City of Pikeville v. Ky. Concealed Carry Coal., Inc.

671 S.W.3d 258

CITY OF PIKEVILLE, Kentucky ; Board of Commissioners City of Pikeville, Kentucky; City of Pikeville Exposition Center Corporation; James A. Carter; and Philip R. Elswick, Appellants

v.KENTUCKY CONCEALED CARRY COALITION, INC., Appellee

2022-SC-0053-DG

Supreme Court of Kentucky.

April 27, 2023

COUNSEL FOR APPELLANTS: Russell H. Davis, Jr., Baird and Baird, PSC, Pikeville.

COUNSEL FOR APPELLEE: Steven D. Jaeger, The Jaeger Firm, PLLC.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUSTICE NICKELL

Under the Kentucky Constitution, circuit courts "have original jurisdiction of all justiciable causes not vested in some other court." Ky. Const. § 112 (5). Courts, thus, do not possess freestanding subject-matter jurisdiction to evaluate the legality of actions taken by the other branches of government upon the complaint of a concerned citizen unless the citizen demonstrates, at a minimum, a cognizable injury to his or her rights by the opposing party.

We granted discretionary review to evaluate the reversal by the Court of Appeals of a summary judgment granted by the Pike Circuit Court dismissing Kentucky Concealed Carry Coalition's (KC3) claims that the City of Pikeville, Kentucky, (the City) and its agents violated KRS ¹ 65.870, which generally prohibits the regulation of firearms by local government. Having determined KC3 lacked constitutional standing to assert the claims raised in its complaint, we reverse the Court of Appeals and remand to the trial court with instructions to dismiss the action in its entirety, without prejudice.

KC3 is a non-profit Kentucky corporation comprised of individuals "who work to protect the Second Amendment from over-regulation and implement the right of Kentucky's citizens to carry firearms either openly or concealed, in accordance with the laws and Constitutions of the Commonwealth of Kentucky and the United States."² By posted policy and the operation of various rules and contractual provisions, the City and its agents effectively prohibit both the open and concealed carrying of firearms within certain buildings and properties owned, leased, or occupied by the City. These properties include the Expo Center³ , the Garfield Community Center, the Fire Department Training Center, the RV Park and recreational shelters located in Bob Amos Park, and the City's parks.⁴

KC3 filed suit against the City, James A. Carter, in his official capacity as Mayor, Philip R. Elswick, in his official capacity as City Manager, the Board of Commissioners, and the City of Pikeville Exposition Center Corporation. In its complaint, KC3 alleged the City's prohibition on firearms within the properties constituted unlawful local regulation in violation of KRS 65.870. KC3 further alleged the City implemented an unlawful policy prohibiting the possession of firearms within any RV or other vehicle on the premises of the RV Park in violation of KRS 527.020. KC3 sought declaratory relief, injunctive relief, and an award of attorney's fees, costs, and expenses.

In its answer, the City asserted its posted policies, rules, and contract provisions regarding the possession of firearms upon the City's properties were authorized by the federal Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C.⁵ §§ 921 - 922, in conjunction with companion legislation encouraging the posting of signs by local authorities as well as KRS 527.070 which prohibits the possession of a weapon on school property and also requires relevant signage. Additionally, the City asserted KRS 237.110 and KRS 244.125 authorized the prohibition on the possession of firearms at certain events at the Expo Center where alcoholic beverages are served by the drink. The City sought dismissal of the complaint and an award of attorney's fees, costs, and expenses.

The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The trial court recounted the undisputed evidence that the Expo Center, Garfield Community Center, Fire Department Training Center, and the City of Pikeville Park⁶ were all located within 1000 feet of the Pikeville Elementary School. The trial court further noted the Expo Center regularly hosts school-related activities, such as basketball and archery tournaments. Moreover, the trial court recognized that many other events at the Expo Center, such as music concerts, are operated in a proprietary, rather than public, capacity. During such private events, the prohibitions on the possession and carrying of firearms were the result of contractual negotiations and obligations rather than governmental action.

Regarding the RV Park, the trial court noted the undisputed evidence that the RV Park was located within 1000 feet of the City's soccer field, junior high school football field, tennis courts, and track and field facilities. It noted these sporting facilities are subject to a use agreement between the City and the Pikeville Independent School Board allowing the School Board non-exclusive use of the City's property to operate school sports programs. As a result, the trial court concluded each of the properties were subject to the Gun-Free School Zones Act and KRS 527.070. In addition, the trial court concluded the provisions of KRS 65.870 did not preclude the City from enforcing the applicable federal and state laws prohibiting the possession of firearms upon its properties.

