City of E. Peoria v. Police Pension Fund

232 N.E.3d 43

2023 IL App (4th) 220816

The CITY OF EAST PEORIA, Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.The BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICE PENSION FUND OF the CITY OF EAST PEORIA, an Administrative Agency; William McWhirter, in His Official Capacity as President of the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of East Peoria; and Chad LaCost, Defendants-Appellees.

No. 4-22-0816

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed May 1, 2023

Appeal from the Circuit Court of Tazewell County, No. 20MR232, Honorable Paul E. Bauer, Judge Presiding.

Robert B. McCoy, of Miller, Hall & Triggs, LLC, of Peoria, for appellant.

Richard Reimer and Vincent C. Mancini, of Reimer Dobrovolny & Labardi PC, of Hinsdale, for appellees Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of East Peoria and William McWhirter.

Jennifer Bonesteel, of Stephen P. Kelly, Attorney at Law, LLC, of Peoria, for other appellee.

OPINION

PRESIDING JUSTICE DeARMOND delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In April 2022, the Board of Trustees of the Police Pension Fund of the City of East Peoria, Illinois (Board), granted Chad LaCost a pension, based on the salary attached to LaCost’s former rank of deputy chief, which he held for three months during his final year of service. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff, the City of East Peoria, Illinois (City), filed a complaint for administrative review of the Board’s decision, alleging LaCost’s pension benefits should have been calculated based on an average of the actual salary he received over the course of his final year. Ultimately, the circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision.

¶ 2 The City appeals, arguing the Board misconstrued section 3-111(a) of the Illinois Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-111(a) (West 2020)) when it approved LaCost’s pension and contends the statute’s plain language establishes that pension benefits should be based on an average of the actual "wages received by an officer during his or her last year." For the following reasons, we reverse the circuit court’s judgment; vacate the Board’s decision granting LaCost a pension based upon the salary attached to deputy chief, the highest rank LaCost earned during his final year of employment; and remand the cause with directions.

¶ 3 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The facts material to the resolution of this case are not in dispute. LaCost became an officer with the East Peoria Police Department on October 7, 1996. In September 2019, LaCost was promoted from sergeant to deputy chief. In December 2019, LaCost’s appointment as deputy chief was terminated, and he reassumed the rank of sergeant. In March 2020, LaCost’s hourly rate of pay was increased to reflect an annual longevity adjustment to his salary.

¶ 5 In a letter, dated August 25, 2020, LaCost announced his decision to resign from his position as sergeant effective October 8, 2020, and requested his pension benefits be "determined by the highest rate of pay within the last year." LaCost’s pension benefits were later approved during a Board meeting in September 2020 and were calculated, based on his former rank of deputy chief pursuant to section 3-111(a) of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-111(a) (West 2020)).

¶ 6 On October 30, 2020, the City filed a complaint, seeking administrative review of the Board’s decision. In February 2021, the parties entered into to an agreed order whereby the matter was to be remanded to the Board to conduct a new hearing with respect to the calculation of LaCost’s pension benefits. The order also indicated that the circuit court "retain[ed] jurisdiction to conduct an administrative review of the written decision of the *** Board following remand," and any party wishing to object to the Board’s decision was required to file a request for administrative review within 14 days of the decision.

¶ 7 A hearing on LaCost’s application for pension benefits was held in December 2021. On April 19, 2022, the Board entered its decision and order reapproving LaCost’s request that his pension benefits be based on his former rank of deputy chief. In doing so, the Board reasoned that section 3411(a) of the Pension Code protected against a diminishment in pension benefits for an officer "who is demoted after paying into the pension fund 9.91% of the officer’s salary ***, provided that officer retires within one year of a demotion."

¶ 8 On April 20, 2022, the City again sought administrative review in the circuit court. Ultimately, the court found the Board’s decision was proper and LaCost was entitled to pension benefits based on his former rank of deputy chief.

¶ 9 This appeal followed.

¶ 10 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 11 On appeal, the sole issue before this court is whether the Board misconstrued section 3-111(a) of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-111(a) (West 2020)) when it granted LaCost a pension based upon the salary attached to the rank of deputy chief, a rank he held for approximately three months. The City argues the most natural reading of the statute establishes that an officer’s pension should be based on the salary attached to the rank held on the last day of service or "the salary received during the one-year period prior to the last day of service," whichever is greater. The City contends this is so because "salary has a commonsense meaning—it is the wages received by an officer during his or her last year." Thus, the City asserts that, if an officer’s rank changes during his last year, his "salary for purposes [ ]of calculating his retirement benefits should reflect his average (actual) wages in his last year of service."

