City of Hous. v. Meka

695 S.W.3d 520

CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant

v.Adaeze Shavon MEKA, Appellee

NO. 01-22-00002-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (1st Dist.).

Opinion issued April 25, 2023

On Appeal from the 129th District Court, Harris County, Texas, Trial Court Case No. 2018-76033

ARTURO G. MICHEL, City Attorney, SUZANNE R. CHAUVIN, Chief, General Litigation Section, DONALD B. HIGHTOWER, Senior Assistant City Attorney, CITY OF HOUSTON LEGAL DEPARTMENT, 900 Bagby, 4th Floor, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellant.

BRIAN S. HUMPHREY II, HUMPHREY LAW PLLC, TC Energy Center, 700 Louisiana, Suite 3950, Houston, Texas 77002, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Landau, Countiss, and Guerra.

OPINION

Amparo Guerra, Justice

The City of Houston (the City) appeals from the trial court’s denial of its motion for, summary judgment. Appellee Adaeze Shavon Meka brought suit against the City pursuant to the Texas Tort Claims Act (the TTCA) for injuries she sustained in a car accident involving a vehicle driven by a City employee. See Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 101.021(1) (waiving sovereign immunity for personal-injury claims caused by negligence of governmental employee, acting within scope of his employment in operating motor-driven vehicle, if that employee would be personally liable to claimant). The City moved for summary judg- ment alleging that because Meka failed to serve the City with citation before the running of the applicable statute of limitations, and because compliance with statutes of limitations is jurisdictional in suits against a governmental entity, the trial court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. See Tex Gov’t Code § 311.034 ("Statutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity."). The trial court denied the motion for summary judgment, and the City filed this interlocutory appeal. See Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 51.014(a)(8).

We affirm.

Background

This suit arises from a May 7, 2018 motor vehicle collision involving Meka, Christopher John Closure, Jamarcus Ward,¹ and Jean Alphone Dorelus, a City employee who was driving a City-owned vehicle at the time of the accident. On December 13, 2019, within the applicable two-year statute of limitations, Meka sued the City and Dorelus, alleging that she suffered personal injuries as a result of the accident. See id. § 16.003(a) ("[A] person must bring suit for personal injury not later than two years after the day the cause of action accrues."). The City was never served with citation for Meka’s original petition.

On January 7, 2021, Meka filed her first amended petition, alleging claims for personal injuries against Dorelus and the City under the TTCA based on the accident. Meka served the City with citation on January 11, 2021, eight months after the expiration of the two-year statute of limitations. The City answered and asserted a general denial as well as affirmative defenses, including immunity from suit.

On January 22, 2021, the City moved for traditional summary judgment on limitations and immunity. Specifically, the City argued that Meka’s claims should be dismissed because she failed to serve the City with citation before the applicable limitations period had expired. Meka responded, arguing that she exercised diligence in attempting to serve the City and, alternatively, the Texas Supreme Court’s Emergency Orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic tolled the applicable statute of limitations until June 1, 2021. Because she filed and served the City before June 1, 2021, Meka argued that she complied with the limitations period and that the trial court should deny the City’s motion for summary judgment.

The trial court held an oral hearing on the City’s motion for summary judgment on December 10, 2021, and denied the City’s motion the same day. On December 30, 2021, the City filed this timely interlocutory appeal.

Appellate Jurisdiction

[1] In her response brief, Meka contends that we lack appellate jurisdiction because compliance with the TTCA’s statute of limitations is not jurisdictional. The City’s summary judgment, according to Meka, did not raise a jurisdictional issue and the City’s appeal therefore is not authorized under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 51.014(a)(8). Be- cause this question implicates our appellate jurisdiction, we consider it first.

