City of L. A. v. Cnty. of Kern

59 Cal.4th 618

328 P.3d 56

174 Cal.Rptr.3d 67

CITY OF LOS ANGELES et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents,

v.COUNTY OF KERN et al., Defendants and Appellants.

No. S210150.

Supreme Court of California

July 7, 2014.

Arnold & Porter, San Francisco, Jerome B. Falk, Jr., Steven L. Mayer, Sara J. Eisenberg ; Theresa A. Goldner, County Counsel, Mark L. Nations, Deputy County Counsel; Hogan Guiney Dick, Hogan Law and Michael M. Hogan, San Diego, for Defendants and Appellants.

Carmen A. Trutanich and Michael N. Feuer, City Attorneys, Valerie Flores, Managing Assistant City Attorney, Edward M. Jordan, Assistant City Attorney; Beveridge & Diamond, San Francisco, Gary J. Smith, Zachary M. Norris and James B. Slaughter for Plaintiffs and Respondents City of Los Angeles, Responsible Biosolids Management, Inc., R & G Fanucchi, Inc., and Sierra Transport, Inc.

Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith, Los Angeles, Daniel V. Hyde and Paul J. Beck for Plaintiff and Respondent County Sanitation District No. 2 of Los Angeles County.

Woodruff Spradlin & Smart, Costa Mesa, Bradley R. Hogin and Ricia R. Hager for Plaintiff and Respondent Orange County Sanitation District.

Law Offices of Michael J. Lampe, Visalia, Michael J. Lampe and Michael P. Smith for Plaintiffs and Respondents Shaen Magan, Honey Bucket Farms, Tule Ranch/Magan Farms, Western Express, Inc., and City of Los Angeles.

Somach Simmons & Dunn, Sacramento, Robert L. Larson and Theresa A. Dunham

for Plaintiff and Respondent California Association of Sanitation Agencies.

Freeman Freeman Smiley, Christopher M. Westhoff, Los Angeles; and Nathan Gardner–Andrews for National Association of Clean Water Agencies as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

Barg Coffin Lewis & Trapp and Marc A. Zeppetello for Water Environment Federation as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

WERDEGAR, J.

Though federal court jurisdiction is constrained by article III of the United States Constitution principally to claims presenting a federal case or controversy or disputes between diverse parties, federal courts may assume supplemental jurisdiction over related state claims that " form part of the same case or controversy." ( 28 U.S.C. § 1367(a) ; see United Mine Workers v. Gibbs (1966) 383 U.S. 715, 725, 86 S.Ct. 1130, 16 L.Ed.2d 218 [federal jurisdiction extends to state claims that share "a common nucleus of operative fact" with a federal claim].)¹ The assumption and retention of supplemental jurisdiction are not mandatory; inter alia, if the federal basis for jurisdiction dissolves but supplemental claims remain, the federal court may dismiss them, leaving them to be refiled in state court. ( § 1367(c)(3) ; see Jinks v. Richland County (2003) 538 U.S. 456, 459, 123 S.Ct. 1667, 155 L.Ed.2d 631.) Congress has spelled out the consequences for statute of limitations purposes of such a state claim journey into federal court: the limitations period is "tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed" absent a state rule extending the period still further. ( § 1367(d).)

Section 1367(d) has confounded courts nationally and in California, with two near-equal camps emerging. Under one view, the statute affords parties a grace period, allowing claims that would otherwise have become barred to be pursued in state court if refiled no later than 30 days after federal court dismissal; under another, it suspends the limitations clock, with any time left from before the federal filing beginning to run again 30 days after dismissal. We conclude the first view is correct: Congress enacted section 1367(d) to provide a grace period for claims that would otherwise be lost, not to categorically suspend state statutes of limitations and thereby potentially extend filing periods for years following federal dismissal. Because the Court of Appeal applied a different interpretation, we reverse.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Local governments have a duty to treat sewage and dispose of the treatment byproducts, commonly known as biosolids. City of Los Angeles v.

County of Kern

(C.D.Cal.2007) 509 F.Supp.2d 865, 871.) One widely used method is to recycle biosolids as farm fertilizer. (Ibid. ) The City of Los Angeles and other plaintiffs (collectively Los Angeles) have for years recycled much of their biosolids on farmland, some of it owned by the City of Los Angeles, in unincorporated portions of the County of Kern (Kern). ( Id. at pp. 873–875.)

In June 2006, Kern voters approved Measure E, a ban on the use of biosolids as fertilizer in unincorporated Kern. ( City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern, supra, 509 F.Supp.2d at pp. 876–877.) Shortly thereafter, Los Angeles sued in federal court, alleging inter alia that Measure E violated the federal equal protection clause and dormant commerce clause,² exceeded the limits of Kern's police powers, and was preempted by state law. (See City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (C.D.Cal.2006) 462 F.Supp.2d 1105, 1111–1119.) The district court granted a preliminary injunction ( id. at pp. 1108–1109 ) and thereafter granted summary adjudication on the commerce clause and preemption claims and entered judgment in Los Angeles's favor. ( City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern, supra, 509 F.Supp.2d at pp. 870, 902.)

