City of Johnstown v. Workers' Comp. Appeal Bd.

255 A.3d 214

CITY OF JOHNSTOWN, Appellant

v.WORKERS' COMPENSATION APPEAL BOARD (Sevanick), Appellees

No. 28 WAP 2020

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued: April 13, 2021

Decided: July 21, 2021

Kristopher Aaron Kachline, Esq., for Appellant City of Johnstown

Michael Gerald Dryden, Esq., Willig, Williams & Davidson, for Appellee Michael Sevanick

Eric G. Preputnick, Esq., Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, for Workers' Compensation Appeal Board

BAER, C.J., SAYLOR, TODD, DONOHUE, DOUGHERTY, WECHT, MUNDY, JJ.

OPINION

JUSTICE DONOHUE

Section 301(c)(2) of the Workers’ Compensation Act ("the Act") provides that for disability or death caused by an occupational disease to be compensable, the death or disability must occur within 300 weeks of the claimant's last date of employment in the occupation that exposed the claimant to the conditions that led to the disease. 77 P.S. § 411(2). Pursuant to Section 108(r), claims made by the firefighters for certain types of cancer fall under the Act. See id. § 27.1. These firefighter cancer claims are subject to Section 301(f), which provides that "[n]otwithstanding" the 300-week requirement in Section 301(c)(2), firefighter cancer claims made pursuant to Section 108(r) "may be made within [600] weeks after the last date of employment" in an occupation that exposed the firefighter to the cancer-causing hazards. Id. § 414. Appellant, the City of Johnstown ("Johnstown"), contends that a party asserting a firefighter cancer claim must satisfy the requirements of both Section 301(c)(2) and Section 301(f) to establish a viable claim. For the reasons that follow, we disagree and conclude that the time for filing a Section 108(r) firefighter cancer claim is governed by Section 301(f) alone. We therefore affirm the ruling of the Commonwealth Court.

I. Statutory Framework

To center our discussion, we briefly review the pertinent statutory provisions. As referenced above, Section 301(c)(2) of the Act provides that a compensable injury includes death or disability caused by the occupational diseases enumerated in Section 108. 77 P.S. § 411(2). Section 301(c)(2) also requires that when a claim is based on an occupational disease, the disability or death must occur within 300 weeks of the last date of employment in which the claimant was exposed to the disease-causing conditions. Id. In 2011, the General Assembly enacted Act 46,¹ which amended the Act so as to provide coverage for cancers traceable to firefighting. To that end, Act 46 amended Section 108 to include "[c]ancer suffered by a firefighter which is caused by exposure to a known carcinogen which is recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by the International Agency for Research on Cancer[ ]" ("IARC") as an occupational disease. Id. § 27.1(r). In addition to adding cancer suffered by firefighters to the list of occupational diseases, through Act 46 the General Assembly also enacted Section 301(f), "Compensation for cancer suffered by a firefighter." This provision, which we discuss at length infra, establishes the criteria that must be met for a claim of firefighter cancer raised under Section 108(r) to be compensable under the Act. See id. § 414.² In addition to the filing period contained therein, Section 301(f) requires that the firefighter-claimant must have served for four or more years in continuous firefighting, must establish direct exposure to a carcinogen of the class referred to in Section 108(r), and must have passed a physical examination that revealed no evidence of cancer prior to engaging in firefighting duties or asserting a claim thereunder. Id.

II. Factual & Procedural History

Michael Sevanick was a firefighter for the City of Johnstown ("Johnstown") for twenty-nine years, from June 1, 1977 until September 10, 2006.³ After retiring from the fire department, Sevanick worked at a car dealership. In 2015, he was diagnosed with kidney cancer. Sevanick sought treatment for approximately eight weeks, and returned to a part-time position with the dealership in May 2015. In 2016, he filed a claim for workers’ compensation benefits, alleging that his cancer was caused by exposure to a carcinogen recognized as a Group 1 carcinogen by IARC during his time as a firefighter.⁴ The Workers’ Compensation Judge found in Sevanick's favor, and Johnstown appealed. Before the Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, Johnstown argued that Sevanick's claim was barred by Section 301(c)(2)’s 300-week manifestation requirement, which provides that

whenever occupational disease is the basis for compensation, for disability or death under this act, it shall apply only to disability or death resulting from such disease and occurring within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which he was exposed to hazards of such disease[.]