The City filed its motion for summary judgment, in which it raised the issue of governmental immunity based on Meka’s failure to serve the City with citation within the two-year limitations period applicable to Meka’s TTCA claims. See Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 16.003(a). Section 51.014(a)(8) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code authorizes an interlocutory appeal from the "grant[] or deni[al] [of] a plea to the jurisdiction by a governmental unit[.]" Id. § 51.014(a)(8). Because the City’s motion for summary judgment raised the issue of immunity, regardless of whether the motion was styled as a plea to the jurisdiction and regardless of whether we. ultimately conclude that the City was entitled to dismissal based on immunity, we have appellate jurisdiction to hear the City’s appeal. See PHI, Inc. v. Tex. Juv. Just. Dep’t, 593 S.W.3d 296, 301 n.1 (Tex. 2019) (holding appellate court had jurisdiction over appeal from denial of combined plea to jurisdiction and motion for summary judgment, regardless of how pleading was styled, because substance of pleading raised sovereign immunity, which implicates subject-matter jurisdiction); Harris Cnty. v. Sykes, 136 S.W.3d 635, 638 (Tex. 2004) ("If the trial court denies the governmental entity’s claim of no jurisdiction, whether it has been asserted by a plea to the jurisdiction, a motion for summary judgment, or otherwise, the Legislature has provided that an interlocutory appeal may be brought."); Tex Dep’t of Crim. Just. v. Simons, 140 S.W.3d 338, 349 (Tex. 2004) ("The reference to ‘plea to the jurisdiction’ [in Section 51.014] is not to a particular procedural vehicle but to the substance of the issue raised. Thus, an interlocutory appeal may be taken from a refusal to dismiss for want of jurisdiction whether the jurisdictional argument is presented by plea to the jurisdiction or some other vehicle, such as a motion for summary judgment.").

We turn to the merits of the City’s appeal.

Sovereign Immunity and Statute of Limitations

The City argues that the trial court erred by refusing to dismiss Meka’s claims despite Meka failing to exercise diligence in serving the City with citation within the applicable limitations period. Meka responds that compliance with the statute of limitations and service of citation is not jurisdictional and, even if it was, the Texas Supreme Court’s Emergency Orders issued in response to the COVID-19 pandemic extended the statute of limitations.

A. Standard of Review

[2] "Sovereign immunity bars suits against the state and its entities, and this immunity remains intact unless surrendered in express and unequivocal terms by a clear and unambiguous statutory waiver." Prairie View A&M Univ. v. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d 500, 512 (Tex. 2012). Meka pleaded her case under the TTCA, which waives sovereign immunity for personalinjury claims caused by the negligence of an employee, acting within the scope of his employment in operating a motor-driven vehicle, if that employee would be personally liable to the claimant. See Tex Civ Prac & Rem Code § 101.021(1). Section 311.034 of the Code Construction Act, set forth in the Government Code, specifies that "[s]tatutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity." Tex Gov’t Code § 311.034.

[3–7] "[I]t is the Legislature’s function to determine what steps a litigant must take before the state’s immunity is waived." Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 513. The Legislature "establishes the timeline for filing suit and the mandatory tasks that must be completed before filing." Id. at 514. It is "within the Legislature’s discretion to determine the procedures required before the State’s immunity is waived." Id. at 513. "[A] statutory provision that is mandatory and must be complied with before filing suit is sufficient to fall within the ambit of section 311.034." Id. at 514 (emphasis added). In a statutory cause of action against a governmental entity, like this TTCA suit against the City, failure to comply with the statute’s mandatory provisions that must be accomplished before filing suit is a jurisdictional bar to suit. See id. at 511, 512.

[8–10] Sovereign immunity implicates a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction, and because subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, we review the trial court’s ruling on the City’s motion for summary judgment de novo. See Ben Bolt-Palito Blanco Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Pol. Subdivs. Prop./Cas. Joint Self-Ins. Fund, 212 S.W.3d 320, 323 (Tex. 2006); City of Houston v. McGriff, No. 01-21-00487-CV, 695 S.W.3d 377, 385-86 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 15, 2022, no pet.). Because the jurisdictional issue here involves statutory construction, it presents a question of law that we also review de novo. See Galbraith Eng’g Consultants, Inc. v. Pochucha, 290 S.W.3d 863, 867 (Tex. 2009). We rely on statutory- interpretation principles to ascertain and effectuate the Legislature’s intent as expressed by the statute’s language. Chatha, 381 S.W.3d at 511.

B. Sovereign Immunity and Jurisdictional Prerequisites to Suit

[11 , 12] The defense of limitations is classified generally as an affirmative defense that is not jurisdictional in nature. In re United Servs. Auto. Ass’n, 307 S.W.3d 299, 308 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding).

Section 311.034 of the Government Code, however, provides that "[s]tatutory prerequisites to a suit, including the provision of notice, are jurisdictional requirements in all suits against a governmental entity." Tex Gov’t Code § 311.034; see also Chatha, 381...