The Ninth Circuit reversed. ( City of Los Angeles v. County of Kern (9th Cir.2009) 581 F.3d 841, 849.) It held Los Angeles lacked prudential standing because its interests were not of the sort sought to be protected by the dormant commerce clause. ( Id. at pp. 846–849.) Because the remaining basis for the judgment, state preemption, was a nonfederal issue, the Ninth Circuit vacated the judgment and remanded to permit the district court to exercise discretion whether to retain the case. ( Id. at p. 849, citing § 1367.) On remand, the district court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction, citing the novel and complex nature of the remaining state preemption issue, and on November 9, 2010, dismissed the case. (See § 1367(c).)

On January 26, 2011, 78 days after dismissal, Los Angeles refiled suit in state court. Like the federal action, the state suit alleged violation of the dormant commerce clause, actions in excess of Kern's police powers, and state preemption. The trial court rejected Kern's argument that the suit was time-barred under section 1367(d) and granted Los Angeles a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeal affirmed. Before reaching the merits, it considered and rejected Kern's argument that suit was untimely under the applicable statutes of limitations and section 1367(d). The Court of Appeal reasoned that section 1367(d) suspended the running of the statute of limitations for the entire time suit was pending in federal court, plus 30 days, that thereafter any unexpired time remaining on the applicable statutes of limitations began running, and that each of Los Angeles's claims was thus timely because suit was refiled long before even the shortest unexpired limitations period would have lapsed.

The Court of Appeal's decision added to an existing split. While the Court of Appeal in Kolani v. Gluska (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 402, 75 Cal.Rptr.2d 257 interpreted section 1367(d) as providing only a 30–day grace period in which to refile otherwise expired claims, the Court of Appeal in Bonifield v. County of Nevada (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 298, 114 Cal.Rptr.2d 207 had, like the Court of Appeal here, rejected that interpretation in favor of a reading that suspended the statute of limitations and tacked on any unexpired time beginning 30 days after dismissal. (See also Okoro v. City of Oakland (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 306, 311, fn. 5, 48 Cal.Rptr.3d 260 [noting the existing split but not taking sides because the complaint in that case was timely under either view of § 1367(d) ].) We took review to resolve the split.

DISCUSSION

I. Section 1367(d) : Its Text

Section 1367(d) provides in full: "The period of limitations for any claim asserted under subsection (a) [i.e., asserted under supplemental jurisdiction in federal court], and for any other claim in the same action that is voluntarily dismissed at the same time as or after the dismissal of the claim under subsection (a), shall be tolled while the claim is pending and for a period of 30 days after it is dismissed unless State law provides for a longer tolling period." When interpreting federal statutes, no less than when interpreting state statutes, our foremost duty is to discern and give effect to the legislative body's intent, beginning with the text. ( Dole v. Steelworkers (1990) 494 U.S. 26, 35, 110 S.Ct. 929, 108 L.Ed.2d 23 ; Wells Fargo Bank v. Superior Court (1991) 53 Cal.3d 1082, 1095, 282 Cal.Rptr. 841, 811 P.2d 1025.)

Tolling is a centuries-old concept. (E.g., Stewart v. Kahn (1871) 78 U.S. 493, 503–507, 11 Wall. 493, 20 L.Ed. 176 [upholding Congressional power to toll state claims during the pendency of the Civil War]; Hanger v. Abbott (1868) 73 U.S. 532, 539–542, 6 Wall. 532, 18 L.Ed. 939 [applying the common law to toll claims] ; see Raygor v. Regents of Univ. of Minn. (2002) 534 U.S. 533, 551 & fn. 4, 122 S.Ct. 999, 152 L.Ed.2d 27 (dis. opn. of Stevens, J.) [tracing tolling as far back as the 17th-century common law].) Long-standing usage has not produced a single, settled understanding of the term, which has been applied to a cluster of related principles. We have identified as "the most common understanding" of tolling a temporary abatement or suspension of the running of a time period. ( People v. Leiva (2013) 56 Cal.4th 498, 507–508, 154 Cal.Rptr.3d 634, 297 P.3d 870 ; see Cuadra v. Millan (1998) 17 Cal.4th 855, 864–865, 72 Cal.Rptr.2d 687, 952 P.2d 704.) However, tolling may refer not only to the suspension of a statute of limitations, but also its extension ( Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc. (2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1192, 151 Cal.Rptr.3d 827, 292 P.3d 871 ) or its renewal or revival (Garner, Dict. of Legal Usage (3d ed.2011) p. 897).

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