Christopher v. Reaching Fourth Ministries

CARREA CHRISTOPHER, Plaintiff, v. REACHING FOURTH MINISTRIES, et al., Defendants.

Case No. 17-cv-00726-BAS-BLM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

January 22, 2018

ORDER:

(1) GRANTING MOTION FOR COURT TO REVIEW DE NOVO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION [ECF No. 20];

(2) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS FOR LACK OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION [ECF No. 21];

AND

(3) DISMISSING CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE

Plaintiff Carrea Christopher, proceeding in forma pauperis ("IFP"), has filed a Second Amended Complaint ("SAC"). (ECF No. 18.) Defendants Buffco Production, Inc. ("Buffco"), Frank M. Bufkin III, Jason Moore, John Rich, and Arthur "Eric" Swanson (the "Appearing Defendants") have moved to dismiss the SAC for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 21.) Plaintiff has opposed (ECF No. 24) and the Appearing Defendants have replied (ECF No. 29.) In addition, Plaintiff has filed motions to (1) conduct a de novo review of subject matter jurisdiction over the SAC (ECF No. 20) and (2) transfer the case to the Eastern District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1406 (ECF No. 26). For the reasons herein, the Court grants Plaintiff's motion to conduct a de novo review of subject matter jurisdiction and grants the Appearing Defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The Court dismisses Plaintiff's claims without prejudice and terminates as moot all other motions pending before this Court. (ECF Nos. 26, 28.)

I. BACKGROUND

On April 10, 2017, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commenced this action alleging claims of fraud, negligence, and "illegal drainage of resources" in connection with land located in Cherokee County, Texas and claimed by Plaintiff. (ECF No. 1.) The case has twice been dismissed for failure to properly invoke diversity jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 3, 14.) In its last dismissal of the case, the Court cautioned Plaintiff that venue in the Southern District might be improper under 28 U.S.C. §1391 because none of the Defendants reside in California and the property that Plaintiff's claims concern is located in Texas. (ECF No. 14.) Plaintiff subsequently filed the SAC on November 14, 2017. (ECF No. 18.) The SAC alleges the foregoing claims against the Appearing Defendants as well as Defendants Reaching Fourth Ministries, Cattle Oil Co. ("Cattle Oil"), Sharon Christopher and Gary Christopher. (Id.) The Appearing Defendants have made a special appearance in this Court for the limited purpose of moving to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. (ECF No. 21.)

II. DISCUSSION

A. The Court Possesses Subject Matter Jurisdiction

The Court first considers Plaintiff's request for a de novo determination of whether this Court has subject matter jurisdiction over the action. (ECF No. 20.)

Separate from the pre-screening requirements Section 1915(e) imposes on a complaint where a plaintiff proceeds IFP, "federal courts have a duty to raise and decide issues of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte if at any time it appears that subject matter jurisdiction may be lacking." Bank Julius Baer & Co. Ltd v. Wikileaks, 535 F. Supp. 2d 980, 984 (N.D. Cal. 2008) (citations omitted). "Where a court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, it must dismiss the complaint in its entirety." Adames v. Taju, 80 F. Supp. 3d 465, 467 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (citing Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 514 (2006)). Subject matter jurisdiction may exist where the pleadings present a federal question, see 28 U.S.C. §1331, or where the plaintiff invokes diversity jurisdiction, see 28 U.S.C. §1332. On two occasions, the Court determined that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiff's Complaint for failure to properly invoke diversity jurisdiction. (ECF Nos. 3, 14.) Plaintiff filed the SAC to cure the subject matter deficiencies of the First Amended Complaint.

After a review of the SAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff has now properly invoked diversity jurisdiction by pleading complete diversity. Complete diversity exists when "the citizenship of each plaintiff is diverse from the citizenship of each defendant." Caterpillar Inc. v. Lewis, 519 U.S. 61, 68 (1996). Plaintiff alleges that he is a resident of Washington and all Defendants are residents of Texas. (ECF No. 18 at 2.) Although Plaintiff refers to residence, the Court, liberally construing the pleadings, believes that Plaintiff is referring to domicile, which is what a court reviews to determine whether complete diversity exists insofar as the individual defendants are concerned. See Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 2001) (a natural person's citizenship is determined by the state of domicile, not the state of residence). Plaintiff also alleges that the corporate Defendants are incorporated in and have principal places of business in Texas. (SAC at 2.) Accordingly, there is complete diversity among the parties and this Court has subject matter jurisdiction.

