City of Springfield v. Ameren Ill. Co.

2018 IL App (4th) 170755

127 N.E.3d 703

431 Ill.Dec. 170

The CITY OF SPRINGFIELD, Illinois, a Municipal Corporation, Plaintiff-Appellee,

v.AMEREN ILLINOIS COMPANY, d/b/a Ameren Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.

NO. 4-17-0755

Appellate Court of Illinois, Fourth District.

Filed November 13, 2018

James F. Clayborne, of Clayborne, Sabo & Wagner LLP, of Belleville, for appellant.

Matthew J. Cate and R. Kurt Wilke, of Barber, Segatto, Hoffee, Wilke & Cate, LLP, of Springfield, for appellee.

JUSTICE STEIGMANN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 In September 2013, the City of Springfield (the city) filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Ameren Illinois Company, d/b/a Ameren Illinois (Ameren). The city alleged that, based upon section IX of a franchise agreement and prior case law, it had the exclusive right to provide electricity to residents living in an area which it had recently annexed, excepting only those residents who opted to retain Ameren after annexation. In September 2016, the city filed a motion for summary judgment. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2016). In September 2017, the trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment.

¶ 2 Ameren appeals, arguing that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was improper because (1) Ameren has a statutory right to continue to serve its customers, (2) section IX of the franchise agreement is unenforceable because it required the approval of the Illinois Commerce Commission, (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its grant of summary judgment, and (4) section IX of the franchise agreement violates public policy. The city argues that the franchise agreement gives it the right to provide electricity to the newly-annexed residents.

¶ 3 We conclude that Ameren has a statutory right to continue to serve its customers. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

¶ 4 I. BACKGROUND

¶ 5 A. The Complaint

¶ 6 In September 2013, the city filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against Ameren. The city alleged that it had the exclusive right to provide electricity to residents whose property had been recently annexed into the city, excepting only those residents who opted to retain Ameren after annexation. The city based its claim upon (1) section IX of the franchise agreement between the city and Ameren and (2) this court's decision in Central Illinois Light Co. v. City of Springfield , 161 Ill. App. 3d 364, 112 Ill.Dec. 939, 514 N.E.2d 602 (1987).

¶ 7 Section IX of the franchise agreement provides as follows:

"This franchise is granted for the sole purpose of permitting [Ameren] to serve existing customers in the [c]ity who have opted to continue to receive service from [Ameren] after annexation, to serve customers of [Ameren] who annex to the [c]ity and which [Ameren] has a right to continue to serve and the customer has not requested service from the [c]ity, and to provide electric service to customers within [Ameren's] authorized service areas outside the corporate limits of the [c]ity or to make interconnections with the city or other electric systems. Unless approved by the [c]ity or other entity having authority to approve such action, [Ameren] shall not otherwise provide or furnish electric energy at retail within the present or future corporate limits of the city, or service territory of the [c]ity, and nothing herein contained shall be construed as a grant or franchise to [Ameren] to conduct such business in the [c]ity."

¶ 8 In Central Illinois Light Co. , 161 Ill. App. 3d at 367, 112 Ill.Dec. 939, 514 N.E.2d 602, this court concluded that because "the city has the power to operate a [power] plant and sell electricity to its inhabitants, we hold the [Electric Supplier] Act does not give CILCO (Central Illinois Light Company) any territorial rights which prohibit the city from furnishing services to the tract in question."

¶ 9 B. Ameren's Motion to Dismiss and Answer

¶ 10 In January 2014, Ameren filed a motion to dismiss. 735 ILCS 5/2-619.1 (West 2014). In December 2014, the trial court denied this motion. In January 2015, Ameren filed an answer, affirmative defenses, and counterclaims. These affirmative defenses and counterclaims are not raised on appeal.

¶ 11 C. The City's Motion for Summary Judgment

¶ 12 In September 2016, the city filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing it had the exclusive right to provide electricity to residents living in an area that was recently annexed into the city, excepting only those residents who opted to retain Ameren after annexation. 735 ILCS 5/2-1005 (West 2016). The city based its argument on (1) section 11-117-6(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code ( 65 ILCS 5/11-117-6(b) (West 2016) ), (2) this court's decision in Central Illinois Light Co. , and (3) section IX of the franchise agreement.

¶ 13 In July 2017, Ameren filed a response to the city's motion for summary judgment, in which Ameren argued that the city did not have an exclusive right to provide electricity to the residents of the recently annexed area because (1) the Illinois Municipal Code allowed Ameren to continue serving its existing customers despite the annexation, (2) Central Illinois Light Co. was abrogated by modifications to the Illinois Municipal Code, (3) section IX of the franchise agreement was invalid, (4) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant the relief requested by the city, and (5) a question of fact remained as to whether all of the customers requested their electrical service be transferred to the city.

