City of Emporia v. Cty. of Greensville

901 S.E.2d 485

81 Va.App. 28

CITY OF EMPORIA

v.COUNTY OF GREENSVILLE

Record No. 0792-23-2

Court of Appeals of Virginia, Richmond.

June 11, 2024

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF GREENSVILLE COUNTY, Thomas B. Hoover, Judge Designate

Leslie A. Winneberger, Roanoke (David P. Corrigan, Glen Allen; Harman, Claytor, Corrigan & Wellman, on briefs), for appellant.

Andrew M. Bowman (Gregory J. Haley; Monica T. Monday; Russell O. Slayton, Jr., Lawrenceville; Gentry Locke; Slayton & Clary, on brief), for appellee.

Present: Judges Beales, AtLee and Malveaux

OPINION BY JUDGE RICHARD Y. ATLEE, JR.

₃₁The City of Emporia appeals the circuit court’s decision ordering it to pay $676,924.94 to the County of Greensville as its proportionate share of the costs and expenses of the County Sheriff’s budget for fiscal year 2021-2022. On appeal, the City argues that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted Code § 15.2-3830 to require it to pay a proportionate share of the entire County Sheriff’s budget, "including funding for the provision of law enforcement services," when the language of the statute only required it to share in the "costs and expenses of the circuit court for the county" and the "salary of the ‘sheriff of the county.’ " The City also argues that the circuit court erred by denying its motion craving oyer. Finally, the City argues that the circuit court erred by granting partial summary judgment and denying the City an opportunity to present evidence. We find that the circuit court properly denied the motion craving oyer, But we agree that the circuit court incorrectly interpreted Code § 15.2-3830. Therefore, we affirm in part and reverse in part.

I. Background

Prior to 1967, the City of Emporia was a town located within the County of Greensville. On July 31, 1967, the City transitioned from a town to an independent city of the second class under Virginia law. Following this transition, the City remained within the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court of Greensville County, and the City and County share the Greensville County Circuit Court. The City and County also share the clerk of the circuit court, Commonwealth’s Attorney, ₃₂and County Sheriff. The qualified voters of both the City and the County elect the County Sheriff.

Because the City and County share services, Code § 15.2-3830 provides for the apportionment of certain costs and expenses between the parties. It requires the "expenses of the circuit court for the county, including jury costs, and the salaries of the judge and clerk of the circuit court and the clerk, attorney for the Commonwealth and sheriff of the county" to be shared by each party proportionally based on population. Code § 15.2-3830.

Historically, the City paid a proportionate share of the County Sheriff’s entire budget. In 2021, however, the City refused to pay towards the County Sheriff’s entire budget. Although it agreed to pay the portion of the budget associated with the circuit court,¹ it notified the County that it refused to pay "any portion of the costs associated with the County Sheriff’s law enforcement because the City had its own police department." The County informed the City by letter that the City had an obligation to share in the costs of the County Sheriff’s budget and asked the City to comply with Code § 15.2-3830. When the County invoiced the City for the shared costs, the City paid only the amount associated with the circuit court.

The County filed suit in the Circuit Court for Greensville County.² The complaint included two counts. Count one sought a writ of mandamus compelling the City to perform its "ministerial duty to share in the funding of the County Sheriff’s budget." Count two sought a declaratory judgment that the "City’s share of the County Sheriff’s budget is calculated in accordance with Code § 15.2-3830."

In response, the City filed a demurrer and a motion craving oyer. It sought to add two documents to the complaint: a Law ₃₃Enforcement Mutual Aid Agreement from 2019, and documents and communications relating to their shared dispatch and records system. The City argued that the County put "blinders" on the circuit court by alleging in its complaint that the County Sheriff assists the Emporia Police Department with law enforcement activities in the City without including the written documents that govern the division of costs for these activities.³ The County noted that a motion craving oyer is only "appropriate when the document that is being craved Oyer is essential to the claim." It argued that its claims are based on the City’s statutory duty rather than any agreements, and therefore the documents were not essential to the claim. Additionally, it argued that the Mutual Aid Agreement was between the City and County Sheriff—not the County. The circuit court denied the motion craving oyer. It also sustained the demurrer and denied the writ of mandamus, but it allowed the case to proceed on the request for declaratory judgment.