B. The Court Lacks Personal Jurisdiction Over the Defendants

The Appearing Defendants move to dismiss the action under Rule 12(b)(2) on the ground that this Court lacks personal jurisdiction over them. (ECF No. 21.) The Appearing Defendants have also filed declarations in support of their motion. (See ECF No. 21-2 ("Bufkin Decl."); ECF No. 21-2 ("Moore Decl."); ECF No. 21-3 ("Rich Decl."); ECF No. 21-4 ("Swanson Decl.").) The Court agrees that it lacks personal jurisdiction over the Appearing Defendants and further concludes that it lacks such jurisdiction over the Defendants who have not yet appeared.¹

1. Legal Standard

Rule 12(b)(2) allows a party to move for dismissal based on a lack of personal jurisdiction. FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(2). Personal jurisdiction is an essential element of a court's jurisdiction and, without it, a court is "powerless to proceed to an adjudication." Ruhrgas AG v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 575 (1999). "Personal jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant is appropriate if the relevant state's long arm-statute permits the assertion of jurisdiction without violating federal due process." Schwarzenegger v. Fred Martin Motor Co., 374 F.3d 797, 800-01 (9th Cir. 2004). Because California's long arm statute is co-extensive with federal due process requirements, the jurisdictional analyses under California law and federal due process are the same. Id. at 801. Therefore, absent traditional bases for personal jurisdiction (i.e., physical presence, domicile, and consent), the Due Process Clauserequires that nonresident defendants have certain "minimum contacts" with the forum state, "such that the exercise of personal jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice." Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).

As the party seeking to invoke this Court's jurisdiction, Plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that this Court has personal jurisdiction over Defendants. Scott v. Breeland, 792 F.2d 925, 927 (9th Cir. 1986) (citing Data Disc, Inc. v. Sys. Tech. Assocs., 557 F.2d 1280, 1285 (9th Cir. 1977)). The prima facie showing is achieved by producing admissible evidence which, if believed, would sufficiently establish personal jurisdiction. Ballard v. Savage, 65 F.3d 1495, 1498 (9th Cir. 1995). The court accepts uncontroverted facts in the complaint as true. Mavrix Photo, Inc. v. Brand Techs., Inc., 647 F.3d 1218, 1223 (9th Cir. 2011). Jurisdictional facts, however, cannot be established by nonspecific, conclusory statements. Butcher's Union Local No. 498, United Food & Commercial Workers v. SDC Inv., Inc., 788 F.2d 535, 540 (9th Cir. 1986) (although liberally construed, the complaint "must contain something more than mere conclusory statements that are unsupported by specific facts").

2. The Court Lacks General Jurisdiction Over the Defendants

General jurisdiction exists if a nonresident's contacts with the forum are "continuous" and "systematic." Ziegler v. Indian River Cty., 64 F.3d 470, 473 (9th Cir. 1995). These continuous and systematic contacts with a state allow a court to exercise general jurisdiction over defendants even for causes of action that are "entirely distinct" from acts which confer such jurisdiction. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2849 (2011). Given the nature of general jurisdiction, a plaintiff must meet an "exacting standard" because a finding of general jurisdiction would "permit[] a defendant to be haled into court in the forum state to answer for any of its activities elsewhere in the world." Schwarzenegger, 374 F.3d at 801.

a. The Corporate Defendants

A court may assert jurisdiction over a foreign corporation to hear any and all claims against it "only when the corporation's affiliations with the State in which suit is brought are so constant and pervasive 'as to render it essentially at home in the forum state.'" Goodyear, 131 S. Ct. at 2850. This requires a corporation to be "at home" in the State, which is ordinarily shown when the defendant is incorporated in the jurisdiction or its principal place of business is located there. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 753 (2014). Contacts such as a "long-established presence," generation of "substantial revenue" from a state, and having "many in-state consumers" have all also been used to establish general jurisdiction. Tuazon v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 433 F.3d 1163, 1169 (9th Cir. 2006).

In his SAC, Plaintiff concedes that Buffco is incorporated in and has its principal place of business in Texas. (SAC at 2.) In seeking to dismiss the Complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, Buffco's founder, Defendant Frank M. Bufkin III, corroborates this point. (See Bufkin Decl. ¶4.) He further represents that Buffco lacks property, assets, operations, employees, or offices in California and does not pay taxes to any California entity. (Id. ¶3.) Plaintiff's opposition to Defendants' motion offers no specific facts controverting these representations. (See generally ECF Nos. 18, 24.) Accordingly, the Court finds that...