 18.2-250.1, in Roanoke General District Court in 2007 and that the charged offense was a criminal one at that time. Nonetheless, the appellant pointed to the 2020 statutory amendment decriminalizing marijuana possession and making it a civil offense instead.² He emphasized that marijuana possession also had been removed from the provisions of the deferral statute and argued that his 2007 deferral for that offense therefore did not bar his request for deferral on the 2020 methamphetamine charge.

The trial court rejected the appellant's argument. It concluded that the statutory scheme provided "one bite at the apple" in the form of a deferred disposition for a criminal offense. Because the appellant "had his bite at the apple" for the 2007 then-criminal offense, he "[did not] get a second bite." The court reasoned that the legislature "remove[d] possession of marijuana [from] the first offender provision" of the deferral statute "merely to be consistent with thechange[ of] possession of marijuana" from a criminal offense to a civil one. Finally, it reasoned that general retroactivity principles were not relevant because the applicable version of the deferral statute was the one in effect at the time of sentencing in September 2020.

The court sentenced the appellant to two years in prison with all time suspended on certain conditions.

II. ANALYSIS

The appellant argues that the trial court erred by interpreting Code § 18.2-251 to bar him from receiving a deferred disposition for his charge of possession of methamphetamine. He contends that the deferred disposition of his 2007 charge for misdemeanor marijuana possession pursuant to the pre-2020 version of Code § 18.2-251 does not constitute the "previous[] . . . dismiss[al]" of "such an offense . . . as provided in this section" under the 2020 version of the statute. This is so, he suggests, because the amendments to Code § 18.2-251 and related statutes "reflect[] the legislative intent to decriminalize the personal use of marijuana." As a result, he argues that his 2007 charge for possession of marijuana is no longer "such a criminal offense" under the language of Code § 18.2-251. Consequently, he concludes that this prior deferral does not bar him from receiving another deferred disposition, suggesting essentially that the first deferral is a nullity.

Code § 18.2-251 permits a court to defer proceedings against defendants charged with drug offenses under specified circumstances. See 2001 Va. Acts ch. 827; 2007 Va. Acts ch. 133; 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1286. "Deferred dispositions under Code § 18.2-251" are "acts of legislative grace that allow someone who has broken the law to avoid conviction" pursuant to the express terms of the statute. Nunez v. Commonwealth, 66 Va. App. 152, 160 (2016). Virginia's trial courts have "broad discretion under Code § 18.2-251 in deciding whether to defer a finding ofguilt and to grant first offender status to a first-time drug offender." Montalvo v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 95, 98 (1998).

The instant case requires interpretation of Code § 18.2-251. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that is reviewed de novo by an appellate court. Wright v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 754, 759 (2009). The Court is guided by well-established principles of statutory construction.

We "'presume[] that the legislature chose, with care, the words it use[d]' when it enact[ed the] statute." Jones v. Commonwealth, 68 Va. App. 304, 307 (2017) (first and second alterations in original) (quoting Rives v. Commonwealth, 284 Va. 1, 3 (2012)). "Once the legislature has acted, the role of the judiciary 'is the narrow one of determining what [the legislature] meant by the words it used in the statute [under review].'" Chapman v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 725, 732 (2010) (first alteration in original) (quoting Dionne v. Se. Foam Converting & Packaging, Inc., 240 Va. 297, 304 (1990)). "When [statutory] language . . . is unambiguous, [the appellate court is] bound by its plain meaning." Taylor v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 336, 341 (2020) (quoting Conyers v. Martial Arts World of Richmond, Inc., 273 Va. 96, 104 (2007)).

"Statutes that permit the trial court to impose alternatives to incarceration," like the statute at issue here, "are highly remedial and should be liberally construed to provide trial courts [with] valuable tools for rehabilitation of criminals." Peyton v. Commonwealth, 268 Va. 503, 508 (2004). Nonetheless, a court may not construe a statute so broadly as to extend it beyond its express boundaries. See, e.g., Neal v. Fairfax Cnty. Police Dep't, 299 Va. 253, 269 (2020) (noting that even in the case of remedial legislation, a court is "not at liberty to stretch the meaning of a statute in a manner that would contravene the legislature's intent").

We first address which version of the deferred disposition statute controls the outcome of the case. At all times relevant to this appeal, Code § 18.2-251 provided in pertinent part that acourt "may" defer proceedings "[w]henever any person who [meets certain criteria] pleads guilty to . . . possession of a controlled substance under § 18.2-250," the statute under which the appellant's methamphetamine offense was charged. Compare 2020 Va. Acts chs. 1285-86, with 2001 Va. Acts ch. 827, and 2007 Va. Acts ch. 133. See generally Code § 1-214(A) (providing that when no effective date is specified in ordinary legislation enacted in a general session, that legislation takes effect on July 1). The statute further states that the court "may" defer disposition "upon such plea." See 2020 Va. Acts ch. 1285-86; 2007 Va. Acts ch. 133; 2001 Va. Acts ch. 827. Consequently, to determine which version of the deferral statute applies, the Court looks to when the defendant pleaded guilty to the offense. Here, the appellant entered his guilty plea on August 25, 2020. Therefore, the version of Code § 18.2-251 that took effect on July 1, 2020, is the applicable version of the statute.³

The Court must next determine whether the appellant met the criteria in that version of the deferral statute necessary to permit the trial court to grant a deferred disposition on the 2020 methamphetamine charge. The 2020 version of the statute provides more fully as follows (with the text added in 2020 appearing in italics and the text deleted appearing as stricken):

Whenever any person who has not previously been convicted of any criminal offense under this article or under any statute . . . of any state relating to narcotic drugs[ or] marijuana . . . , or has not previously had a proceeding against him for violation of such an offense dismissed as provided in this section, . . . pleads guilty to . . . possession of a controlled substance under § 18.2-250 or to possession of marijuana under § 18.2-250.1, the court, upon such plea if the facts found by the court would justify a finding of guilt, without entering a judgment of guilt . . . , may defer further proceedings and place him on probation . . . .

2020 Va. Acts chs. 1285-86. In amending Code § 18.2-251 in 2020, the General Assembly altered the terms under which the single act of legislative grace authorized by the statute can be granted. See Nunez, 66 Va. App. at 160. Effective on the same date, July 1, 2020, the General Assembly also amended Code § 18.2-250.1. See 2020 Va. Acts chs. 1285-86; Code § 1-214(A). As a consequence of that amendment, possession of marijuana was "a civil offense" rather than a criminal one under the 2020 version of the statute. See 2020 Va. Acts chs. 1285-86.⁴

Regardless of the 2020 amendment to Code § 18.2-250.1 making possession of marijuana a civil offense, the Court must first look solely to the language of the 2020 version of Code § 18.2-251, the deferred disposition statute. Although statutes involving the same subject matter should be...