The County then moved for partial summary judgment "on the limited issue of the meaning of … Code § 15.2-3830," which it argued was the "central issue" in the case. The County argued that the plain language of Code § 15.2-3830 requires the City to pay a proportionate share of the costs and expenses of the County Sheriff, not just the salary of the County Sheriff. It contends that the statute treats the circuit court, the clerk, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and the County Sheriff the same. It noted that the County and City have historically applied this interpretation of the statute, pointing to two contracts between the parties from 1968 and 2013, and the County attached these contracts as exhibits to its memorandum in support of partial summary judgment.

₃₄The City opposed the motion. It argued that the language of the statute requires it to pay a proportionate share of the "costs and expenses" of the circuit court, as well as a proportionate share of the salaries of the judge, the clerk of the circuit court, the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and the County Sheriff. The City maintained that it was only required to pay towards the portion of the County Sheriff’s budget that relates to the circuit court. It noted that the description of the costs and expenses in paragraph two of the statute, were significantly different than those for which the County argued it was responsible. Further, it asserted that the County Sheriff did not provide law enforcement services to the City, and it was therefore not a shared service. It noted that the issue "came to a head" after the County Sheriff’s budget increased by 20% over three years, and it argued that it should not be bound by its past dealings with the County. Finally, the City argued that summary judgment was not appropriate as there was a factual question about what law enforcement services the County Sheriff provided to the City, and the City was entitled to a hearing and to present evidence.

The circuit court granted the County’s motion for partial summary judgment, It found that an evidentiary hearing was not necessary because the issue was "a pure issue of law" that was for the court to decide. It agreed with the County’s interpretation of the statute, and it found that Code § 15.2-3830 required the City to pay a proportionate share of the costs and expenses of: (1) the circuit court, including jury costs, the salaries of the judge and the clerk of the circuit court, (2) the clerk, (3) the Commonwealth’s Attorney, and (4) the County Sheriff. It also found that the list of costs and expenses in paragraph two of the statute was not "an all inclusive list." The circuit court referred to the fact that the City has historically paid a share of the County Sheriff’s entire budget and that this course of conduct was consistent with its ruling, but it noted that "that’s simply because that’s the way the statute reads." It found that the statute did not provide a credit to the City for having its own police department or for the increase in the County Sheriff’s budget. Thus, it granted the County’s motion for partial summary judgment,

₃₅Following the hearing, the parties stipulated that the "proportion that the population of the City bears to the aggregate population of the City and County is 32.62%." They also stipulated that the total costs and expenses of the County Sheriff for fiscal year 2021-2022 was $2,075,172 and that the City’s proportionate share based on population was $676,924.94. The City stipulated that it had not paid the proportionate share billed by the County. The circuit court ordered the City to pay its proportionate share of the costs and expenses in the amount of $676,924.94. The City now appeals.

II. Analysis

A. The circuit court erred in its interpretation of Code § 15.2-3830.

[1] The City argues in this appeal that the circuit court erroneously interpreted Code § 15.2-3830 to require it to pay a proportionate share of the County Sheriff’s entire budget. As this issue is "a purely legal issue of statutory construction, we review the issue de novo." Turner v. Commonwealth, 295 Va. 104, 108, 809 S.E.2d 679 (2018).

[2, 3] We are guided in our analysis of Code § 15.2-3830 "by familiar principles of statutory construction." Id. "[O]ur primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to legislative intent, as expressed by the language used in the statute." Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 300 Va. 153, 161, 861 S.E.2d 47 (2021) (quoting Va. Elec. & Power Co. v. State Corp. Comm’n, 295 Va. 256, 263, 810 S.E.2d 880 (2018)). To ascertain that intent, we give the words "their ordinary meaning, unless it is apparent that the legislative intent is otherwise." Turner, 295 Va. at 108, 809 S.E.2d 679 (quoting Phelps v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 139, 142, 654 S.E.2d 926 (2008)). And we "presume that the legislature chose, with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant statute." Cornell v. Benedict, 301 Va. 342, 349, 878 S.E.2d 191 (2022) (quoting Tvardek v. Powhatan Vill. Homeowners...