Christina C. v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.

1

CHRISTINA C. ^[1], Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.

No. 23-CV-107 (JLS)

United States District Court, W.D. New York

January 16, 2024

DECISION AND ORDER

JOHN X SINATRA, JR. UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

Plaintiff Christina C. brought this action under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of the Social Security Act, seeking review of the decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration that she was not disabled. Dkt. 1. Plaintiff moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 6-1. The Commissioner responded and cross-moved for judgment on the pleadings. Dkt. 9-1. For the reasons below, the Court denies Plaintiffs motion and grants the Commissioner's cross motion.

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

This action originates from Plaintiffs application for Supplemental Security Income (“SSI”), filed on August 8, 2019.^[2] Tr. 10, 216-32.^[3] Plaintiffs application was initially denied, and she requested a hearing before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”). Tr. 127-134 137-155. Following the hearing, in which Plaintiff was represented by counsel, ALJ Robert Gonzalez issued a decision finding that Plaintiff was not disabled. Tr. 7-20. Plaintiff s request for Appeals Council review was denied, after which Plaintiff commenced this action. Dkt. 9-1.

LEGAL STANDARDS

I. DISTRICT COURT REVIEW

Judicial review of disability claims under the Act is limited to whether the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence and whether the correct legal standards were applied. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Cichocki v. Astrue, 729 F.3d 172, 177 (2d Cir. 2013). The Commissioner's factual findings are conclusive when supported by substantial evidence. See Biestek v Berryhill, 139 S.Ct. 1148, 1152 (2019). “Substantial evidence” is “more than a mere scintilla” and “means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).

The Court does not determine de novo whether the claimant is disabled, but the Commissioner's conclusions of law are not given the same deferential standard of review. See Byam v. Barnhart, 336 F.3d 172, 179 (2d Cir. 2003). If there is a reasonable basis of doubt about whether the ALJ applied the correct legal standards, then upholding the determination “creates an unacceptable risk that a claimant will be deprived of the right to have his disability determination made according to correct legal principles.” Johnson v. Bowen, 817 F.2d 983, 986 (2d Cir. 1987); see Moran v. Astrue, 569 F.3d 108, 112 (2d Cir. 2009) (quoting Cruz v. Sullivan, 912 F.2d 8, 11 (2d Cir. 1990)) (holding that the Court's review for legal error ensures “that the claimant has had a full hearing under the . . . regulations and in accordance with the beneficent purposes of the . . . Act.”).

II. DISABILITY DETERMINATION

Disability under the Act is determined under a five-step test. See Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U.S. 467, 470-71 (1986); 20 C.F.R. § 416.920. First, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant is currently engaged in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b). “Substantial gainful activity” is work activity that involves significant physical or mental activities and is normally done for pay or profit. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. If the ALJ finds that the claimant is engaged in substantial gainful activity, the claimant cannot claim disability. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(b).

Second, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has a medically determinable impairment, or a combination of impairments, that significantly limits the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(c). Absent such impairment, the claimant may not claim disability. Id.

Third, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant meets or medically equals the criteria of an impairment listed in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d). If such criteria are met, then the claimant is declared disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(d).

Even if the claimant is not declared disabled under the third step, the ALJ still may find disability under the next two steps of the analysis. The ALJ must determine the claimant's residual functional capacity (“RFC”). 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(e). The RFC is a holistic assessment of the claimant's medical impairments-both severe and non-severe-that evaluates the claimant's ability to perform physical or mental work activities on a sustained basis, notwithstanding limitations for collective impairments. 20 C.F.R. § 416.945.

In the fourth step, the ALJ must determine whether the claimant has the RFC to perform past relevant work. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(f). If the claimant is capable of performing past relevant work, then the claimant is not disabled. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(b)(3). If the ALJ finds that the claimant is unable to perform past relevant work, the analysis proceeds to the fifth and final step. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(g)(1).

In this final analytical step, the AL J must decide whether the claimant is able to perform any other relevant work corresponding with her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c). Here, the burden of proof shifts from the claimant to the Commissioner to prove that a significant number of jobs in the national economy exists that the claimant can perform given her RFC, age, education, and work experience. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.920(g), 416.960(c); see Rosa v. Callahan, 168 F.3d 72, 77 (2d Cir. 1999).

