City of Hous. v. Rodriguez

658 S.W.3d 633

CITY OF HOUSTON, Appellant

v.Ruben RODRIGUEZ and Frederick Okon, Appellees

NO. 14-21-00107-CV

Court of Appeals of Texas, Houston (14th Dist.).

Opinions filed September 8, 2022

Christy L. Martin, for Appellant.

Robert A. McAllister, Houston, for Appellee.

Panel consists of Justices Jewell, Bourliot, and Hassan

MAJORITY OPINION

Meagan Hassan, Justice

Ruben Rodriguez and Frederick Okon (together, "Appellees") were traveling together in a truck when their vehicle was struck by a police officer engaged in a high-speed pursuit. Appellees sued the City of Houston and the City filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that immunity barred Appellees’ claims. The trial court denied the City's summary judgment motion and the City appealed. For the reasons below, we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In January 2019, Houston Police Department ("HPD") Officers Richard Corral and C. Goodman were assisting HPD Vice officers on a prostitution "sting." As part of this operation, an undercover detective posing as a prostitute agreed to engage in sexual intercourse for money with a male suspect driving a red car. The two planned to meet in a nearby parking lot to complete the transaction. Officers Corral and Goodman were waiting nearby in a marked HPD patrol vehicle when another detective participating in the sting told them an arrest was needed and gave them the suspect's travel direction. Officer Corral drove to the parking lot.

As the officers approached the suspect's vehicle, the suspect drove away. Officer Corral activated his vehicle's emergency lights and siren and pursued the suspect, who did not stop but continued southbound on a Highway 59 service road at a high rate of speed. Officer Goodman informed dispatch of the pursuit and relayed the license plate number of the fleeing vehicle. About three minutes into the chase, dispatch informed the officers that the suspect's vehicle had been reported stolen.

Evading the officers, the suspect drove at high speeds, at one point going the wrong direction on a Beltway 8 service road. After entering and then exiting a car dealership parking lot, the suspect abruptly turned right off the access road and onto a side street. Officer Corral, pursuing closely, attempted to follow. Appellees’ truck was stopped at a stop sign on the side street waiting to turn onto the access road. Seeing the truck, Officer Corral attempted to turn wide around the truck by driving past it, over the curb, and then back onto the side street. As he came off the curb to the side street, Officer Corral's patrol car struck Appellees’ truck.

Appellees sued the City and sought damages for injuries sustained in the collision. Appellees alleged that the collision was a direct and proximate result of Officer Corral's negligence in several respects pertaining to the use, operation, and control of a motor vehicle, for which the City was vicariously liable.

The City filed a traditional motion for summary judgment challenging the trial court's subject matter jurisdiction. Appellees filed a response and an amended response. The trial court denied the City's summary judgment motion and the City filed this interlocutory appeal. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.014(a)(8).

ANALYSIS

In its summary judgment motion, the City asserted two bases to support its contention that Appellees’ claims are barred by immunity: (1) Officer Corral's official immunity¹ ; and (2) the Texas Tort Claim Act's ("TTCA") emergency response exception.² We analyze each ground separately, beginning with an overview of the applicable standard of review.

I. Standard of Review

We review a summary judgment de novo. Ferguson v. Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. , 295 S.W.3d 642, 644 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam). We consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the nonmovant if a reasonable fact finder could do so, and disregarding contrary evidence unless a reasonable fact finder could not. See Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez , 206 S.W.3d 572, 582 (Tex. 2006). We must affirm the summary judgment if any of the movant's theories presented to the trial court and preserved for appellate review are meritorious. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott , 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003).

The party seeking a traditional summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c) ; Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding , 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). A defendant who moves for traditional summary judgment must conclusively negate at least one essential element of each of the plaintiff's causes of action or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Frost Nat'l Bank v. Fernandez , 315 S.W.3d 494, 508 (Tex. 2010). "On appeal, the summary-judgment movant still bears the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." City of Houston v. Jenkins , 363 S.W.3d 808, 814 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, pet. denied).