Based upon the foregoing legal conclusions, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the City and dismissed KC3's complaint. By separate order, the trial court determined the City was the prevailing party and awarded $15,404.97 in attorney's fees pursuant to KRS 65.870(4).

On direct appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals held the City was not permitted to enforce an informal blanket prohibition on the possession and carrying of firearms upon the properties, concluding:

(1) under the Gun-Free School Zones Act, the City was permitted to prohibit the open carrying of firearms upon any of its properties located within 1000 feet of a school;

(2) any other prohibition regarding the concealed carrying of firearms upon the properties could only be enforced pursuant to a duly enacted ordinance under KRS 237.115(2) ;

(3) private renters of the Expo Center's facilities have the right to prohibit the carrying of firearms at such private events; and

(4) the City may not prohibit the lawful storage of firearms within a vehicle under KRS 527.020(4) and KRS 527.020(8).

Because the Court of Appeals reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded for further proceedings, the Court also reversed the award of attorney's fees to the City. We granted discretionary review.

The parties appeared at oral argument before this Court on February 8, 2023. During oral argument, the Court raised the issue of constitutional standing because it did not appear KC3 or any of its members had been injured by the City's allegedly unlawful prohibition on the possession and carrying of firearms. In response to questioning from the Court, counsel for KC3 stated there were affidavits attached to the complaint from members who had been denied entry to the Expo Center.

The Court additionally inquired whether Pikeville Code of Ordinances (PCOD) Title XIII § 130.15⁷ had any impact upon the outcome of the proceedings, given both the Court of Appeals and the trial court appeared to operate under the impression that no applicable ordinance existed. To clarify the issue concerning the validity of the ordinance, the Court orally requested the parties to jointly supplement the record.

On March 1, 2023, the parties filed a joint supplemental record entry. The supplemental record suggests PCOD § 130.15 is, in fact, currently in effect as duly amended by the City of Pikeville Commission on February 11, 2013. The parties did not present any evidence the ordinance had been nullified by judicial order or otherwise repealed by the legislative body. Additionally, KC3 filed a notice acknowledging the complaint does not contain any attached affidavits concerning alleged injuries to its members, and instead directed our attention to the allegations contained in paragraphs 12, 19, and 100 of its complaint.

CONSTITUTIONAL STANDING, GENERALLY

To begin, Kentucky "courts do not function to give advisory opinions, even on important public issues, unless there is an actual case in controversy." Philpot v. Patton , 837 S.W.2d 491, 493 (Ky. 1992). Standing must be addressed as a threshold matter because "all Kentucky courts have the constitutional duty to ascertain the issue of constitutional standing, acting on their own motion, to ensure that only justiciable causes proceed in court⁸ , because the issue of constitutional standing is not waivable." Commonwealth, Cabinet for Health & Fam. Servs., Dept. for Medicaid Servs. v. Sexton ex rel. Appalachian Reg'l Healthcare, Inc. , 566 S.W.3d 185, 192 (Ky. 2018).

The justiciability requirement operates as a constitutional limitation on the exercise of judicial power. Id. at 193. While the practical effect of the standing requirement is to avoid speculation and debate over abstract or hypothetical questions, the purpose of the doctrine is "founded in concern about the proper—and properly limited—role of the courts in a democratic society." Warth v. Seldin , 422 U.S. 490, 498, 95 S.Ct. 2197, 45 L.Ed.2d 343 (1975). The standing doctrine "serves to prevent the judicial process from being used to usurp the powers of the political branches ... and confines the ... courts to a properly judicial role." Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins , 578 U.S. 330, 338, 136 S.Ct. 1540, 194 L.Ed.2d 635 (2016) (citations omitted).

The United States Supreme Court has "repeatedly held that an asserted right to have the Government act in accordance with law is not sufficient, standing alone, to confer jurisdiction on a federal court." Allen v. Wright , 468 U.S. 737, 754, 104 S.Ct. 3315, 82 L.Ed.2d 556 (1984), abrogated on other grounds by Lexmark Intern., Inc. v. Static Control Components, Inc. , 572 U.S....