On April 26, 2019, the Second Circuit issued another decision in Shabazz v. United States (Katzmann, Leval, Berman by designation) and denied Al-Malik Shabazz’s request for rehearing in connection with the Court’s January 4, 2019 decision, which reversed the district court’s decision granting Shabazz’s habeas petition to set aside his sentence imposed under the Armed Career Criminal Act (“ACCA”). Our prior coverage of that decision can be found here.
In his petition for rehearing, Shabazz argued that the Court erred by reinstating his original ACCA-based sentence because that outcome was purportedly incompatible with two other precedents—Villanueva v. United States, 893 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2018), and Pepper v. United States, 562 U.S. 476 (2011)—and because reimposing a sentence that was potentially imposed in the first instance in reliance on the ACCA’s now-unconstitutional Residual Clause constituted “structural error.” Both arguments were rejected.
With respect to his first argument, Shabazz objected to the Court’s prior decision to remand his case to the sentencing court with a directive that Shabazz’s original sentence be reimposed, rather than remanding for resentencing. Shabazz argued that Villanueva required the Court to allow the lower court to conduct a full resentencing when its original sentence relied on the ACCA’s Residual Clause. The Court disagreed, holding that Villanueva did not prevent an appellate court from directing that the original sentence be reimposed as the remand for resentencing in Villanueva had been discretionary.
The Court also disagreed with Shabazz’s contention that the Court’s prior decision was in conflict with Pepper. Rather, the Court noted that Pepper merely required a district court, at resentencing, to consider the facts as they are at the time the new sentence is imposed when an appellate court has remanded for plenary resentencing. The Court rejected Shabazz’s suggestion that Pepper precluded remands that reopened only limited aspects of a previously imposed sentence.
As to Shabbazz’s second argument, the Court rejected Shabazz’s contention that the district court committed “structural error” by imposing a sentence that may have relied on the ACCA’s Residual Clause before it was held to be unconstitutional. The Court noted that even if the sentencing court had relied on the Residual Clause, Shabazz’s ACCA enhancement applied under the Force Clause “in exactly the same, quantifiable manner that it...
