Cirocco v. McMahon

294 F.Supp.3d 1086

Sue CIROCCO, Plaintiff,

v.Linda MCMAHON, in her official capacity as Administrator of the United States Small Business Administration, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 17–cv–01588–NYW

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

Filed February 14, 2018

Sue Cirocco, Coppell, TX, pro se.

Evan Bradley Lange, Rob Wiley, P.C., Dallas, TX, for Plaintiff.

Katherine Ann Ross, U.S. Attorney's Office–Denver, Denver, CO, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Magistrate Judge Nina Y. Wang

This matter comes before the court on Defendant Linda McMahon's Motion to Dismiss. [# 7, filed October 10, 2017]. The Motion to Dismiss is before the court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and the Order of Reference dated November 21, 2017 [# 19]. The court has carefully considered the Motion and related briefing, the entire case file, and the applicable case law, and, for the reasons stated below, GRANTS the Motion to Dismiss.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Plaintiff Sue Cirocco ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Cirocco") initiated this lawsuit through counsel on June 29, 2017, by filing a Complaint asserting unlawful sex discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e–2(a)(1), and for retaliation. [# 1].¹ The court draws the following facts from Ms. Cirocco's Complaint, and accepts them as true for the purposes of considering the Motion to Dismiss. Ms. Cirocco began working at the United States Small Business Administration ("SBA") in August 2009 as a Finance Division Manager. [# 1 at ¶ 9]. In December 2012, she was promoted to Finance Director over two male colleagues, Mr. Bates and Mr. Berges, who "vocally expressed" their displeasure, suggested the promotion was on account of gender, and "went as far to file an EEO complaint regarding Mr. Cirocco's selection."² [Id. at ¶¶ 10–13]. In October 2013, Mr. Gribben was hired as the Deputy Chief Financial Officer and he became Ms. Cirocco's manager. [Id. at ¶¶ 15–16]. Ms. Cirocco alleges that Mr. Gribben and Mr. Bates began working together to her exclusion and "outside the normal chain of command." [Id. at ¶ 17]. At one point, Mr. Gribbon reversed Ms. Cirocco's performance review of Mr. Bates, [id. at ¶¶ 20–22]; he also instructed Ms. Cirocco not to issue written discipline to Mr. Bates after Mr. Bates had been insubordinate to her and verbally abusive toward one of his female co-workers. [Id. at ¶¶ 26, 27–28, 31–32]. Mr. Gribben also instructed Ms. Cirocco against further communicating with Mr. Bates, an employee whom she managed. [Id. at ¶¶ 33–34].

Ms. Cirocco alleges that not only was Mr. Gribben "complicit in supporting Mr. Bates' discriminatory behavior," he reprimanded her for retaliating against Mr. Berges for his filing of an EEO complaint, when in fact Mr. Berges "routinely confided in Ms. Cirocco about the stress he experienced in filing his complaint." [# 1 at ¶¶ 35, 37–38, 40]. Ms. Cirocco asserts that Mr. Gribben gave her a poor annual review ("FY14") that was lower than any review she had ever received at the SBA, and in stark contrast to her mid-year performance review that she was "doing a fabulous job." [Id. at ¶¶ 42–43, 49]. When Plaintiff asked Mr. Gribben about the FY14, he said he "based his decision on ‘complaints about [her] professional conduct,’ " which Plaintiff alleges referred to her "efforts to discipline Mr. Bates for verbally berating a female employee." [Id. at ¶¶ 45, 47]. Ms. Cirocco lost the opportunity for a raise as a result of the FY14. [Id. at ¶ 52].

Plaintiff filed her own EEO complaint in February 2015, and alleges the retaliation continued thereafter. She was moved to a less desirable office away from her team; she received a written reprimand for failing to treat Mr. Bates "with respect"; and she was placed under investigation in February and March 2015. [Id. at ¶¶ 60–62]. In March, the chief financial officer of the SBA visited the Denver office and announced that Ms. Cirocco's staff would be reduced by approximately 50 percent so as to comply with "best practices." [Id. at ¶ 65]. Ms. Cirocco alleges that, without adequate staffing and no change in the description of her position, it was impossible to perform her job. [Id. at ¶ 72]. Ms. Cirocco thereafter took a medical leave of absence and ultimately sought employment elsewhere.

