Clark v. Town of Waterford

206 Conn.App. 223

261 A.3d 97

Christopher A. CLARK

v.TOWN OF WATERFORD, COHANZIE FIRE DEPARTMENT et al.

AC 44170

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued April 12, 2021

Officially released July 27, 2021

Kyle J. Zrenda, with whom was James P. Berryman, New London, CT, for the appellant (named defendant).

Eric W. Chester, for the appellee (plaintiff).

Bright, C. J., and Moll and Clark, Js.

CLARK, J.

The defendant town of Waterford, Cohanzie Fire Department (town)¹ appeals from the divided decision of the Compensation Review Board (board) affirming the finding and award of the Workers’ Compensation Commissioner for the Second District (commissioner), ordering the town to accept as compensable a claim filed by the plaintiff, Christopher A. Clark, for heart benefits pursuant to General Statutes § 7-433c,² commonly referred to as the Heart and Hypertension Act. The town claims the board improperly affirmed the decision of the commissioner by failing to apply the definition of the term member as provided in General Statutes § 7-425 (5)³ when determining whether the plaintiff was entitled to benefits under § 7-433c. The question on appeal is whether the plaintiff was a "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department" while he was employed by the town as a part-time firefighter.⁴ (Emphasis added.) General Statutes § 7-433c. We affirm the decision of the board.

The following facts are relevant to our resolution of the town's appeal. The town, a municipality organized under the laws of the state, hired the plaintiff as a part-time firefighter on May 24, 1992. Prior to being hired by the town, the plaintiff underwent and passed a physical examination that revealed no evidence of heart disease or hypertension.

As a part-time firefighter in Waterford, the plaintiff's responsibilities included answering the telephone at the fire station, keeping the fire station clean, responding to medical and fire emergencies, and maintaining fire apparatus. When he was working, the plaintiff wore a uniform shirt, badge, belt, pants, and black shoes, which is what other firefighters also wore. He was issued fire protective gear in the event he had to respond to a fire call. In 1997, the plaintiff was hired by the town as a full-time firefighter.

On or about June 24, 2017, the plaintiff suffered a myocardial infarction that required him to undergo quadruple bypass surgery. On August 14, 2017, the plaintiff filed a Form 30C,⁵ seeking heart disease benefits under § 7-433c. Pursuant to General Statutes § 31-294c (b), the town gave notice of its intent to contest the compensability of the plaintiff's claim on the ground that he was not employed as a full-time firefighter until June 18, 1997, and therefore did not qualify for benefits because § 7-433c (b) precludes benefits for persons who began their employment on or after July 1, 1996.

The commissioner held a formal hearing on the plaintiff's claim on March 7, 2019. The plaintiff testified at the hearing, but he did not testify on direct examination as to the number of hours he customarily worked while he was employed as a part-time firefighter. On cross-examination, however, the plaintiff testified that he worked assigned shifts and that the number of shifts he was assigned varied from week to week. In light of the plaintiff's testimony regarding his other employment and the irregular number of hours he worked per week as a part-time firefighter, the town argued that the plaintiff had failed to establish that he customarily worked twenty hours or more per week prior to July 1, 1996.

The town further argued that § 7-433c benefits are available only to "a uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department" hired on or before July 1, 1996, and that the term member , as used in § 7-433c, is controlled by the definition set forth in § 7-425 (5). The town pointed out that §§ 7-425 and 7-433c are both within part II of chapter 113 of the General Statutes. Section 7-425, titled Definitions, provides in relevant part that the "following words and phrases as used in this part, except as otherwise provided , shall have the following meanings ...." (Emphasis added.) Because member under § 7-425 (5) "shall not include any person who customarily works less than twenty hours per week" and the plaintiff was not hired as a full-time firefighter until June 18, 1997, the town contended that the plaintiff was not entitled to § 7-433c benefits, as "persons who began employment on or after July 1, 1996, shall not be eligible for any benefits pursuant to this section." General Statutes § 7-433c (b).

The plaintiff countered that he was entitled to benefits under § 7-433c because that statute does not on its face distinguish between part-time and full-time uniformed members of a paid municipal fire department, and the definition of member in § 7-425 (5) did not apply. As a result, he claimed that he met all of the requirements of § 7-433c because he was paid by the town and wore a uniform while he was a part-time firefighter prior to July 1, 1996.

