Clark v. Shrader

SHAUN ALLEN CLARK, Plaintiff, v. JEFF SHRADER, JEFFERSON COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPT.,JEFFERSON COUNTY COMBINED COURTS, and WESTMINSTER MUNICIPAL COURT, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 20-cv-01410-DDD-KLM

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

January 22, 2021

RECOMMENDATION OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

ENTERED BY MAGISTRATE JUDGE KRISTEN L. MIX

This matter is before the Court on the Motion to Dismiss Prisoner Complaint [ECF No. 1] [#17]¹ filed by Defendants Jeff Shrader ("Shrader") and Jefferson County Sheriff's Department ("JCSD"). Plaintiff, who proceeds as a pro se litigant,² filed two Responses [#35, #42] in opposition to the Motion [#17], Defendants Shrader and JCSD filed two Replies [#39, #45], and Plaintiff filed a Surreply [#46]. The Motion [#17] has beenreferred to the undersigned pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and D.C.COLO.LCivR 72.1. See [#36]. The Court has reviewed the briefs, the entire case file, and the applicable law, and is sufficiently advised in the premises.³ For the reasons set forth below, the Court respectfully RECOMMENDS that the Motion [#17] be GRANTED.

I. Background⁴

Plaintiff is a pretrial detainee who has been housed at the Jefferson County Detention Facility ("JCDF" or the "Jail") at all times relevant to this lawsuit. Compl. [#1] at 4. He states that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, Defendants Shrader, JCSD, and Jefferson County Combined Courts have chosen more than half of the jail's population to release early, to lower their bonds drastically, or to give personal recognizance bonds, in an attempt to decrease the number of people at the jail. Id. He states that has seen people with gun charges on parole get personal recognizance bonds, strangulation charges dropped to misdemeanors and the person released, and "every other charge you can think of" get released as well. Id. He states that many early releases and charges have been dropped to a summons to court. Id.

Plaintiff states that he has two open lawsuits, one against a prosecuting attorney for allegedly dropping misdemeanor charges and raising felony charges against him to keep him held ninety days past his Speedy Trial date, and the other a double jeopardycase involving alleged illegal sentencing against Defendant Shrader. Id. Plaintiff states that, because of these lawsuits, he has been discriminated against by not being released. Id. He states that "[t]o choose any one person over another that doesn't face a capital crime to release during this time is blatant discrimination." Id.

Plaintiff states that he is now stuck in quarantine and that everyone at the jail is either showing symptoms of COVID-19 or has already tested positive for the virus. Id. He states that he is over forty years old and a life-long asthmatic, and therefore he fears for his life. Id. His quarantine space includes the entirety of Module 5d, comprised of approximately 40-50 men. Id. at 5. He further states that they "are currently being held on the 7th floor in complete isolation from one another 23 hours[s] a day lockdown and only see medical once in the morning and once at night." Id. Before everyone became sick, Plaintiff and other inmates asked for appropriate personal protective equipment and social distancing guidelines, "as well as some sort of protocol pertaining to movement of inmates/deputies and especially new inmates brought in from the street." Id. Plaintiff specifically points to a man named Mr. Montoya who was brought in and placed in general population in Plaintiff's Module 5d even though he was obviously very sick. Id. at 5-6.

As a result of these allegations, Plaintiff explicitly asserts one claim for discrimination. Id. at 4. Defendants also construe the Complaint [#1] as asserting a claim for deliberate indifference to health and safety. Motion [#17] at 2; see also Response [#42] at 3 (discussing deliberate indifference). Plaintiff seeks $50 million dollars and "a public apology made to myself and all the people who are suffering the COVID-19 pandemic by being held at Jefferson County Jail" by Defendants. Compl. [#1] at 8. In the present Motion [#17], Defendants Shrader and JCSD seek dismissal of all aspects of Plaintiff'sclaim(s).

