CHRO v. City of Torrington, No. CV04-0528132S (CT 6/10/2005)

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Unpublished Opinion

Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities v. City of Torrington et al.

Holly Blinkoff v. Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities et al.

Opinion No.: 89174.

No. CV04-0528132S

Superior Court of Connecticut

Judicial District of New Britain at New Britain

June 10, 2005

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

MARSHALL K. BERGER, JUDGE.

I

On January 20, 1995, Holly Blinkoff (Ms. Blinkoff) filed a complaint with the Commission on Human Rights and Opportunities (CHRO) alleging that the city of Torrington (city) and its employees and officials (the municipal defendants) discriminated against her, because of her sex and religion, in the operation of her family quarry business. Since that time, the parties have been engaged in battle before the CHRO and in various courts in connection with those claims. This court heard the instant motions to dismiss and/or for judgment in connection with the latest round of litigation almost ten years after the commencement of the process.¹

First, an abbreviated history. After the initial complaint was filed, Ms. Blinkoff filed two amendments and the CHRO investigated and determined on January 6, 1997 that it had reasonable cause to proceed.² At an initial hearing, scheduling orders were entered for an evidentiary hearing to commence on July 11, 1997. Prior to the commencement of that hearing Ms. Blinkoff filed an eight-count complaint in federal court alleging a number of federal constitutional and state law claims.³ Counts one and two of her federal complaint allege violations of General Statutes §46a-58, 46a-60 and 46a-64.⁴ The CHRO, through the Attorney General, moved to stay its own proceeding on a number of occasions, alleging in its July 11, 1997 motion for stay of proceedings that "she has raised the same claims which appear in her CHRO complaint . . . It is well established through law and precedent that a stay of the CHRO case . . . should be granted under these circumstances." (Emphasis supplied.) The municipal defendants moved for summary judgment in the federal action on various grounds, including, as to the first two counts, an exhaustion argument because the plaintiff had failed to receive a release pursuant to General Statutes §46a-101.⁵ The motion was denied as the court, Underhill, J., found that the plaintiff was still able to obtain such a release prior to trial.⁶ The summary judgment motion resolved certain other issues⁷ but, prior to trial, the court revisited the release requirement as to counts one and two. Ms. Blinkoff's attorney stated, in response to the court's question with regard to counts one and two, that "[t]hose are not in the case. We decided not to pursue those claims in this trial." (Transcript, March 28, 2002.) The matter proceeded to trial with the jury ruling for the defendants on April 16, 2002; the appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit was dismissed on June 18, 2003. On April 1, 2004, the city filed a motion to dismiss the pending matter before the CHRO on the grounds that Ms. Blinkoff's claims were fully adjudicated in federal court and its findings were binding on the CHRO pursuant to the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel. On May 10, 2004, the Honorable John P. Fitzgerald, Presiding Human Rights Referee, CHRO, ordered the matter dismissed under the doctrine of res judicata and the plaintiffs filed the present two appeals.

II

A.

As noted, the defendants maintain that all of Ms. Blinkoff's claims were either heard or could have been heard in her federal action and thus are now precluded under the doctrines of res judicata or collateral estoppel. The plaintiffs argue that counts one and two concerning the state statutory violations and the retaliation claim were not heard, could not have been heard, and certainly could not be binding on the CHRO which was not a party to the federal action.

"Res judicata or claim preclusion prevents a litigant from reasserting a claim that has already been decided on the merits. Collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, prevents a party from relitigating an issue that has been determined in a prior suit . . . Res judicata, or claim preclusion, is distinguishable from collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion. Under the doctrine of res judicata, a final judgment, when rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action, between the same parties or those in privity with them, upon the same claim . . . In contrast, collateral estoppel precludes a party from relitigating issues and facts actually and necessarily determined in an earlier proceeding between the same parties or those in privity with them upon a different claim." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Milford v. Andresakis, 52 Conn.App. 454, 460, 726 A.2d 1170, cert. denied, 248 Conn. 922, 733 A.2d 845 (1999). "The doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel protect the finality of judicial determinations, conserve the time of the court, and prevent wasteful relitigation." Gionfriddo v. Gartenhaus Cafe, 15 Conn.App. 392, 401, 546 A.2d 284 (1988), aff'd, 211 Conn. 67, 557 A.2d 540 (1989). The applicability of these two doctrines presents a question of law for the court to decide. Cumberland Farms, Inc. v. Groton, 262 Conn. 45, 57-58, 808 A.2d 1107 (2002).

