Christie v. Islamic Republic of Iran

GLENN TYLER CHRISTIE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 19-1289 (BAH)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

July 2, 2020

Chief Judge Beryl A. Howell

MEMORANDUM OPINION

This action arises out of the bombing on June 25, 1996 of the Khobar Towers apartment complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, which housed United States military personnel, including the 14 service-member plaintiffs in this case. See First Amended Compl. ("FAC") at 3, ECF No. 9. Also among the 35 plaintiffs are family members of these 14 service-member plaintiffs. See id. ¶ 41. Plaintiffs allege that defendants — the Islamic Republic of Iran ("Iran"), the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps ("IRGC"), and the Iranian Ministry of Information and Security ("MOIS") — are liable under the terrorism exception to the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act ("FSIA"), 28 U.S.C. § 1605A, for "provid[ing] material support and resources to its agent, Hizbollah . . . which facilitated and caused the terror attack on the Khobar Towers[]." FAC ¶ 136. Although plaintiffs have complied with the FSIA's requirements for service on defendants, defendants have failed to enter an appearance or otherwise defend against this action. See 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(4); Return of Service, ECF No. 23; Clerk's Entry of Default, ECF No. 30. Plaintiffs now seek the entry of a default judgment against defendants as to liability and damages. Pls.' Mot. to Take Judicial Notice of Evid. in Related Prior Cases and for Entry of Default J. as to Liability ("Pls.' Mot. I"), ECF No. 29; Pls.' Mot. for Default J. as to Liability and Damages & Entry of Final J. ("Pls. Mot. II"), ECF No. 35. For the reasons detailed below, default judgment as to liability and damages is granted.¹

I. BACKGROUND

Several prior decisions of this Court have found the defendants liable for the Khobar Towers bombing: Blais v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 459 F. Supp. 2d 40, 46-51 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); Estate of Heiser v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Heiser I), 466 F. Supp. 2d 229, 248 (D.D.C. 2006) (Lamberth, J.); Rimkus v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 750 F. Supp. 2d 163, 167 (D.D.C. 2010) (Lamberth, J.); Akins v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 332 F. Supp. 3d 1, 10 (D.D.C. 2018) (Howell, C.J.); Schooley v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 17-cv-1376 (BAH), 2019 WL 2717888 (D.D.C. June 27, 2019) (Howell, C.J.); Aceto v. Islamic Republic of Iran, No. 19-cv-464 (BAH), 2020 WL 619925 (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2020) (Howell, C.J.) (addressing only defendant Iran). In Blais and Heiser I, the Court heard evidence and witness testimony. See Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 46 n.4; Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 250. In Heiser I alone, the offering of evidence took 17 days, which included examination of witnesses, including seven expert witnesses. See 466 F. Supp. 2d at 250.² Rimkus, Akins, and Schooley concluded that judicial notice of the findings of fact in Blais and Heiser I was appropriate, see Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 167; Akins,332 F. Supp. 3d at 9; Schooley, 2019 WL 2717888, at *2, and the plaintiffs here request that this Court "take judicial notice of the records and proceedings from prior related cases . . . wherein the same Iranian Defendants were held liable for providing material support and resources to support" the Khobar Towers bombing. Pls.' Mem. Supp. Mot. to Take Judicial Notice of Evid. in Related Prior Cases and for Entry of Default J. as to Liability and Request to Submit Documentary Evidence Under Seal ("Pls.' Mem.") at 9, ECF No. 29.

Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of Evidence authorizes a court to "judicially notice" adjudicative facts that are "not subject to reasonable dispute because" they "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." FED. R. EVID. 201(b).³ Rule 201 is used frequently to judicially notice factual evidence developed in other FSIA proceedings "involving the same conduct by the same defendants," Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, "even when those proceedings have taken place in front of a different judge," Foley v. Syrian Arab Republic, 249 F. Supp. 3d 186, 191 (D.D.C. 2017) (citing Brewer v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 664 F. Supp. 2d 43, 54 (D.D.C. 2009)). This avoids "the formality of having that evidence reproduced." Harrison v. Republic of Sudan, 882 F. Supp. 2d 23, 31 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Taylor v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 811 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7 (D.D.C. 2011)); see also Oveissi v. Islamic Republic of Iran (Oveissi II), 879 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2012) (finding courts permitted "in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation"); Estate of Botvin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 873 F. Supp. 2d 232, 237 (D.D.C. 2012) (taking "judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases"). Taking judicial notice ofprior findings "does not conclusively establish the facts found in those cases" in the later FSIA case. Foley, 249 F. Supp. 3d at 191. Rather, "based on judicial notice of the evidence presented in the earlier cases[,] . . . courts may reach their own independent findings of fact." Anderson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 753 F. Supp. 2d 68, 75 (D.D.C. 2010); see also Rimkus, 750 F. Supp. 2d at 172. In fact, "courts in FSIA litigation have adopted a middle-ground approach that permits courts in subsequent related cases to rely upon the evidence presented in earlier litigation — without necessitating the formality of having that evidence reproduced — to reach their own, independent findings of fact in the cases before them." Rimkus, 750 F.Supp.2d at 172.⁴