II. Official Immunity

A. Governing Law

Political subdivisions of the state — including cities — are entitled to immunity from suit under the doctrine of governmental immunity. Reata Constr. Corp. v. City of Dallas , 197 S.W.3d 371, 374 (Tex. 2006). Under this doctrine, the City is not liable for the torts of its agents or officers unless there is a constitutional or statutory waiver of immunity. City of Houston v. Collins , 515 S.W.3d 467, 472 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).

Section 101.021 of the TTCA grants a limited waiver of immunity against a "governmental unit" for "property damage, personal injury, and death proximately caused by the wrongful act or omission or the negligence of an employee acting within his scope of employment if ... the property damage, personal injury, or death arises from the operation or use of a motor-driven vehicle or motor-driven equipment; and ... the employee would be personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law[.]" Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021. The City is a governmental unit under this statute. Id. § 101.001(3)(B).

Official immunity is an affirmative defense that protects governmental employees from personal liability. Univ. of Houston v. Clark , 38 S.W.3d 578, 580 (Tex. 2000) ; Collins , 515 S.W.3d at 472. If a governmental employee is entitled to official immunity, then the employee is not "personally liable to the claimant according to Texas law" and section 101.021 ’s limited waiver does not apply to the governmental unit. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 101.021 ; Collins , 515 S.W.3d at 472.

A governmental employee is entitled to official immunity for (1) the performance of discretionary duties, (2) within the scope of the employee's authority, (3) provided the employee acted in good faith.³

Tex. Dep't of Pub. Safety v. Bonilla , 481 S.W.3d 640, 642-43 (Tex. 2015) (per curiam) ; Collins , 515 S.W.3d at 472. Official immunity is an affirmative defense and the burden is on the movant to conclusively prove each element of the defense. Univ. of Houston , 38 S.W.3d at 580 ; Collins , 515 S.W.3d at 472. Because we conclude that showing was not made with respect to whether Officer Corral acted in good faith, we need not address the defense's other elements.⁴

In a police pursuit or emergency response case, an officer acts in good faith if a reasonably prudent officer under the same or similar circumstances could have believed that the need for the officer's actions outweighed a clear risk of harm to the public from those actions. Telthorster v. Tennell , 92 S.W.3d 457, 465 (Tex. 2002) ; Gillespie v. Galveston Cnty. Health Dist. , 639 S.W.3d 815, 823 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2021, no pet.). To satisfy this showing, the City need not prove that all reasonably prudent officers would have taken the same actions. Gomez v. City of Houston , 587 S.W.3d 891, 897 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) (en banc). Rather, "the City must prove conclusively that a reasonably prudent officer, under the same or similar conditions, might have reached the same decision." Id. (emphasis in original). That an officer may have been negligent will not defeat good faith; the test of good faith does not inquire into "what a reasonable person would have done", but into "what a reasonable officer could have believed." Telthorster , 92 S.W.3d at 465 ; Gomez , 587 S.W.3d at 897.

Good faith is measured against a standard of objective legal reasonableness, without regard to the police officer's subjective state of mind. Wadewitz v. Montgomery , 951 S.W.2d 464, 466 (Tex. 1997). This determination hinges on how a reasonably prudent officer could have assessed the need to which he was responding versus the risks of his course of action, based on his perception of the facts at the time of the event. Gomez , 587 S.W.3d at 897-98.

In the context of an emergency response, "need" is determined by factors such as: (1) the seriousness of the crime or accident to which the officer is responding; (2) whether the officer's immediate presence is necessary to prevent injury or loss of life or to apprehend a suspect; and (3) what alternative courses of action, if any, are available to achieve a comparable result. Id. at 898. The "risk" aspect refers to the countervailing public safety concerns like: (1) the nature and severity of the harm the officer's actions could cause (including injuries to bystanders); (2) the likelihood that any harm would occur; and (3) whether any risk of harm would be clear to a reasonably prudent officer. Id.

To warrant summary judgment on official immunity, the defendant's proof must sufficiently address these factors. Id. Once the defendant produces competent evidence of good faith, the defense is established unless the plaintiff shows that no reasonable person in the officer's position...