Claflin v. Claflin

288 So.3d 774

Allan L. CLAFLIN, Appellant,

v.Heidee Zamora CLAFLIN, Appellee.

No. 1D19-1370

District Court of Appeal of Florida, First District.

January 21, 2020

Terrance A. Jones, Green Cove Springs, for Appellant.

Heidee Zamora Claflin, pro se, Appellee.

M.K. Thomas, J.

Heidee Zamora petitioned for dissolution of her nineteen-year marriage to Allan Claflin, a petition which Mr. Claflin contends should be dismissed because under Philippine law, the marriage was never valid. The trial court disagreed, denied Mr. Claflin's request for a dismissal, and determined the marriage could be dissolved under Florida law. Thereafter, Mr. Claflin—having in the interim obtained a second judgment from a Philippine court declaring the marriage between the parties to be void—filed a timely motion to set aside the final judgment pursuant to Rules 1.540(b)(2), (b)(3), and (b)(5) of the Florida Rules of Civil Procedure. The motion asserted that the latest Philippine judgment constituted newly discovered evidence. The trial court subsequently scheduled three additional evidentiary hearings, ultimately considering the newly acquired Philippine judgment presented by Mr. Claflin. Following the three evidentiary hearings, the trial court entered an "Order Denying Former Husband's Motion to Set Aside Final Judgment." Although the trial court indicated a technical denial of Mr. Claflin's motions, the order contemplated the Philippine judgment he acquired, reconsidered the merits of the petition for dissolution and arrived at the same disposition. The order on appeal is regarded as an amended final judgment and we affirm. We write only to address the rule of comity and its application here.

Facts

The parties were married in the Philippines in 1994 and subsequently settled in the United States. They raised three children together before Ms. Zamora petitioned for dissolution of the marriage in March 2013. Around the time of the petition filing, Mr. Claflin discovered that Ms. Zamora had previously married Rodolfo Mallari in the Philippines in 1989, and that marriage had not been officially annulled by a Philippine court prior to the parties entering their marriage.

Ms. Zamora denies that she was married to Mallari. Due to a lack of undisputed evidence to the contrary, the trial court denied Mr. Claflin's motion to dismiss the petition for dissolution. The trial court reasoned that the issues required resolution in the Philippines, kicking off a years-long overseas legal odyssey. Ms. Zamora eventually filed with the trial court a Philippine judgment she acquired from the regional trial court of San Mateo which addressed the status of her alleged previous marriage to Mallari. The "San Mateo" judgment resulted from Ms. Zamora's request for an annulment and declaration of nullity as to the Mallari marriage. The judgment described the Mallari marriage as orchestrated by Ms. Zamora's family against her will. At the time of the alleged marriage, Ms. Zamora was barely seventeen years of age. She did not attend any ceremony, never lived with Mallari and subsequently fled her family's home. Ms. Zamora testified that she had never seen the alleged Mallari marriage certificate until it appeared in the current dissolution proceedings. The San Mateo judgment declared the Mallari marriage as "void from the beginning" as under Philippine law, Ms. Zamora lacked the legal capacity to marry because of her age.

The trial court acknowledged the San Mateo judgment declaring that the Mallari marriage was invalid and found the parties' marriage validly entered and capable of dissolution under Florida law. Dissatisfied, Mr. Claflin filed a timely motion to set aside the trial court's order and renewed his motion to dismiss the action. Mr. Claflin argued that under Philippine law, the validity of the Mallari marriage was irrelevant to the legality of the subsequent marriage between the parties as no judicial declaration of its illegality was obtained prior to the solemnization of the subsequent marriage. The motions notified the trial court of a separate legal action Mr. Claflin was pursuing in the regional trial court of Pasig City in the Philippines. Subsequently, Mr. Claflin filed with the trial court a separate Philippine judgment he acquired from the Pasig City court. The "Pasig City" judgment declared the parties' marriage to be "void ab initio" as bigamous, terminated the mutual support obligation of the parties, declared the children born of the parties' marriage as "illegitimate," and ordered the children's birth certificates be amended to reflect the new status.

The trial court found the Philippine judgments "irreconcilable" and, in instances of conflicting foreign judgments, "courts have discretion to recognize the earlier judgment, the later judgment, or neither one." The trial court followed the San Mateo judgment and maintained its previous determination that the subsequent marriage between parties was valid because the Mallari marriage was void.