In his findings and award, the commissioner found that while the plaintiff was a part-time firefighter, the number of hours he worked per week was consistent and was affected by the time of year, as well as the vacation, sick time, and any injuries sustained by the full-time staff. Some weeks he was assigned to work multiple shifts, and other weeks he was not assigned to work. As a part-time employee of the town, the plaintiff did not receive any holiday or vacation pay or benefits toward a pension. In 1997, the town employed the plaintiff as a full-time firefighter and paid him accordingly. Part-time and full-time firefighters were paid by the town, and their duties were the same.

The commissioner decreed that § 7-433c does not define the phrase "uniformed member of a paid municipal fire department" or distinguish between part-time and full-time employment status. (Emphasis added.) The commissioner, thus, determined that the plaintiff's date of employment was May 24, 1992, which was prior to July 1, 1996, and that he was entitled to benefits pursuant to § 7-433c. The commissioner ordered the town to accept the plaintiff's June 24, 2017 myocardial infarction as a compensable impairment of his health.

The town filed a motion for articulation asking the commissioner to clarify how he had defined the term member in his award and urging the commissioner to adopt the statutory definition of member provided in § 7-425 (5). The town argued that if the § 7-425 (5) definition of member were used, it would mandate a finding that the plaintiff is not entitled to benefits under § 7-433c because he worked fewer than twenty hours per week through July 1, 1996. The town also argued that the record is devoid of evidence as to how many hours the plaintiff customarily worked per week while he was a part-time firefighter and that the plaintiff had failed not only to meet his burden of proof but also his burden of production.

In his July 17, 2019 articulation, the commissioner stated that the definition of member in § 7-425 (5) is "irrelevant to the issue at hand, as it pertains to the minimum requirements for participating in the Municipal Employees Retirement Fund. Given that the term member is not otherwise defined as it pertains to ... § 7-433c, the plain meaning of the term member is utilized as it pertains to whether the [plaintiff] is a member of the fire department itself." (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.)

On July 24, 2019, the town filed a motion to correct, arguing that the commissioner's finding that the plaintiff's weekly hours were consistent when he was employed as a part-time firefighter was unsupported by the evidence in the record and that the commissioner misinterpreted the relevant statutory scheme in failing to apply the definition of member provided in § 7-425 (5). The commissioner denied the town's motion to correct in its entirety.

The town filed an appeal to the board and an amended appeal on August 6, 2019, after the commissioner denied its motion to correct. The town claimed that the commissioner erred by (1) finding that the plaintiff worked a consistent number of hours per week during his part-time employment as a firefighter, (2) applying his own definition of the term member rather than the definition provided in § 7-425 (5), (3) finding that the plaintiff's date of employment for purposes of § 7-433c was May 24, 1992, rather than June 18, 1997, (4) finding that the plaintiff is entitled to benefits pursuant to § 7-433c, and (5) ordering the town to accept the plaintiff's June 24, 2017 myocardial infarction as a compensable impairment of his health. The board heard arguments on the town's appeal on January 31, 2020, and issued its decision on July 15, 2020.

At the hearing before the board, the town argued that the rules of statutory construction require that statutes be interpreted with regard to other relevant statutes because the legislature is presumed to have created a consistent body of law; see Conway v. Wilton , 238 Conn. 653, 664, 680 A.2d 242 (1996) ; and that it must be assumed that the legislature intended the definition of member in § 7-425 (5) to apply to § 7-433c. The logical conclusion, therefore, is that § 7-433c pertains only to those individuals who work twenty hours or more per week. The town further argued that it cannot reasonably be inferred that the plaintiff became a member of the fire department until he was hired on a full-time basis on June 18, 1997. That date put the plaintiff outside the ambit of § 7-433c, as the benefits provided by the statute are not available to persons who began employment on or after July 1, 1996. See General Statutes § 7-433c (b). The town also argued that the commissioner ignored the dictates of General Statutes § 1-2z by consulting extratextual sources for the meaning of member . The town, therefore, contended that the commissioner erred by concluding that the plaintiff had satisfied his...