City of Jacksonville v. Jacksonville Hosp. Holdings, L.P.

82 F.4th 1031

CITY OF JACKSONVILLE, a State of Florida municipal corporation, Plaintiff-Counter Defendant, v. JACKSONVILLE HOSPITALITY HOLDINGS, L.P., a Delaware Limited Partnership, et al., Defendant-Counter Claimant,Continental Holdings, Inc., a Wyoming Corporation, Defendant-Counter Claimant-Counter Defendant Third Party Plaintiff-Appellant,PGS, Defendant,Claude Nolan Cadillac, Inc., et al., Third Party Defendants,HPL GP, LLC, Houston Pipe Line Company, L.P., Third Party Defendants-Counter Claimants Appellees.

No. 22-12419

United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit

Filed: September 13, 2023

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida, D.C. Docket No. 3:12-cv-00850-HES-MCR

John R. Thomas, Attorney, Stephen D. Busey, Tim Elsworth Sleeth, Allan E. Wulbern, Smith Hulsey & Busey, Jacksonville, FL, for Defendant-Appellant.

Ethan J. Loeb, Bartlett Loeb Hinds & Thompson, PLLC, Tampa, FL, Scott R. Alexander, Richard W. Gardner, Anne O'Connor McCready, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP (Indianapolis), Indianapolis, IN, Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Bartlett Loeb Hinds & Thompson, PLLC, Stuart, FL, George F. Gramling, III, Gramling Environmental Law, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee HPL GP, LLC.

Ethan J. Loeb, Allison C. Doucette, Bartlett Loeb Hinds & Thompson, PLLC, Tampa, FL, Scott R. Alexander, Richard W. Gardner, Anne O'Connor McCready, Taft Stettinius & Hollister LLP (Indianapolis), Indianapolis, IN, Steven Geoffrey Gieseler, Bartlett Loeb Hinds & Thompson, PLLC, Stuart, FL, George F. Gramling, III, Gramling Environmental Law, Tampa, FL, for Defendant-Appellee Houston Pipe Line Company, L.P.

Before Wilson, Grant, and Brasher, Circuit Judges.

Wilson, Circuit Judge:

The procedural histories of some cases make one appreciate even more the exemplary work done by our country's district and magistrate judges. This is one such case.

After eight years of litigation involving ten different parties, Continental Holdings, Inc. (Continental) appeals the district court's denial of its November 2015 motion to voluntarily dismiss Houston Pipe Line Company, L.P. and HPL GP, LLC (collectively, Houston) from the case pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(2). Continental argues that we should reverse the district court's Rule 41(a)(2) decision and vacate all of the subsequent orders governing its dispute with Houston.

Fortunately, we need not delve too far into the volumes of court filings today. What is important for our purposes is that, over the course of this litigation, many parties filed motions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) in an attempt to voluntarily dismiss their claims against another party. For each motion, fewer than all parties involved in the litigation provided a signature. Yet, Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) only permits a plaintiff to dismiss an action without a court order by filing "a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared." (emphasis added). The question for this court is the following: In a multi-defendant lawsuit, does "all parties who have appeared" refer to 1) all parties involved in the dismissal (e.g., the plaintiff and the defendant(s) being dismissed), or 2) all parties who have appeared in the lawsuit (e.g., the plaintiff and all other parties who have appeared at some point during the litigation)?

We conclude that the plain text of Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) requires the latter. Because multiple motions made under this Rule were not signed by all parties who appeared in the lawsuit, they were ineffective, and the claims they purported to dismiss remain pending before the district court. Consequently, there has not been a final judgment below, and we lack jurisdiction to consider the merits of this appeal.

I. Background

A truncated history of this litigation may be useful here. This saga began in March 2015, when the City of Jacksonville (the City) filed a second amended complaint to recover costs and damages related to the contamination of soil and groundwater near a gas plant located within its borders. In its complaint, the City alleged that three parties were liable to it under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. §§ 9607(a), 9613(g)(2), and Florida Statute § 376.313. The three named defendants were Jacksonville Hospitality Holdings L.P. (JHH); Shoppes of Lakeside, Inc. (Shoppes); and Continental.

