Clayton v. U.S. Xpress, Inc.

538 F.Supp.3d 707

Alicia CLAYTON, Individually and as Representative of the Estate of Christopher Marlin, Deceased, Plaintiff,

v.U.S. XPRESS, INC., U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc., U.S. Express Enterprises, Inc., and Markethe Becan, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-03006-L

United States District Court, N.D. Texas, Dallas Division.

Signed May 11, 2021

Robert L. Ranco, DC Law, PLLC, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

Mark S. Scudder, Erin Michelle Garza, Quilling Selander Lownds Winslett & Moser PC, Dallas, TX, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Sam A. Lindsay, United States District Judge

Before the court is Defendant U.S. Xpress, Inc., U.S. Xpress Leasing, Inc., U.S. Xpress, Enterprises, Inc., and Markethe Becan's (collectively, "Defendants") Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 10), Brief in Support (Doc. 11), and Appendix (Doc. 12) filed October 22, 2020; Plaintiff Alicia Clayton's ("Plaintiff" or "Ms. Clayton") Response (Doc. 14); and Defendants’ Reply (Doc. 15). After careful consideration of the motion, appendix, briefs of the parties, and applicable legal authority, the court grants Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Factual and Procedural Background

On November 6, 2019, Ms. Clayton initially filed this action against Defendants in the 193rd Judicial District Court of Dallas County, Texas, alleging violations of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code § 71.001 - 71.012 (Texas Wrongful Death Statute) and the Texas Civil Practice § 71.021 (Texas Survival Statute). Ms. Clayton also asserts claims of negligence against Markethe Becan and the Corporate Defendants. These claims arise out of and relate to the death of Ms. Clayton's biological father Christopher Marlin ("Mr. Marlin" or "Decedent") who was killed in a motor vehicle accident between a Freightliner truck, owned and operated by the Corporate Defendants, and Mr. Marlin's motorcycle. On December 19, 2019, Defendants removed this action to federal court based on diversity jurisdiction.

In Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment, they establish that Plaintiff was formally adopted by her stepfather Christopher Clayton as an adult prior to Mr. Marlin's death. They argue that when she was adopted by Mr. Clayton as an adult, the parent-child relationship between her and Mr. Marlin terminated. Defendants assert that Plaintiff is not an heir of Mr. Marlin and, therefore, lacks capacity to assert a survival action on behalf of his estate. Further, they argue that Plaintiff lacks standing to assert a wrongful death claim because her adoption as an adult prior to the death of Mr. Marlin divested her and Mr. Marlin of all legal rights, privileges, duties, and powers with respect to each other.

In Plaintiff's Response, she argues that the parent-child relationship between her and Mr. Marlin was never terminated because termination must be explicitly ordered and was not done in this case. As such, Plaintiff asserts that her right to bring a wrongful death claim is unchanged, despite her adoption. She does not respond to Defendants’ arguments regarding the survival action.

In Defendants’ Reply, they argue that, while termination of a parent's rights with respect to a minor child is not automatic, termination of a parent's rights with respect to an adult child is automatic. The court agrees.

II. Undisputed Facts

For the purposes of this Motion, the following facts are undisputed:

• Plaintiff's mother Cynthia Clayton married Mr. Clayton in November 2000, when Plaintiff was seven years old.

• Mr. Clayton adopted Plaintiff on April 6, 2015, when she was twenty-one years old.

• The motor vehicle accident that resulted in Mr. Marlin's death occurred on November 9, 2017.

III. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment shall be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 323-25, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986) ; Ragas v. Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. , 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998). A dispute regarding a material fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict in favor of the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the court is required to view all facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party and resolve all disputed facts in favor of the nonmoving party. Boudreaux v. Swift Transp. Co., Inc. , 402 F.3d 536, 540 (5th Cir. 2005). Further, a court "may not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence" in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc. , 530 U.S. 133, 150, 120 S.Ct. 2097, 147 L.Ed.2d 105 (2000) ; Anderson , 477 U.S. at 254-55, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