¶ 14 D. The Trial Court's Order

¶ 15 In September 2017, the trial court granted the city's motion for summary judgment. When granting the motion for summary judgment, the court concluded that there was no issue of material fact and that it had jurisdiction. The court ruled that the city had the exclusive right to provide electricity to residents whose property had been recently annexed, excepting only those residents who opted to retain Ameren after annexation. The court based this conclusion upon section 11-117-6(b) of the Illinois Municipal Code, section IX of the franchise agreement, and this court's prior ruling in Central Illinois Light Co. , 161 Ill. App. 3d at 367, 112 Ill.Dec. 939, 514 N.E.2d 602. 65 ILCS 5/11-117-6(b) (West 2016).

¶ 16 This appeal followed.

¶ 17 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 18 Ameren appeals, arguing that the trial court's grant of summary judgment was improper because (1) Ameren has a statutory right to continue to serve its customers, (2) section IX of the franchise agreement is unenforceable because it required the approval of the Illinois Commerce Commission, (3) the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter its grant of summary judgment, and (4) section IX of the franchise agreement violates public policy. The city argues that the franchise agreement gives it the right to provide electricity to the newly annexed residents.

¶ 19 We conclude that Ameren has a statutory right to continue to serve its customers. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with the views expressed herein.

¶ 20 A. Summary Judgment and the Standard of Review

¶ 21 The purpose of summary judgment is not to try an issue of fact but to determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists. Evans v. Brown , 399 Ill. App. 3d 238, 243, 339 Ill.Dec. 144, 925 N.E.2d 1265, 1270 (2010). Summary judgment is properly granted when the pleadings, depositions, admissions, and affidavits on file, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, show that (1) there is no genuine issue of material fact and (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Enbridge Pipeline (Illinois), LLC v. Temple , 2017 IL App (4th) 150346, ¶ 69, 414 Ill.Dec. 641, 80 N.E.3d 784. When determining whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all pleadings and attachments strictly against the moving party and liberally in favor of the nonmoving party. Olson v. Williams All Seasons Co. , 2012 IL App (2d) 110818, ¶ 23, 363 Ill.Dec. 117, 974 N.E.2d 914. A triable issue exists when there is a dispute concerning material facts or when those facts are undisputed but reasonable persons might draw different inferences from those facts. Messerly v. Boehmke , 2014 IL App (4th) 130397, ¶ 32, 380 Ill.Dec. 126, 8 N.E.3d 57. Summary judgment is a drastic means of disposing of litigation and, therefore, should only be allowed when the right of the moving party is clear and free from doubt. Lee v. Six Flags Theme Parks, Inc. , 2014 IL App (1st) 130771, ¶ 61, 381 Ill.Dec. 359, 10 N.E.3d 444. A trial court's ruling on a motion for summary judgment is reviewed de novo . Boehmke , 2014 IL App (4th) 130397, ¶ 32, 380 Ill.Dec. 126, 8 N.E.3d 57.

¶ 22 B. Ameren's Statutory Right

¶ 23 Ameren argues it has a statutory right to continue to serve its recently annexed customers. We agree.

¶ 24 1. The Applicable Law

¶ 25 "The primary goal of statutory construction is to determine and execute the intent of the legislature." Enbridge Energy (Illinois), L.L.C. v. Kuerth , 2018 IL App (4th) 150519-B, ¶ 43, 421 Ill.Dec. 210, 99 N.E.3d 210. The language of a statute, given its plain and ordinary meaning, is the best indication of the legislature's intent. People v. Burlington , 2018 IL App (4th) 150642, ¶ 16, 421 Ill.Dec. 333, 99 N.E.3d 577. A court must view a statute as a whole, construing words and phrases in light of other relevant provisions. People v. Jackson , 2011 IL 110615, ¶ 12, 353 Ill.Dec. 353, 955 N.E.2d 1164. Courts presume that the legislature is aware of judicial decisions interpreting a statute. Pielet v. Pielet , 2012 IL 112064, ¶ 48, 365 Ill.Dec. 497, 978 N.E.2d 1000. Courts further presume that every amendment to a statute is made with a purpose. People v. Almond , 2015 IL 113817, ¶ 39, 392 Ill.Dec. 227, 32 N.E.3d 535. Statutory construction is a question...