This Court is persuaded that this approach is both "efficient and sufficiently protective of the absent defendants' interests," Akins, 332 F. Supp. 3d at 11, and will therefore adopt it and grant the plaintiffs' request to take judicial notice of the evidence presented in Heiser I, Blais, Rimkus, Akins, and Schooley. See id. (stating that factual evidence developed in other cases "involving the same conduct by the same defendants . . . admissible and may be relied upon in this case."). The evidence regarding the Khobar Towers bombing is summarized below, followed by an overview of the procedural history of this case.

A. The Attack on Khobar Towers

The Khobar Towers residential complex in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia "housed the coalition forces," including the U.S. military forces, "charged with monitoring compliance with [United Nations] security council resolutions." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47. About 10 minutes before 10:00 pm on June 25, 1996, "a large gasoline tanker truck pulled up" and parked "alongside theperimeter wall of the Khobar Towers complex." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; see also FAC ¶ 124. Security guards near the top of one of the towers, Building 131, "started to give warnings about the unusual vehicle location," but the truck exploded "within about 15 minutes." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; see also FAC ¶ 124. The blast "sheared off the face of Building 131," Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252, and "shattered windows more than half a mile away," FAC at 1. Subsequent "investigation determined that the force of the explosion was the equivalent of 20,000 pounds of TNT. The Defense Department said that it was the largest non-nuclear explosion ever up to that time." Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252; see also FAC ¶ 126.

B. The Defendants' Roles

Iran "has been designated a state sponsor of terrorism" by the U.S. Department of State "since January 19, 1984." Blais, 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47; see also, e.g., Fritz v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 320 F. Supp. 3d 48, 77 (D.D.C. 2018); U.S. Dep't of State, State Sponsors of Terrorism, https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm. As Blais described it, "the IRGC is a non-traditional instrumentality of Iran," serving as "the military arm of a kind of shadow government answering directly to the Ayatollah and the mullahs who hold power in Iran." 459 F. Supp. 2d at 47.

Prior proceedings have found that Iran, along with the IRGC and MOIS, planned and supported the Khobar Towers bombing.⁵ The attack was "approved" by both the Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran at the time, and the Minister of Intelligence and Security. Heiser I, 466 F. Supp. 2d at 252. The truck bomb used was "assembled" at a base in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley "jointly operated by the IRGC and by the terrorist organization known as Hezbollah;" the individuals who carried out the bombing called themselves "Saudi Hezbollah." Id.

These conclusions are based in part on the testimony of four key expert witnesses in Blais and Heiser I. Louis Freeh, who was director of the FBI at the time of the bombing, and Dale Watson, then deputy counterterrorism chief of the FBI, testified in Heiser I based on their oversight of the FBI's "massive and thorough investigation of the attack, using over 250 agents." Id.; see also id. at 260-62. "Based on that investigation, an Alexandria, Virginia, grand jury returned an indictment . . . against 13 identified members of the pro-Iran Saudi Hezbollah organization." Id. at 252. During its investigation, the FBI interviewed six members of Saudi Hezbollah who "admitted to the FBI their complicity in the attack on Khobar Towers, and admitted that senior officials in the Iranian government provided them with funding, planning, training, sponsorship, and travel necessary to carry out the attack on Khobar Towers." Id. at 253. Both Freeh and Watson testified to their conclusions. Id. at 264. Based on information gathered in their investigations, both testified that "Iran, MOIS, and IRGC were responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing carried out by Saudi Hezbollah." Id. at 264.

Finally, Dr. Patrick Clawson provided expert testimony in support of this conclusion in Heiser I: "the government of Iran, MOIS, and IRGC were responsible for the Khobar Towers bombing, and that Saudi Hezbollah carried out the attack under their direction." Id. at 253. This conclusion was ...