The parties filed answers and counterclaims. Then, in April 2015, Continental filed an amended third-party complaint against six third-party defendants, including Houston (both Houston Pipe Line Company, L.P. and HPL GP, LLC); Greif, Inc. (Greif); Claude Nolan Cadillac, Inc. (Claude Nolan); JEA f/k/a/ Jacksonville Electric Authority (JEA); and Texaco, Inc. (Texaco). Continental alleged that these third-party defendants were liable for the release of pollutants at the gas plant. Houston lodged counterclaims in return. Then, in May 2015, Continental filed an amended, four-count counterclaim against the City, contending that the City was also liable for the pollution.

Bit by bit, whether through amended complaints, summary judgments, or voluntary dismissals, the claims dropped off. Important for this case, numerous claims were "dismissed" using stipulations of voluntary dismissal under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii). By our tally, the following combinations of parties filed such stipulations: 1) Continental and Texaco (purporting to dismiss Texaco from the action); 2) Continental and Greif (purporting to dismiss Greif from the action); 3) Continental and Claude Nolan (purporting to dismiss Claude Nolan from the action); 4) the City and Shoppes (purporting to dismiss "all remaining claims and defenses against each other in this action"); 5) the City and JHH (purporting to dismiss "all remaining claims and defenses asserted against each other in this action"); 6) the City, Continental, and JEA (purporting to dismiss "all claims, defenses counterclaims, and/or third party complaints against one another"); and 7) Continental and Houston (purporting to dismiss "the Counterclaims filed by [Houston]"). For each of these, fewer than all parties involved in the litigation signed the stipulation. As an example, the stipulation between Continental and Texaco that purported to dismiss Texaco from the case was only signed by those two parties—no other parties added their signatures.¹

After the dust settled and all the claims were seemingly resolved, Continental filed its notice of appeal, challenging an earlier district court order that denied its motion to voluntarily dismiss Houston pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2).² Continental contests this order because, well over a year after it was denied, the district court granted a motion by Houston to impose sanctions on Continental for what the district court determined was frivolous and bad-faith litigation. Toward the end of the proceedings, after a hearing to determine the appropriate sanctions, the district court ordered Continental to pay Houston nearly $1.5 million in attorneys' fees and costs. From Continental's perspective, though, these monetary sanctions would not have been unduly multiplied if the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying (at Houston's request) its Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss Houston from the case.

Before receiving the parties' briefs on the merits, we issued a jurisdictional question. The question cited Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) and inquired "whether all the voluntarily dismissed claims have been properly resolved for purposes of this Court's appellate jurisdiction." We now turn to our resolution of that question.³

II. Law and Analysis

A. Standard of Review

"We have a threshold obligation to ensure that we have jurisdiction to hear an appeal, for 'without jurisdiction we cannot proceed at all in any cause.' " Acheron Capital, Ltd. v. Mukamal ex rel. Mut. Benefits Keep Pol'y Tr., 22 F.4th 979, 986 (11th Cir. 2022) (quoting Corley v. Long-Lewis, Inc., 965 F.3d 1222, 1227 (11th Cir. 2020)). The jurisdiction of this court "is ordinarily limited to appeals from final decisions of the district courts." Id. (quoting Thomas v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield Ass'n, 594 F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2010)). "In a case involving multiple claims, in the absence of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) certification, a district court's disposition of fewer than all the claims does not constitute an appealable final judgment." Castleberry v. Goldome Credit Corp., 408 F.3d 773, 779-80 (11th Cir. 2005); see also Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v. Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1245-46 (11th Cir. 2012) (per curiam).

We review the interpretation of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and any jurisdictional issues de novo. United States v. Lopez, 562 F.3d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir. 2009).

B. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1)(A)(ii)

Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(ii) states that, subject to certain rules and statutes (none of which are relevant here), a "plaintiff may dismiss an action without a court order by filing . . . a stipulation of dismissal signed by all parties who have appeared." (emphases added). "We give the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure their plain meaning, and generally with them as with a statute, when we find the terms unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete." Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Ent. Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 123, 110 S.Ct. 456, 107 L.Ed.2d 438 (1989) (cleaned up).

Guided by this instruction, this court has recently explained the meaning of "an action" in the context of Rule 41(a). In the case of In re Esteva, we made clear that a "plain reading" of Rule 41(a)(1)(A) "reveals that the Rule does not authorize the voluntary dismissal of individual claims." 60 F.4th 664, 675 (11th Cir. 2023). Instead, the word "action" refers to an entire lawsuit and not just particular claims within it. Id.; see also id. at 675-76 (explaining that "reading Rule 41(a)(1)(A) in concert with Rule 41's other provisions, as we must, makes it abundantly clear"...