Once the moving party has made an initial showing that there is no evidence to support the nonmoving party's case, the party opposing the motion must come forward with competent summary judgment evidence of the existence of a genuine dispute of material fact. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio , 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986). On the other hand, "if the movant bears the burden of proof on an issue, either because he is the plaintiff or as a defendant he is asserting an affirmative defense, he must establish beyond peradventure all of the essential elements of the claim or defense to warrant judgment in his favor." Fontenot v. Upjohn Co. , 780 F.2d 1190, 1194 (5th Cir. 1986) (emphasis in original). "[When] the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no ‘genuine [dispute] for trial.’ "

Matsushita , 475 U.S. at 587, 106 S.Ct. 1348. (citation omitted). Mere conclusory allegations are not competent summary judgment evidence, and thus are insufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment. Eason v. Thaler , 73 F.3d 1322, 1325 (5th Cir. 1996). Unsubstantiated assertions, improbable inferences, and unsupported speculation are not competent summary judgment evidence. See Forsyth v. Barr , 19 F.3d 1527, 1533 (5th Cir. 1994).

The party opposing summary judgment is required to identify specific evidence in the record and to articulate the precise manner in which that evidence supports his or her claim. Ragas , 136 F.3d at 458. Rule 56 does not impose a duty on the court to "sift through the record in search of evidence" to support the nonmovant's opposition to the motion for summary judgment. Id. ; see also Skotak v. Tenneco Resins, Inc. , 953 F.2d 909, 915-16 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1992). "Only disputes over facts that might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing laws will properly preclude the entry of summary judgment." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505. Disputed fact issues that are "irrelevant and unnecessary" will not be considered by a court in ruling on a summary judgment motion. Id. If the nonmoving party fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to its case and on which it will bear the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment must be granted. Celotex , 477 U.S. at 322-23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

IV. Analysis

A party must have both standing to sue and capacity to sue. Austin Nursing Ctr., Inc. v. Lovato , 171 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Tex. 2005) (citation omitted). "A plaintiff has standing when [she] is personally aggrieved, regardless of whether [she] is acting with legal authority; a party has capacity when [she] has the legal authority to act, regardless of whether [she] has a justiciable interest in the controversy." Nootsie, Ltd. v. Williamson Cnty. Appraisal Dist. , 925 S.W.2d 659, 661 (Tex. 1996) (citation omitted).

A. Plaintiff's Claim Under the Texas Wrongful Death Statute

To advance a wrongful death claim, "[t]he decedent's surviving spouse, children, and parents are the statutory beneficiaries for purposes of bringing a wrongful death action. The Wrongful Death Act seeks to compensate the decedent's statutory beneficiaries for their loss of future care, maintenance, and support." Davis v. Bills , 444 S.W.3d 752, 757 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, no pet.) (citing Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 71.004 (West 2008) ; Russell v. Ingersoll–Rand Co. , 795 S.W.2d 243, 247 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1990), aff'd, 841 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. 1992) ). Here, the issue the court must determine is whether Ms. Clayton is a child of Mr. Marlin. While the Wrongful Death statute identifies persons who may sue on behalf of decedents, it does not specify who qualifies as a child. The court, therefore, must look to the Family Code to determine whether a person adopted as an adult, as was Ms. Clayton, falls within the definition of a child as one who can sue on behalf of Mr. Marlin under the Wrongful Death Act.

Texas courts have precluded recovery under the Texas Wrongful Death statute for children who have been adopted by others and are seeking to sue on behalf of or through their natural parents. In Go International, Inc. v. Lewis , the court stated:

[U]pon adoption, all legal rights, privileges, duties and powers between the natural parent and the child with respect to each other are divested upon the adoption. Hence, if the Legislature had intended to make an exception with regard to those rights which accrue under the wrongful death statute, it could easily have said so. We hold that the two adopted children [are] no longer "children" within the statute.

601 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1980, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (citations omitted). In other words, the express holding of this case is that, for purposes of the Wrongful Death statute, adopted children are no longer children of their natural parents. See also Haley v. Nova Rsch., Inc. , No. CIV.A. 303CV2749N, 2005 WL 701036, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Mar. 24, 2005).

Ms. Clayton argues that, because there has been no termination of parental rights...