Defendant filed the instant Motion to Dismiss on October 10, 2017, [# 7], and, three days later, counsel for Plaintiff moved to withdraw his representation. See [# 8, # 9]. Plaintiff has proceeded pro se since that time. The Parties then consented to the exercise of jurisdiction by a United States Magistrate Judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c), [# 18]. On November 28, 2017, the court held a telephonic Status Conference at which the undersigned discussed with the Parties the Motion to Dismiss, and Ms. Cirocco represented that she had intended for certain email correspondence, which she had sent to counsel for Defendant, to serve as her response to the Motion. See [# 22]. Accordingly, the court docketed the correspondence as Plaintiff's Response, see [# 23], and Defendant thereafter filed a Reply, [# 25]. The Motion to Dismiss is now ripe, and the court has determined that oral argument would not materially assist in its disposition.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

I. Rule 12(b)(1)

Defendant moves to dismiss the Complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that Plaintiff failed to exhaust her administrative remedies because she failed to participate in the SBA's investigation of her claims and the underlying administrative proceeding. See [# 7]. Federal courts, as courts of limited jurisdiction, must have a statutory basis for their jurisdiction. See Morris v. City of Hobart , 39 F.3d 1105, 1111 (10th Cir. 1994) (citing Castaneda v. INS , 23 F.3d 1576, 1580 (10th Cir. 1994) ). "A court lacking jurisdiction cannot render judgment but must dismiss the cause at any stage of the proceedings in which it becomes apparent that jurisdiction is lacking." Basso v. Utah Power & Light Co ., 495 F.2d 906, 909 (10th Cir. 1974) (emphasis added). As the party seeking to invoke the jurisdiction of this court, Plaintiff bears the burden of alleging facts that support jurisdiction. See Dutcher v. Matheson , 733 F.3d 980, 985 (10th Cir. 2013) ("Since federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, we presume no jurisdiction exists absent an adequate showing by the party invoking federal jurisdiction").

When a party's Rule 12(b)(1) motion challenges the facts upon which subject matter is based, "a district court may not presume the truthfulness of the complaint's factual allegations." Sizova v. Nat'l Inst. of Standards & Tech. , 282 F.3d 1320, 1324 (10th Cir. 2002) (citation and quotations omitted). Instead, the court has "wide discretion to allow affidavits, other documents, and a limited evidentiary hearing to resolve disputed jurisdictional facts under Rule 12(b)(1)." Holt v. U.S. , 46 F.3d 1000, 1003 (10th Cir. 1995). The court's reliance on evidence outside the pleadings in addressing such a motion does not, as a general rule, require conversion of the motion to one for summary judgment under Rule 56. Id. (citation omitted).

II. Rule 12(b)(6)

Defendant also moves to dismiss the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), which authorizes a court to dismiss a pleading for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the court must "accept as true all well-pleaded factual allegations ... and view these allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff." Casanova v. Ulibarri , 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Smith v. United States , 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009) ). However, a plaintiff may not rely on mere labels or conclusions, "and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007).

"To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009). Plausibility refers "to the scope of the allegations in a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent, then the plaintiffs ‘have not nudged their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’ " Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citation omitted). "The burden is on the plaintiff to frame ‘a complaint with enough factual matter (taken as true) to suggest’ that he or she is entitled to relief." Id. The ultimate duty of the court is to "determine whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Forest Guardians v. Forsgren , 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).

III. Pro se Litigants

Ms. Cirocco is currently proceeding pro se and filed her Response as a pro se litigant. Accordingly, the court engages in a liberal review of the Response and holds it to a less stringent standard than if it were drafted by an attorney. See, e.g., Trackwell v. United States Gov't , 472 F.3d 1242, 1243 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted). However, the court does not afford the Complaint the same level of review, because an attorney drafted and filed that pleading. Ultimately, regardless of the standard of review applied, the court will not act as an advocate for a pro se litigant, and will not assume that a plaintiff can prove facts that she has not alleged or that a defendant has violated laws in ways that a plaintiff has not alleged. See Gallagher v. Shelton , 587 F.3d 1063, 1067 (10th Cir. 2009) ("[Court's] role is not to act as [pro se litigant's] advocate"); Drake v. City of Fort Collins , 927 F.2d 1156, 1159 (10th Cir. 1991) ("the court will not construct...