In Duhaime v. American Reserve Life Insurance Co., 200 Conn. 360, 364-65, 511 A.2d 333 (1986), our Supreme Court has stated that:

[b]ecause the operative effect of the principle of claim preclusion or merger is to preclude relitigation of the "original claim," it is crucial to define the dimensions of that "original claim." The Restatement (Second), Judgments provides, in 24, that the claim [that is] extinguished includes all rights of the plaintiff to remedies against the defendant with respect to all or any part of the transaction, or series of connected transactions, out of which the action arose. What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction" and what groupings constitute a "series," are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space, origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations or business understanding or usage. In amplification of this definition of "original claim," §25 of the Restatement (Second) states that [t]he rule of 24 applies to extinguish a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant even though the plaintiff is prepared in the second action (1) [t]o present evidence or grounds or theories of the case not presented in the first action, or (2) [t]o seek remedies or forms of relief not demanded in the first action.

The transactional test of the Restatement provides a standard by which to measure the preclusive effect of a prior judgment, which we have held to include any claims relating to the cause of action which were actually made or might have been made . . . In determining the nature of a cause of action for these purposes, we have long looked to the group of facts which is claimed to have brought about an unlawful injury to the plaintiff . . . and have noted that [e]ven though a single group of facts may give rise to rights for several different kinds of relief it is still a single cause of action.

(Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) See also, New England Rehabilitation Hospital of Hartford, Inc. v. CHHC, 226 Conn. 105, 128, 627 A.2d 1257 (1993) ("Under the doctrine of res judicata, or claim preclusion, a former judgment on a claim, if rendered on the merits, is an absolute bar to a subsequent action on the same claim. A judgment is final not only as to every matter which was offered to sustain the claim, but also as to any other admissible matter which might have been offered for that purpose").

B.

The plaintiffs argue that counts one and two were not resolved in the federal litigation because they were dismissed without prejudice. The record actually reflects that Ms. Blinkoff's counsel chose not to pursue them. There is no question as to whether she had the opportunity to make the claim; the court clearly allowed the plaintiff the opportunity to seek a release from the CHRO, but she made the tactical decision not to pursue the release. Obviously if Ms. Blinkoff had sought, and been denied, a release her claim would not be precluded here but such is not the case. This is especially true in light of the federal court exercising jurisdiction over her other state law claims which arose from the same set of facts as counts one and two. The jury, in fact, was asked in an interrogatory: "[h]as the plaintiff, Holly Blinkoff, proven by a preponderance of the evidence that any or all of the defendants listed below violated equal protection under the law by treating her differently from other, similarly situated quarry owners because of her sex and or religion?" That question, of course, goes to the heart of the state statutory claims and the jury decided against Ms. Blinkoff. The CHRO and Ms. Blinkoff indicated at the hearing on this motion that she was precluded from mentioning retaliation and the CHRO filing at trial; that is certainly understandable in light of her withdrawal of the two counts which alleged such issues.

Our Supreme Court has stated "the central issue is whether, with respect to these operative facts, the [plaintiffs] had an adequate opportunity to litigate all of their claims . . . in the federal proceeding. We agree with the trial court that, in determining whether the [plaintiffs] had such an opportunity, we should apply the test set forth in the Restatement (Second) of Judgments, §25, comment (e). Under this test, [w]hen the plaintiff brings an action on [a] claim in a court, either state or federal, in which there is no jurisdictional obstacle to his advancing both theories or grounds, but he presents only one of them, and judgment is entered with respect to it, he...