Mr. Claflin contends that, considering the Pasig City judgment, the trial court's dissolution of the parties' marriage under Florida law constitutes reversible error as the trial court does not have jurisdiction to dissolve a marriage that is invalid under Philippine law.

Legal Analysis

A lower court's application of a foreign jurisdiction's law is reviewed de novo. Cohen v. Shushan , 212 So. 3d 1113, 1117 (Fla. 2d DCA 2017). In reviewing a trial court's application of foreign law, courts are encouraged to research and analyze the law independently of the issues raised by the parties and to "take an active role in ascertaining foreign law." Transportes Aereos Nacionales, S.A. v. De Brenes , 625 So. 2d 4, 6 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993) ; see also Twohy v. First Nat'l Bank of Chicago , 758 F.2d 1185, 1192 (7th Cir. 1985). Whether the trial court erred in its interpretation of the Florida Statutes and its subsequent determination that a marriage existed between the parties (which could be dissolved) is also a question subject to de novo review. See Payton v. State , 239 So. 3d 129, 131 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (noting that a lower court's statutory interpretation and application is reviewed de novo).¹

In the absence of the Mallari marriage, Mr. Claflin does not dispute the validity of his marriage to Ms. Zamora. Thus, the question on review is whether the trial court erred in its determination that, under Philippine law, the parties' marriage is valid and therefore, subject to dissolution under Florida law.

"Florida has traditionally approved of the sanctity of marriage, and the act of marriage, regardless of where it is contracted." Johnson v. Lincoln Square Props., Inc. , 571 So. 2d 541, 542 (Fla. 2d DCA 1990). Accordingly, "[u]nder principles of comity a marriage by citizens of a foreign country, if valid under foreign law, may be treated as valid in Florida ..." Montano v. Montano , 520 So. 2d 52, 52-53 (Fla. 3d DCA 1988). Conversely, if a purported marital relationship in a foreign jurisdiction would be deemed invalid in that jurisdiction, it must be deemed invalid here. See , e.g., Betemariam v. Said , 48 So. 3d 121, 125 (Fla. 4th DCA 2010) (holding that because the Commonwealth of Virginia mandated a marriage license as a condition of marriage, and the litigants had never obtained such a license, "[t]he trial court had no choice but to determine that no legal marriage had occurred"). However, deference to foreign law or judgments is not absolute.

Before enforcement of the foreign law or judgment in a dissolution proceeding, Florida courts are to review foreign law and ensure compliance with the rule of comity. See § 61.0401(3), Fla. Stat. For application, the rule of comity has three requirements: 1) the parties were given adequate notice and opportunity to be heard; 2) the foreign court had jurisdiction; and, 3) that the judgment does not "offend the public policy of this state." Id.

In 2014, the Florida Legislature enacted section 61.0401 which codified the common law established by Florida courts to protect litigants in family-related matters under Florida Statutes Chapters 61 and 88 (relating to divorce, alimony, division of marital assets, child support, and child custody) from unfair foreign laws. The statute shields a party in Florida from being adversely affected by enforcement of a foreign law or judgment that does not provide the parties the fundamental liberties, rights, and privileges guaranteed by Florida law. See In re Estate of Nicole Santos , 648 So. 2d 277, 282 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995).

Judge Barfield of our Court eloquently stated:

Comity does not require Florida public policy to be supplanted by foreign law. Comity is not a rule of law, but of practice, convenience and expediency. Where it would be contrary to the statutory law or contravene some established and important policy of the forum state, it is not applied.

Anderson Contracting Co., Inc. v. Zurich Ins. Co. , 448 So. 2d 37, 38 (Fla. 1st DCA 1984). Thus, our analysis requires review and application of Philippine law, unless such application would offend Florida law or public policy.²

The Family Code of the Philippines was passed in 1987 and is the source of the Philippine statutory authority at issue. The Code provides that no Philippine marriage shall be valid without both parties to the marriage being of legal capacity, without a valid marriage license, and without both parties freely and personally declaring that they take each other as husband and wife in the presence of a solemnizing officer. Family Code of the Phil., Title I, chap. 1, art. 2-3. The absence of any of these requirements "shall render the marriage void ab initio." Id. at art. 4. The Code further specifies that only parties above the age of eighteen may contract to marry. Id. at art. 5.

Chapter 3 of the Philippine Family Code separately addresses "Void and Voidable Marriages." Article 35 provides that certain marriages "shall be void from the beginning." Included in this list are...