City of Shoreview v. Amro

City of Shoreview, Respondent, v. Mohamad Amro, et al., Appellants.

A20-0513

STATE OF MINNESOTA IN COURT OF APPEALS

March 1, 2021

This opinion is nonprecedential except as provided by Minn. R. Civ. App. P. 136.01, subd. 1(c).

Affirmed

Johnson, Judge

Ramsey County District Court

File No. 62-CV-19-3568

Joseph A. Kelly, Kevin M. Beck, Kelly & Lemmons, PA, St. Paul, Minnesota (for respondent)

Ferdinand F. Peters, Benjamin P. Loetscher, Patrick M. Kennedy, Ferdinand F. Peters, Esq. Law Firm, St. Paul, Minnesota (for appellants Spring Lake Park Gardens, LLC and Mohamad Amro)

Considered and decided by Bjorkman, Presiding Judge; Johnson, Judge; and Larkin, Judge.

NONPRECEDENTIAL OPINION

JOHNSON, Judge

The City of Shoreview commenced this action to abate a nuisance at Mohamad Amro's residence. Amro did not serve a proper answer to the summons and complaint. The district court granted the city's motion for default judgment and later denied Amro's motion to vacate the default judgment. We conclude that the district court did not err by entering default judgment because Amro did not serve a valid answer or otherwise respond to the complaint. We also conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying the motion to vacate the default judgment. Therefore, we affirm.

FACTS

Amro and his family live in a home in the city of Shoreview that is owned by Spring Lake Park Gardens, LLC (SLPG), a company of which Amro is the registered manager. In 2018, Amro began performing significant landscaping work, including the construction of a berm. In 2018 and early 2019, the city and Ramsey County repeatedly informed Amro that he was not in compliance with various ordinances and codes due to the accumulation of refuse and debris, outdoor storage of construction material and construction equipment, outdoor storage of inoperable vehicles, and uncovered excavation. Amro did not resolve the issues to the city's satisfaction.

On March 1, 2019, the city sent Amro a letter stating that he must take action to resolve the issues on his property by March 15 and that the city council planned to discuss the matter at an upcoming March 18 meeting. At the meeting, the city council passed a resolution ordering Amro to abate the nuisance conditions on his property by April 30, 2019. The city sent Amro written notice of the resolution on March 20, 2019. The city inspected Amro's property on March 21, 2019, and May 2, 2019, but determined on each visit that the property still was not in compliance.

On May 15, 2019, the city commenced this action against Amro and SLPG to enforce the city council's resolution. In early June 2019, Amro faxed a one-page documentto an attorney representing the city. The document consists of a photocopy of the first page of the summons with two handwritten comments and a handwritten date. In the top margin, in printed letters, is the handwritten comment, "Attention Kevin M. Beck," who is the attorney who signed the summons and the complaint on behalf of the city. Below the caption, also in printed letters, is the handwritten comment, "I'm contesting the charges." No signature or printed name of the person responsible for the handwriting appears on the document.

In early July 2019, the city filed a motion for default judgment. The city sent the motion papers to Amro via U.S. Mail. The district court held a hearing on the motion in mid-July. Neither Amro nor SLPG appeared at the hearing. The district court granted the city's motion. The district court's order states that Amro and SLPG must abate the nuisance on the property by July 23, 2019; that the city could enter the property and abate the nuisance after that date if Amro and SLPG fail to do so; and that if the city needs to perform abatement work, "it may assess the costs of said abatement to the property taxes of the Property." The district court administrator entered judgment on July 25, 2019, and the notice of judgment indicates that a copy was sent to Amro and SLPG. On July 30 and 31, 2019, the city entered Amro's property and abated the nuisance.

In mid-August 2019, with the assistance of counsel, Amro and SLPG filed a motion to vacate the default judgment. The city opposed the motion. The district court held a hearing on the motion, at which it allowed Amro and SLPG to submit additional evidentiary materials. The district court held a second hearing on the motion in December2019 after the case was reassigned to a different judge. The district court filed a one-page order denying the motion to vacate the default judgment.

Amro and SLPG appeal. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to appellants collectively as Amro.

DECISION

Amro argues that the district court erred in two ways: first, by granting the city's motion for default judgment and, second, by denying his motion to vacate the default judgment. In response, the city argues that the district court did not err in either respect. In addition, the city argues that the appeal is moot because the city has abated the nuisance. We will begin by considering the city's mootness argument.

