Churchill v. Aroostook Med. Ctr.

1

LORI CHURCHILL, Plaintiff, v. THE AROOSTOOK MEDICAL CENTER d/b/a NORTHERN LIGHT A.R. GOULD HOSPITAL Defendant

Civil Action No. CV-2020-159

Superior Court of Maine, Aroostook

April 29, 2022

ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the Court on the motion for summary judgment filed by defendant The Aroostook Medical Center d/b/a Northern Light A.R. Gould Hospital ("TAMC" or the "Defendant"). Plaintiff Lori Churchill (the "Plaintiff") alleged in her three-count Complaint that TAMC committed unlawful employment discrimination against her (1) because of her age in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act (the "MHRA"), 5 M.R.S. § 4572(1)(A) (the Plaintiff's "Age Discrimination Claim"); (2) because she opposed a practice that is unlawful under the MHRA in violation of 5 M.R.S. §§ 4572(1)(E) &4633(1) (the Plaintiff's "MHRA Retaliation Claim"); and (3) because she reported to TAMC what she reasonably believed was a violation of Maine or federal law, 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(A), which constitutes unlawful employment discrimination under the MHRA, 5 M.R.S § 4572(1)(A) (the "WPA Retaliation Claim"). TAMC seeks summary judgment in its favor on all three counts.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The Court will grant a properly supported motion for summary judgment if "there is no genuine issue as to any material fact" and the moving party "is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." M.R. Civ. P. 56(c). "A material fact is one that can affect the outcome of the case." Lougee Conservancy v. City Mortgage Inc., 2012 ME 103, ¶ 11, 48 A.3d 774. A genuine issue exists "when there is sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to choose between competing versions of the fact," Id. ¶ 11, "even if one party's version appears more credible or persuasive." York Cty. v. Propertyinfo Corp., 2019 ME 12, ¶ 16, 200 A.3d 803.

The moving party has the initial burden of proving the absence of any genuine, material factual issues through a properly supported statement of material facts (S.M.F.) and of proving that the facts presented in that S.M.F., left uncontroverted would entitle the moving party to judgment as a matter of law at trial. See M.R. Civ. P. 56(e); Jennings v. Maclean, 2015 ME 42, ¶ 5, 114 A.3d 667; see also 3 Harvey &Merritt, Maine Civil Practice § 56:6 at 242 (3d, 2018-2019 ed.) ("The initial burden under Rule 56 lies with the moving party to demonstrate clearly the absence of a genuine issue of material fact."). In determining whether the summary judgment record reveals a genuine dispute of material fact, the Court examines the facts, including any reasonable inferences that may be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. See e.g., McCandless v. Ramsey, 2019 ME 111, ¶ 11, 211 A.3d 1157; Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 2016 ME 85, ¶ 12, 140 A.3d 1242; Maine Civil Practice § 56:6 at 242. The question of whether the moving party has initially shown that he or she is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, depends on whether the moving party bears the ultimate burden of proof on the particular claim or defense at issue on the motion.

The Defendant has moved for summary judgment on the grounds that Plaintiff is unable to prove all of the elements of her claims. Plaintiff would bear the ultimate burden of proving the elements of her claims. To meet its initial burden as the moving party, Defendant must show either that its S.M.F. presents certain facts that would refute an essential element of Plaintiff's claims, or which indicate that Plaintiff is unable to muster the necessary evidence to set forth a prima facie case. See Fontenot v. Upjohn Co., 780 F.2d 1190, 1194-97 (5th Cir. 1986); see also Waugh v. Genesis Healthcare LLC, 2019 ME 179, ¶ 9, 222 A.3d 1063 (a defendant moving for summary judgment bears the initial burden of establishing that no genuine dispute of material fact exists and that undisputed facts entitle it to a judgment as a matter of law); M.R. Civ. P. 56(e)-(h). If the Defendant satisfies this burden, the Plaintiff must respond by producing the evidence necessary to "establish a prima facie case for each element of [his or her] cause of action." Lougee Conservancy, 2012 ME 103, ¶ 12, 48 A.3d 774. This standard requires only that the Plaintiff produce "enough evidence to allow the [trier-of-fact] to infer the fact at issue and rule in the party's favor." Id. If the Plaintiff fail to satisfy this burden as to any essential element of her cause of action, the Defendant is entitled to summary judgment on that claim. Id. ¶ 12; M.R. Civ. P. 56(e).