DISCUSSION

I. THE ALJ's DECISION

The ALJ determined that Plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since filing her application on August 8, 2019. Tr. 12. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff suffered from the following severe impairments: asthma, peripheral neuropathy, depressive disorder, bipolar disorder, panic disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder (“PTSD”), and attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (“ADHD”). Id. The ALJ concluded, however, that Plaintiffs severe impairments did not meet or medically equal one of the listed impairments in 20 C.F.R. Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. Tr. 12.

After considering the entire record, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff had the RFC to perform light work as defined in 20 C.F.R. § 416.967(b) with the following limitations:

[Plaintiff] must avoid concentrated exposure to dust, fumes, and noxious gases. She can perform frequent stooping, kneeling, crouching, and stair climbing. [Plaintiff] can understand[,] remember[,] and carry out simple work and adapt to routine workplace changes. She can occasionally interact with supervisors, coworkers, and the general public.

Tr. 14.

The ALJ found that Plaintiff had no past relevant work. Tr. 18. But the ALJ concluded that Plaintiff was not disabled because her age, education, work experience, and RFC allowed her to perform jobs existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Id. As such, according to the ALJ, Plaintiff had not been under a disability since her application date of August 8, 2019. Tr. 19.

II. PLAINTIFF'S ARGUMENT

Plaintiff makes three arguments for judgment in her favor. See Dkt. 6-1. First, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erroneously evaluated her subjective complaints. Id. at 13. Second, Plaintiff claims that the ALJ failed to adequately articulate the persuasiveness of the opinion evidence. Id. at 17. Lastly, Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to reconcile the medical opinions of Dr. Santarpia and Dr. Lieber-Diaz. Id. at 20.

III. ANALYSIS

An ALJ must “weigh all of the evidence available to make an RFC finding that [is] consistent with the record as a whole.” Matta v. Astrue, 508 F. App'x. 53, 56 (2d Cir. 2013). The Second Circuit has held that, where “‘the record contains sufficient evidence from which an ALJ can assess the [claimant's] residual functional capacity' a medical source statement or formal medical opinion is not necessarily required[.]” Monroe v. Comm'r, 676 F. App'x. 5, 8 (2d Cir. 2017) (quoting Tankisi v. Comm'r, 521 Fed.Appx. 29, 34 (2d Cir. 2013)). See also Corbiere v. Berryhill, 760 Fed.Appx. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2019) (affirming Commissioner's final decision despite lack of medical opinion expressly discussing Plaintiffs physical limitations and ALJ's reliance on treatment notes to formulate the RFC).

When determining a claimant's RFC, “the ALJ is required to take the claimant's reports of pain and other limitations into account, but is not required to accept the claimant's subjective complaints without question; he may exercise discretion in weighing the credibility of the claimant's testimony in light of the other evidence in the record.” Genier v. Astrue, 606 F.3d 46, 49 (2d Cir. 2010). Daily activities are considered in assessing a plaintiffs subjective symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(3)(i). The ALJ properly accounted for Plaintiffs ability to cook, perform laundry, care for her child, and socialize with friends and family. Tr. 16, 1044, 1040. Although Plaintiff is correct that these activities do not prove that she can hold a job, the ALJ is permitted to consider them when determining the severity of her symptoms.

Here Plaintiff argues that the ALJ improperly cited his own lay judgment as a basis for not accepting Plaintiffs complaints, citing the ALJ's statement regarding Plaintiffs conservative medical treatment. Dkt. 6-1 at 15. Medication and treatment are factors used to evaluate a Plaintiffs symptoms. 20 C.F.R. § 416.929(c)(iv)(v). Additionally, the Second Circuit has determined that conservative treatment may weigh against a finding of disability. See Jessie O. v. Commm'r of Soc. Sec., No. 20-CV-06986-MJR, 2022 WL 4481466, at *9 (W.D.N.Y. Sept. 27, 2022) (conservative treatment may weigh against a finding of disability); Penfield v. Colvin, ...