I. Mootness

As stated above, the city argues that the appeal is moot because the nuisance has been abated, which was the object of its lawsuit.

"An appeal is moot when 'a decision on the merits is no longer necessary or an award of effective relief is no longer possible.'" State ex rel. Ford v. Schnell, 933 N.W.2d 393, 401 (Minn. 2019) (quoting Dean v. City of Winona, 868 N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 2015)). If an event occurs after the district court has made a decision or entered judgment that makes "a decision on the merits unnecessary or an award of effective relief impossible, the appeal will be dismissed as moot." In re Inspection of Minnesota Auto Specialties, Inc., 346 N.W.2d 657, 658 (Minn. 1984); see also Housing & Redevelopment Auth. ex rel. City of Richfield v. Walser Auto Sales, Inc., 641 N.W.2d 885, 888 (Minn. 2002).

We take as given the city's representation that the object of its lawsuit has been achieved. But the relevant question is whether Amro may obtain any relief on his appeal. In his reply brief, Amro argues that the appeal is not moot because the default judgment allows the city to assess his property taxes in an amount equal to the costs of the city's abatement work. Amro is correct that the default judgment allows the city to impose such an assessment. The record reflects that Shoreview incurred expenses of approximately $15,000 on the abatement that it performed in late July 2019. If Amro were successful on either of his arguments for reversal of the district court's orders, relief may be available to him with respect to the $15,000 assessment on his property taxes. Thus, the appeal is not moot.

II. Motion for Default Judgment

Amro argues that, for two reasons, the district court erred by granting the city's motion for default judgment.

A. Sufficiency of the Answer

Amro first contends that the district court erred by finding him to be in default. A district court may enter default judgment against a defendant who "has failed to plead or otherwise defend within the time allowed therefor." Minn. R. Civ. P. 55.01. The appropriate responsive pleading in a civil action is "an answer." Minn. R. Civ. P. 7.01. The form of pleadings is governed by rule 10 of the rules of civil procedure, and the content of an answer is governed by rule 8. Minn. R. Civ. P. 8.02-.06, 10.01-.04. In addition, every pleading "shall be signed by the party" if "the party is self-represented." Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01. This court applies a de novo standard of review to a district court'sinterpretation of the rules of civil procedure. DeCook v. Olmsted Med. Ctr., Inc., 875 N.W.2d 263, 266 (Minn. 2016).

At the July 2019 hearing, the district court stated that, even if the one-page document were liberally construed, it would not constitute a "proper response to the complaint." In its subsequent order, the district court stated, "Defendants have failed to serve an Answer to the Complaint and are wholly in default." Amro contends that the district court erred in making this determination, asserting that pro se pleadings should be liberally construed and that "there was sufficient indicia of appellants' intent to contest the charges." Amro acknowledges that, "[a]lthough some accommodations may be made for pro se litigants," they "are generally held to the same standards as attorneys and must comply with court rules." See Fitzgerald v. Fitzgerald, 629 N.W.2d 115, 119 (Minn. App. 2001).

Amro's contention does not confront the requirement in rule 11 that every pleading be signed, either by an attorney or by a self-represented party.¹ It cannot be disputed that there is no signature on the one-page document that Amro faxed to the city's attorney. Accordingly, the district court did not err by determining that Amro was in default because he did not serve a signed answer.

B. Notice of Default

Amro contends, in the alternative, that he was not given notice of the defect in his purported answer. He bases this contention on rule 11, which states, "An unsigneddocument shall be stricken unless omission of the signature is corrected promptly after being called to the attention of the attorney or party." Minn. R. Civ. P. 11.01 (emphasis added). He relies on the italicized text in contending that the city had a duty to call his attention to the defect in his answer. He further contends that, if the defect had been called to his attention, he could have sought to cure it. See DeCook, 875 N.W.2d at 267-69; Save Our Creeks, 699 N.W.2d at 310-11. In response, the city contends that rule 11 does not require a plaintiff to give notice to a defendant of a defective answer and that, even if such a duty exists, the city fulfilled the duty by sending Amro its motion papers via U.S. Mail.

Amro does not cite any caselaw for the proposition that rule 11 imposes a duty on a plaintiff to give a defendant notice of a deficient answer, and we are not aware of any such authority. The...