77 P.S. § 411(2). The Board found that Section 301(c)(2) did not apply, but rather that the limitations on Sevanick's claim were governed by Section 301(f), which provides as follows:

Compensation pursuant to cancer suffered by a firefighter shall only be to those firefighters who have served four or more years in continuous firefighting duties, who can establish direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r) relating to cancer by a firefighter and have successfully passed a physical examination prior to asserting a claim under this subsection or prior to engaging in firefighting duties and the examination failed to reveal any evidence of the condition of cancer. The presumption of this subsection may be rebutted by substantial competent evidence that shows that the firefighter's cancer was not caused by the occupation of firefighting. Any claim made by a member of a volunteer fire company shall be based on evidence of direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r) as documented by reports filed pursuant to the Pennsylvania Fire Information Reporting System and provided that the member's claim is based on direct exposure to a carcinogen referred to in section 108(r). Notwithstanding the limitation under subsection (c)(2) with respect to disability or death resulting from an occupational disease having to occur within three hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease, claims filed pursuant to cancer suffered by the firefighter under section 108(r) may be made within six hundred weeks after the last date of employment in an occupation or industry to which a claimant was exposed to the hazards of disease. The presumption provided for under this subsection shall only apply to claims made within the first three hundred weeks.

77 P.S. § 414 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added). The Board reasoned that Section 301(f) creates a new timeframe for cancer-related occupational disease claims made by firefighters. Because Sevanick raised his claim well within 600 weeks from his last date of employment as a firefighter, the Board concluded that the claim was timely.

On appeal, the Commonwealth Court agreed with this determination. The court initially recognized that in 2011, cancer claims were added to the list of occupational diseases for firefighters subject to the Act by virtue of Act 46. City of Johnstown v. WCAB (Sevanick) , No. 1156 C.D. 2019, 2020 WL 2187759, at *5 (Pa. Commw. May 6, 2020). It then considered Johnstown's argument that Sevanick's claim was untimely because he failed to prove that he was exposed to a carcinogen that could have caused his cancer within 600 weeks of the date he filed his claim petition. Id. Johnstown argued that it was error to use the last date of Sevanick's employment as a firefighter (August 1, 2006) as the date from which to calculate the 600 weeks because Sevanick did not establish that he was exposed to a qualifying carcinogen on that date. Id. The Commonwealth Court rejected this argument on the basis that the "triggering event" for purposes of Section 301(f) is not the date of disability or injury, but rather the claimant's last day of exposure to a known Group 1 carcinogen. Id. at *7 (citing Fargo v. WCAB (City of Phila.) , 148 A.3d 514, 521 (Pa. Commw. 2016) ).

The court then turned to Johnstown's claim that Sevanick's petition should be denied because he was not disabled within 300 weeks of his last exposure to the carcinogen, as required by Section 301(c)(2). In support of its position, Johnstown cited Szymanski v. Workers’ Compensation Appeal Board (City of Philadelphia) , No. 494 C.D. 2016, 2017 WL 582736 (Pa. Commw. Feb. 14, 2017) (non-precedential decision), in which the Commonwealth Court rejected the firefighter's argument that the discovery rule applied to extend the 300-week period of time for a claimant to obtain the benefit of the causation presumption contained in Section 301(f). Although the Szymanski court discussed some interplay between Sections 301(c)(2) and 301(f), the Commonwealth Court in this case distinguished that discussion based on the fact that Szymanski's cancer manifested before the effective date of Act 46. Sevanick , No. 1156 C.D. 2019, 2020 WL 2187759, at *7. Finding Szymanski inapplicable, the Commonwealth Court concluded that Sevanick was not required to file his claim within the 300-week period contained in Section 301(c)(2), but rather that he was afforded 600 weeks to do so pursuant to Section 301(f). Since there was no dispute that Sevanick filed his claim 490 weeks after his last date of employment, the Commonwealth Court found the petition timely.⁵ Id.

Johnstown filed a Petition for Allowance of Appeal and this Court granted review to determine whether a firefighter making a claim under Section 108(r) must comply with the timing requirements of Section 301(c)(2).⁶

III. Parties’ Arguments

In service of its argument, Johnstown delineates its perceived parameters of both Section 301(c)(2) and Section 301(f). Johnstown's primary contention is that the 300-week period in Section 301(c)(2) is a "jurisdictional...