Clay v. Cnty. of Suffolk

404 F.Supp.3d 737

Yvette CLAY, Plaintiff,

v.COUNTY OF SUFFOLK, Suffolk County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Vincent F. DeMarco and Chief Deputy Sheriff Michael P. Sharkey, Defendants.

17-CV-2251 (SJF)(AKT)

United States District Court, E.D. New York.

Signed September 11, 2019

Vesselin Venelinov Mitev, John W. Ray, John Ray & Associates, Miller Place, NY, for Plaintiff.

Daniel E. Furshpan, Susan A. Flynn, Suffolk County Department of Law, Hauppauge, NY, for Defendants.

ORDER

FEUERSTEIN, District Judge:

I. Introduction

On April 14, 2017, plaintiff Yvette Clay ("plaintiff" or "Clay") commenced this employment discrimination action against defendants County of Suffolk ("the County"), Suffolk County Sheriff's Office (the "Sheriff's Office"), Sheriff Vincent F. DeMarco ("DeMarco") and Chief Deputy Sheriff Michael P. Sharkey ("Sharkey") (collectively, "defendants"), pursuant to, inter alia , the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a) ; 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (" Section 1983"); Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. ; and the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL"), N.Y. Exec. Law § 296, et seq. , alleging discrimination and retaliation on the basis of her disability, gender and sex, and deprivation of her right to equal protection of the laws in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article I, Section 11 of the New York State Constitution. Pending before the Court is defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. For the reasons set forth below, defendants' motion is granted to the extent set forth herein.

II. Background

A. Factual Allegations¹

Plaintiff was hired by the Sheriff's Office as a deputy sheriff in 2006, (Defendants' Statement of Material Facts pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(a) ["Def. 56.1"], ¶ 3; Plaintiff's Counterstatement pursuant to Local Civil Rule 56.1(b) ["Plf. 56.1"], ¶ 3); and her first unit assignment was in the Central Islip District Court, where she remained until 2013. (Def. 56.1 ¶ 4; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 4).

In 2013, plaintiff, as the senior deputy applying, took a temporary position in the Rotating Hospital Squad at headquarters to replace Deputy Sheriff Pamela Lettieri ("Lettieri"), who was out on maternity leave. (Declaration of Daniel E. Furshpan, Esq. ["Furshpan Decl."], Ex. E at 36, 52; and Ex. F at 13-14). Plaintiff testified that she took that position "with the understanding that it was temporary;" and that she was told that she "would be treated exactly like the other male deputy who took the spot prior for the same person, that when the spot expired, there would be a posting listed and you will stay there until the next permanent spot becomes available that you can get." (Id. , Ex. E at 52-53). According to plaintiff, "[t]he other deputy stayed in the Hospital Squad, he is a male, for five months until they posted a spot for him and he ended up going to Transportation of equal pay, so [she] was told the same would happen to [her]" by the union and the captain.² (Id. at 53).

Rotating Hospital Squad is divided into Squads "A," "B" and "C," generally consisting of two (2) deputy sheriffs per squad. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 6; Plf. 56.1 ¶ 6). Plaintiff filled Lettieri's spot on Squad "C," as the partner of John Risley ("Risley"). (Def. 56.1, ¶ 7; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 7). Plaintiff's primary duties were: "[i]ntake of prisoners, transporting of prisoners. Taking them to the hospital. Taking them back to the jails, picking them up from the jails in the morning and basically bringing them to court or anything else they basically asked us to do...." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 8; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 8). Plaintiff's immediate supervisor was Lieutenant Peter Williams and her commanding officer was Captain Colleran. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 9; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 9). Sharkey was, and remains, the chief deputy sheriff. (Id. ).

In February 2015, plaintiff was diagnosed with endometriosis. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 10; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 10). Plaintiff testified that she told her captain that she "was going for surgery and they are going to do a full hysterectomy," but she did not tell him about the endometriosis diagnosis; nor did she tell him when she would be back to work. (Furshpan Decl., Ex. E at 48). She did, however, tell him that she was "going out sick ... [for] a prolonged period of time," (Def. 56.1, ¶ 12; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 12), and that she would report to the Medical Evaluation Unit ("MEU"), as required. (Furshpan Decl., Ex. E at 48). The MEU processes claims related to injured and sick employees; assists injured and sick employees in obtaining care; arranges for the medical review of injured and sick employees to determine their progress and capability for assignment, through consultations with employees and their treating physicians; investigates chronic employee absences; and makes the final determination of when an employee who is out sick or injured may return to duty. (Def. 56.1, ¶¶ 13-14; Plf. 56.1, ¶¶ 13-14).