When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Rule 56, "an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of that party's pleading but must respond by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Rule 56] setting forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." M.R. Civ. P. 56(e). M.R. Civ. P. 56(h)(2) provides that a party who opposes a motion for summary judgment must "submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise opposing statement." In this opposing statement of material facts (Opp. S.M.F.) the nonmoving party must make statements that "admit, deny, or qualify" each item of the moving party's S.M.F, beginning each statement with the designation "Admitted," "Denied," or "Qualified." If the nonmoving party chooses to "deny" or "qualify" an assertion in the S.M.F., the party must support each denial or qualification with a specific citation to evidentiary material that supports the assertion. The nonmoving party's Opp. S.M.F. may also include objections to factual assertions in the moving party's S.M.F., with a brief statement of the basis for the objection. The nonmoving party may also choose to submit a separate statement with any additional facts (S.A.F.), set forth in separate numbered paragraphs and supported by proper record citations, which the party contends raise a disputed issue for trial. The court "need not consider any additional facts when, ..., they are improperly commingled in the nonmoving party's paragraphs responding to the moving party's material facts, ..., and are not set forth in a separate section of additional facts organized in separate numbered paragraphs added pursuant to Rule 56(h)(2)." Doyle v. Dep't of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 11, 824 A.2d 48. The moving party's S.M.F. and the nonmoving party's Opp. S.M.F. and S.A.F. should be limited to factual matters and are not spaces for the parties to engage in legal arguments with each other on the merits of the issues. See e.g., Oceanic Inn, Inc. v. Sloan's Cove, LLC, 2016 ME 34, ¶ 4 n.2, 133 A.3d 1021.

In response to Defendant's S.M.F., Plaintiff filed "Supporting Statement of Material Facts" that consisted of three paragraphs of legal argument, and a "Summary of Facts" that set forth 21 paragraphs ostensibly in response to the Defendant's 152 paragraph Statement of Material Facts. Plaintiff's submission fails to comply with the protocol set forth in Rule 56 and explained by the court. Plaintiff did not respond at all to Defendant's SOMF paragraphs 18-152. Within the paragraphs included in Plaintiff's response to Defendant's SOMF, Plaintiff included improperly commingled legal arguments and commingle additional facts that went beyond admitting, denying, or qualifying the particular assertion in the S.M.F. being responded to. Many of Plaintiffs assertions also are not properly supported by references to competent evidentiary materials.

If the moving party's properly presented assertions are not controverted by proper record citations, they are deemed admitted. M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(4). Self-represented litigants are held to the same standards as represented litigants. See, Dufort v. Bangs, 644 A.2d 6, 7 (Me. 1994) (citing Uotinen v. Hall, 636 A.2d 991, 992 (Me. 1994)). Accordingly, Defendant's SOMF paragraphs 18 through 152 are deemed admitted in their entirety.

DISCUSSION

Plaintiff worked at TAMC in its Aroostook Cancer Care department. In June of 2016, the Plaintiff got into an argument at work with a physician of Middle Eastern and/or Egyptian descent during which she called him "a little brown man." As a result of Plaintiff's use of a racial slur, Yoosuf (Joseph) Saleem Siddiqui, TAMC's Vice President of Human Resources, approved disciplinary action for the Plaintiff in the form of a final written warning.

In December of 2017, Brenda Baker, who was the Plaintiff's direct supervisor, received two separate complaints regarding the Plaintiff's rude and abrupt behavior and attitude at work. One complaint involved Plaintiff's attitude towards a patient and the patient's family member, and the other complaint involved her conduct towards a TAMC maintenance worker. Based on the two complaints, Ms. Baker determined that remedial action was appropriate. Ms. Baker knew of the Plaintiff's prior written final warning for calling a physician a "little brown man," so further disciplinary action would have likely resulted in a discharge. Because Ms. Baker felt the Plaintiff could correct her behavior with coaching, she conferred with Mr. Siddiqui and together they decided not to formally discipline the Plaintiff and instead to issue her a documented "coaching session."

In January of 2018, the Plaintiff complained to Mr. Siddiqui that she felt bullied by Ms. Baker, and that Ms. Baker gossiped about her and treated her less favorably than others. The Plaintiff said nothing about perceived age or other protected class discrimination or harassment. Mr Siddiqui directed Jennifer Tweedie (who was Ms. Baker's immediate supervisor)^[1] and Sherry Hitchcock (who worked with Mr. Siddiqui in Human Resources) to conduct an investigation. When Ms. Tweedie and Ms. Hitchcock interviewed the Plaintiff, she reiterated her...