Clay v. Weidner

MICHAEL CLAY, Plaintiff, v. MCKALEE WEIDNER, et al., Defendants.

CASE NO. 1:19CV1916

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO EASTERN DIVISION

June 16, 2020

PEARSON, J.

JUDGE BENITA Y. PEARSON

MEMORANDUM OF OPINION AND ORDER [Resolving ECF Nos. 7, 15]

Pending are Defendants' motion to dismiss (ECF No. 7) and motion to strike Plaintiff's sur-reply (ECF No. 15). The motion to dismiss has been fully briefed. ECF Nos. 7, 11, 13, and 14. For the reasons explained below, the motion to dismiss is granted in part and denied in part. The motion to strike is granted.

I. Introduction

Plaintiff Michael Clay is a prisoner confined in a state correctional institute in Lebanon, Ohio. This civil rights lawsuit stems from alleged interactions with Defendants at Mansfield Correctional Institute ("Mansfield").

A. Law Library

While at Mansfield, Plaintiff was a law clerk in the prison's law library. ECF No. 1 at PageID #: 3, ¶ 20. Plaintiff alleges that when he attempted to make copies of affidavits from a trauma nurse and forensic pathologist for his post-conviction proceedings, Defendant McKalee Weidner, the law librarian, prohibited him from doing so. Id. Plaintiff subsequently filed a complaint against Weidner to her supervisor, alleging that she was misapplying prison policy and violating his access to the courts. Id. ¶ 21. The complaint was denied. Id. at PageID#: 4, ¶ 22. Plaintiff subsequently filed a grievance against Weidner. His grievance was denied by Defendant Assistant Institutional Inspector Charles Moore. Id. ¶¶ 22-23.

Weidner learned of the grievances, confronted Plaintiff about the grievances, and fired Plaintiff from his position as a law clerk on August 10, 2017. Id. ¶ 26. After he was fired, Plaintiff filed an informal complaint alleging that Weidner had retaliated against him when she fired him. Id. at PageID #: 5, ¶ 30. Plaintiff alleges that Weidner fabricated an evaluation of Plaintiff's work performance to justify firing him. Id. ¶ 31. A meeting was subsequently held with Plaintiff, Weidner, and Weidner's supervisor wherein Plaintiff was reinstated as a law clerk. Id. at PageID #: 6, ¶ 36.

According to Plaintiff, Weidner continued to harass Plaintiff after he was reinstated by deleting his personal legal documents along with those of other inmates he was assisting. Id. at PageID #: 7, ¶ 39.

B. Digital Grievance Procedure

Plaintiff alleges that the grievance procedure was digital and required an inmate to draft his complaint at a kiosk system. Id. at PageID #: 4, ¶ 27. He claims that the grievance procedure operates under a time system that prevents an inmate from submitting the grievance if not completed within a set time frame. Id. at PageID #: 4-5, ¶¶ 27-28.

C. Assisting Other Inmates, Misconduct Report, and Administrative Segregation

In late May 2018, Plaintiff attempted to type out complaints, at the kiosk, against Weidner for other prisoners. Id. at PageID #: 7, ¶ 42. R. Bacon, Weidner's other supervisor, allegedly told the inmates that the documents were not deleted but merely moved. Id. ¶ 44. In addition, Bacon informed the inmates that Plaintiff could not help them because he was no longer associated with the law library. Id. Plaintiff again attempted to file a grievance, claiming that Bacon's response was nonresponsive to the other inmates' concerns. Id. ¶ 46. This grievance was denied and Defendant Assistant Institutional Inspector Charles Moore noted that the grievance was filed by Plaintiff, not by the inmate whose name was associated with the file; this, the report indicated, was not permitted. Id. ¶ 47.

On June 12, 2018, Plaintiff met with Defendant Institutional Inspector Lisa Booth and her assistant, Defendant Charles Moore. Id. ¶ 49. Plaintiff claims that Booth informed him he could not assist other inmates with their grievances, a conduct report would be issued against him, and he was being restricted from access to the grievance procedure. Id. at PageID #: 8-9, ¶¶ 49-50. Plaintiff insists that there was never a policy prohibiting inmates from working with one another to draft grievances against correctional officers. Id. at PageID #: 8, ¶ 48.