According to plaintiff, she called the MEU after she was diagnosed and "explained what was going on;" then, about a week before the surgery, she "furnished them all the paperwork of [her] illness ... what the prognosis was and how long [she] expected to be out with the hysterectomy and the follow-up to what had to be done." (Furshpan Decl., Ex. E at 45-46).

On February 21, 2015, plaintiff went out on extended leave for treatment, which included a hysterectomy followed by a series of Lupron injections, a form of chemotherapy. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 15; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 15). Plaintiff was told by her doctors that treatment would last approximately six (6) months, a "ballpark" figure that could change depending on the progress of her recovery. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 16; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 16). Plaintiff's surgeon, Dr. Patton, told her that treatment would last "... a ballpark six months, you know ... unless it's catastrophic ... that was his thing, a ballpark six months and the six months was due to chemotherapy shots." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 17; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 17).

Plaintiff never informed her chain of command of her diagnosis, the Lupron injections, how long treatment would last, or when she expected to return to work. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 18; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 18).

In May 2015, while still out on medical leave, plaintiff sought treatment with Dr. Ruggiero, a general practitioner associated with Peconic Bay Primary Medical Care P.C. ("PBMC"), because she "started getting really sick." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 19; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 19). Plaintiff testified that her immune system crashed, (Def. 56.1, ¶ 20; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 20), and the records from PBMC indicate that she had Lyme's disease. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 21; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 21).

During Dr. Ruggiero's examination on July 22, 2015, plaintiff exhibited "joint pain, swelling, stiffness, fatigue, numbness and tingling." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 22; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 22). Plaintiff was still not cleared to return to work. (Id. ). Dr. Ruggiero issued a note to the MEU indicating, "[Plaintiff] was seen in my office on 7/22/15. She will be out till [sic] 8/27/15. At that time she will be evaluated. Any questions feel free to call my office." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 23; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 23). Plaintiff testified that Dr. Ruggiero told her she would be able to return to work in "about a month." (Def. 56.1, ¶¶ 24-25; Plf. 56.1, ¶¶ 24-25). Plaintiff did not inform anyone up her chain of command of what Dr. Ruggiero had told her. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 26; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 26).

On July 9, 2015 and August 5, 2015, respectively, Sharkey posted notices to all deputy sheriff personnel that openings would soon be available in various commands. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 31; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 31).

Transfer requests are based on seniority. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 32; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 32). Specifically, Section 26 of the Collective Bargaining Agreement ("CBA"), entitled "Transfers," indicates, in pertinent part, "... in case of transfer, strict seniority shall prevail, unless the Sheriff's Office establishes that the senior applicant does not possess the minimum qualifications for the job." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 32; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 32). The notices were posted while plaintiff was still out on medical leave without a definitive return date. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 33; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 33).

On or about July 12, 2015, and continuing through August 7, 2015, plaintiff placed certain transfer/reassignment requests to her superiors, including Sharkey, wherein she requested reassignment to one of the following positions: "Rotating Hospital shift (first choice);" "Midnight Hospital (second choice; two openings);" or "Main Squad (third choice)." (Complaint ["Compl."], ¶ 22; see also Furshpan Decl., Ex. E at 66-67, and Ex. F at 68). Plaintiff testified: "The Hospital Squad was my first request and it always goes by seniority, so you write one, two, three and you get the transfer by seniority, so if my first preference if I wasn't the first person, I would go to my second choice or my third choice, so I put in for Hospital Squad. I was a senior deputy. I was skipped. The second choice was Hospital Squad midnight." (Furshpan Decl., Ex. E at 66). When plaintiff put in her transfer request, she was still out on medical leave without a definitive return date. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 35; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 35).

During the MEU's examination on August 11, 2015, plaintiff exhibited "lower abdominal tightness and intermittent discomfort and bowel irregularities. Generalized weakness, arthalgias [sic] and joint swelling. No abdominal pain. Admits to improvement of her GI symptoms without diarrhea or mucus. No fever." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 27; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 27). The MEU report indicates that plaintiff would "follow up in one month for duty status." (Def. 56.1, ¶ 28; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 28). According to plaintiff, the MEU told her that if Dr. Ruggiero cleared her to work during her next visit with him on August 27, 2015, they would agree. (Def. 56.1, ¶ 29; Plf. 56.1, ¶ 29). Specifically, plaintiff testified as follows:

Q. So they said if you go back and you're evaluated and cleared to return to work, they

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