II. Standard of Review

The purpose of a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) is to test "the sufficiency of the allegations within the four corners of the complaint after taking those allegations as true." Mobley v. McCormick, 40 F.3d 337, 340 (10th Cir. 1994); Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (stating that a complaint may be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted"). "The court's function on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion is not to weigh potential evidence that the parties might present at trial, but to assess whether the plaintiff's complaint alone is legally sufficient to state a claim for which relief may be granted." Sutton v. Utah State Sch. for the Deaf & Blind, 173 F.3d 1226, 1236 (10th Cir. 1999) (citation omitted). To withstand a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), "a complaint must contain enough allegations of fact 'to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atlantic Co. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Shero v. City of Grove, Okla., 510 F.3d 1196, 1200 (10th Cir. 2007) ("The complaint must plead sufficient facts, taken as true, to provide 'plausible grounds' that discovery will reveal evidence to support the plaintiff's allegations." (quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570)). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "A pleading that offers labels and conclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Nor does a complaint suffice if it tenders naked assertion[s] devoid of further factual enhancement." Id. (brackets in original; internal quotation marks omitted).

To survive a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the factual allegations in the complaint "must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Christy Sports, LLC v. Deer Valley Resort Co., 555 F.3d 1188, 1191 (10th Cir. 2009). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct," a factual allegation has been stated, "but it has not show[n][ ] that the pleader is entitled to relief," as required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a). Iqbal, 552 U.S. at 679 (second brackets added; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

III. Analysis

A. Equitable/Injunctive Relief

Plaintiff asks for "a public apology made to myself and all the people who are suffering the COVID-19 pandemic by being held at Jefferson County Jail" by Defendants. Compl. [#1] at 8. The Court therefore first addresses the issue of the appropriateness of requiring an apology as equitable/injunctive relief in a section 1983 case.

In Dahn v. Adoption Alliance, 164 F. Supp. 3d 1294, 1318 (D. Colo. 2016), rev'd on other grounds by Dahn v. Amedei, 867 F.3d 1178 (10th Cir. 2017), the Court examined a similar issue, where the plaintiff had stated "that he seeks only an equitable, injunctive remedy in the form of an apology." The Court noted that "there appears to be a split in authority as to whether a federal district court may award equitable relief in the form of an apology." Dahn, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 1318 (citing Villescas v. Abraham, 285 F. Supp. 2d 1248, 1256 (D. Colo. 2003) (stating that an apology was a permissible equitable remedy); Wells v. Lobb & Co., Inc., Nos. Civ.A. 97-WM-1011, Civ.A. 97-WM-1317, Civ.A. 98-WM-279, 1999 WL 1268331 (D. Colo. Dec. 1, 1999) (ordering defendants to deliver letter of apology to plaintiff); Kitchen v. Essex Cnty. Corr. Facility, No. 12-2199 (JLL), 2012 WL1994505, at *4 (D.N.J. May 31, 2012) (holding that an apology is not cognizable remedy "either within the meaning of a § 1983 action or as a general legal remedy"); Norris v. Poole, No. 8:10-750-JFA-BHH, 2010 WL 1903970, at *3 (D.S.C. Apr. 19, 2010) (stating that an apology is only available "in extraordinary circumstances"); Burkes v. Tranquilli, No. 08-474, 2008 WL 2682606, at *4 (W.D. Pa. July 2, 2008) (stating that an apology is not an appropriate remedy); Woodruff v. Ohman, 29 F. App'x 337, 346 (6th Cir. 2002) (holding that "the district court exceeded its equitable power when it ordered [defendant] to apologize"); McKee v. Turner, 491 F.2d 1106, 1107 (9th Cir. 1974) (noting that the court was "not commissioned to run around getting apologies"); Rumbles v. Hill, 182 F.3d 1064, 1066-67 (9th Cir. 1999), overruled on other grounds by Booth v. Churner, 532 U.S. 731 (2001) (stating that the district court correctly "held that it had no power to...compel a party to apologize.")).

Despite this split, the Dahn court ultimately held that it could not order one party to apologize to another in a § 1983 action:

The Court finds more persuasive those cases finding that a court ordered apology is generally an inappropriate remedy. The Court is not aware of any authority finding it appropriate to enjoin a party to submit an apology in connection with a plaintiff's § 1983 claim, yet the Court is cognizant of the constitutional implications attendant to enjoining a party to make statements that may run contrary to his or her beliefs. And the fact that Plaintiff seeks an apology from these Defendants in their official capacities . . . reinforces the Court's belief that this remedy should be available, if at all, only in extraordinary circumstances. The Court finds that this remedy would be inappropriate in this case, and that this Court is without power to order such remedy in the first instance.

Dahn, 164 F. Supp. 3d at 1318.

For essentially the reasons stated in Dahn, the Court agrees that enjoining one partyto issue an apology to another party in a §...