Booth allegedly responded that she had spoken to Defendant Chief Inspector Roger Moore beforehand and they both agreed to restrict Plaintiff's grievance access due to Plaintiff's abuse of the grievance system. Id. at PageID #: 9, ¶ 51. In response, Plaintiff told them that he planned to sue them for restricting his right to file grievances. Id. On that same day, Plaintiff was placed in administrative segregation for "falsifying documents, disrespect[ing] [Booth], and disobey[ing] adirect order." Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff alleges Chief Inspector Roger Moore ordered that he be placed in administrative segregation. Id. at PageID #: 17, 107.

D. Rules Infraction Board Hearings

Plaintiff was called to a hearing before the Rules Infraction Board ("RIB") led by Defendant Lieutenant Kirk Dolby on June 22, 2018. Id. at PageID #: 9, ¶ 56. According to Plaintiff, he was charged with three offenses: forgery, disobeying a direct order, and disrespecting an officer. Id. ¶ 52. Plaintiff maintains that he was found not guilty of the first two offenses but was found guilty of offense of disrespecting an officer. Id. at PageID #: 10, ¶ 60. When announcing that Plaintiff was guilty of the aforementioned offense, Dolby allegedly stated that he could not permit Plaintiff to be found not guilty on all the offenses because it was Plaintiff's word against Booth's. Id. Because he was found guilty of one of the offenses, Plaintiff was placed back in administrative segregation. Id. ¶ 61. Although Plaintiff was set to be released from administrative segregation on June 25, 2018, he was not released that day. Id. ¶¶ 61-62.

On June 28, 2018, the RIB held another hearing to reconsider the charges against Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 63. Before the hearing, Plaintiff was allegedly informed to leave his written defenses in his cell. Id. ¶ 64. According to Plaintiff, Defendant Scott Basquin, the Warden's assistant, ordered the matter be remanded back to RIB to reconsider the charges against Plaintiff and permit the charging officer to testify. Id. Plaintiff alleges that Basquin, Chief Inspector Roger Moore, and Booth all engaged in the decision to amend the offense brought against Plaintiff. See id. at PageID #: 17, ¶ 109. The forgery offense, which Plaintiff was adjudicated not guilty, was amended to a violation of mail rule. Id. at PageID #: 11, ¶ 66. Booth, who sat with Dolby at thehearing, allegedly declared: "[M]e and the chief inspector still think you're guilty of forgery, and you ought to be found guilty." Id. Plaintiff alleges that Booth sat behind the desk of Dolby and served as a member of the RIB panel reviewing the charges. Id. ¶¶ 65, 70. At this second hearing, Booth testified and Plaintiff was found guilty of the amended offense (instead of forgery) and all other charges in Booth's conduct report. Id. ¶¶ 67-68. Plaintiff was placed back in administrative segregation for fourteen days. Id. ¶ 68.

Plaintiff requested the disposition of the hearing in writing so that he could appeal. Id. Plaintiff claims that he never received the disposition. Id. at PageID #: 12, ¶ 75. Because he was prohibited from filing any grievances, Plaintiff claims he was unable to appeal the RIB's ruling on time. Id. Plaintiff also alleges this resulted in him being unable to apply to Ashland University. Id. ¶ 78.

E. Plaintiff's Claims

Plaintiff filed this civil rights action against Defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The Court construes Plaintiff's Complaint as raising the following claims against Weidner: (1) First Amendment denial of access to the courts; and (2) First Amendment retaliation.¹ The remaining claims raised against the other Defendants are: (1) First Amendment retaliation; (2) Fourteenth Amendment Due Process violations; and (3) civil conspiracy. Plaintiff raises all of his claimsagainst Defendants in their individual and official capacities. Defendants subsequently filed the pending motion to dismiss.

II. Standard of Review

To survive a Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a plaintiff's complaint must allege enough facts to "raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Ass'n of Cleveland Fire Fighters v. City of Cleveland, Ohio, 502 F.3d 545, 548 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007)). Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only that a pleading contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." However, "a plaintiff's obligation to provide the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citing Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286 (1986)). A complaint requires "further factual enhancement," which "state[s] a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 557, 570. A claim has facial plausibility when there is enough factual content present to allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). When a claim lacks "plausibility in th[e] complaint," that cause of action fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Twombly, U.S. 550 at 564.

Additionally, when a party files a motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P.12(b)(1) in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court generally considers the Rule 12(b)(1) motion first. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) ("[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a casewithout first determining that it has jurisdiction[.]"). "It is the plaintiff's burden . . . to prove that this court has jurisdiction over [the plaintiff's] claim." Kiser v. Reitz, 765 F.3d 601, 607 (6th Cir. 2014). "[W]...