¶ 12 On the other hand, the Board and LaCost (collectively, defendants) argue that the Board's decision was proper and contend that nothing within section 3-111(a) contemplates "an average or proration of salaries for the purposes of awarding pension benefits." Rather, according to defendants, the plain language the legislature chose "ensured retiring police officers would be treated equally and free from the whims of management by securing the greatest retirement benefit [the officer] would be eligible for during the last year of employment." As a result, defendants maintain that section 3-111 (a) establishes "a retiring police officer is awarded benefits based on the highest ‘salary attached to rank’ earned during the last year of employment."

[1, 2] ¶ 13 A reviewing court, when deciding an appeal from a judgment in an administrative review proceeding, reviews the administrative agency’s decision, not the circuit court’s decision, and will reverse where the agency’s decision is legally erroneous. Masterton v. Village of Glenview Police Pension Board, 2022 IL App (1st) 220307, ¶ 45, 464 Ill.Dec. 857, 214 N.E.3d 303. "Interpretation of a statute is a question of law where the agency’s interpretation is considered relevant but not binding on the court." Springfield School District No. 186 v. Department of Revenue, 384 Ill. App. 3d 715, 719, 323 Ill.Dec. 568, 893 N.E.2d 1042, 1047 (2008). "The construction of a statute is an issue of law that is reviewed de novo on appeal." Masterton, 2022 IL App (1st) 220307, ¶ 45, 464 Ill.Dec. 857, 214 N.E.3d 303.

[3, 4] ¶ 14 "The cardinal rule of statutory interpretation is to determine and give effect to the intent of the legislature." Miller v. Sarah Bush Lincoln Health Center, 2016 IL App (4th) 150728, ¶ 10, 404 Ill.Dec. 615, 56 N.E.3d 599. "The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning." Bank of New York Mellon v. Laskowski, 2018 IL 121995, ¶ 12, 423 Ill.Dec. 56, 104 N.E.3d 1145; see Kloeppel v. Champaign County Board, 2021 IL App (4th) 210091, ¶ 15, 453 Ill.Dec. 60, 186 N.E.3d 1094 (stating "the specific words the legislature chose to use are the best evidence of legislative intent"), aff’d, 2022 IL 127997, 465 Ill.Dec. 697, 215 N.E.3d 902. " ‘When the language is unambiguous, the statute must be applied as written without resorting to other aids of construction.’ " Howard v. Weitekamp, 2015 IL App (4th) 150037, ¶ 14, 404 Ill. Dec. 740, 57 N.E.3d 499 (quoting Moore v. Green, 219 Ill. 2d 470, 479, 302 Ill.Dec. 451, 848 N.E.2d 1015, 1020 (2006)). This court "must construe the statute so that each word, clause, and sentence, if possible, is given a reasonable meaning and not rendered superfluous [citation], avoiding an interpretation which would render any portion of the statute meaningless or void." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

Cooke v. Illinois State Board of Elections, 2019 IL App (4th) 180502, ¶ 56, 438 Ill. Dec. 277, 146 N.E.3d 31. Reviewing courts, in interpreting a statute, "view all provisions of an enactment as a whole," taking care not to isolate words and phrases but reading them "in light of other relevant provisions of the statute." Michigan Avenue National Bank v. County of Cook, 191 Ill. 2d 493, 504, 247 Ill.Dec. 473, 732 N.E.2d 528, 535 (2000). With these principles in mind, we turn to the disputed statute, section 3-111(a) of the Pension Code.

¶ 15 Because it has a population of less than 500,000, the City is governed by article 3 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/art. 3 (West 2020)). Pursuant to section 3-111(a),

"A police officer age 50 or more with 20 or more years of creditable service, who is not a participant in the self-managed plan under Section 3-109.3 and who is no longer in service as a police officer, shall receive a pension of 1/2 of the salary attached to the rank held by the officer on the police force for one year immediately prior to retirement or, beginning July 1, 1987 for persons terminating service on or after that date, the salary attached to the rank held on the last day of service or for one year prior to the last day, whichever is greater." 40 ILCS 5/3-111(a) (West 2020).

Section 3-125.1 of the Pension Code (40 ILCS 5/3-125.1 (West 2020)) specifies that a certain percentage of a police officer’s salary is deducted for pension contributions. The second paragraph of...