Clean Label Project Found. v. Garden of Life, LLC

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CLEAN LABEL PROJECT FOUNDATION, Plaintiff, v. GARDEN OF LIFE, LLC, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 20-3229 (RC)

United States District Court, District of Columbia

May 24, 2022

MEMORANDUM OPINION DENYING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION TO RECONSIDER AND GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR REMAND TO D.C. SUPERIOR COURT RE DOCUMENT NO 16

RUDOLPH CONTRERAS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

I. INTRODUCTION

After an order of dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction from this Court, Clean Label Project Foundation (“CLP”) filed a motion for reconsideration pursuant to Rules 59(e) and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Clean Label Project Foundation v. Garden of Life, LLC, No. CV 20-3229 (RC), 2021 WL 4318099 (D.D.C. Sept. 23, 2021) (granting Defendant Garden of Life's motion to dismiss) (“Mem. Op.”), ECF No. 15; Mem. P. & A. Supp. Pl. Mot. for Recons. of Order Dismissal, or in Alternative, Remand to D.C. Superior Court (“Mot. for Recons.”), ECF No. 16. CLP asks the Court to reconsider its judgment based on an alleged “intervening change of controlling law, ” citing Animal Legal Defense Fund v. Hormel Foods Corp., 258 A.3d 174 (D.C. 2021) (“ALDF”). Mot. for Recons. at 6, 9. In the alternative, CLP asks the Court for remand. Id. For the reasons discussed below, the Court denies reconsideration and grants remand to the D.C. Superior Court.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The Court previously described the facts of this case, Mem. Op. at 2-3, and thus confines its recital here to the most relevant facts, followed by this case's procedural history. CLP, a nonprofit organization, sued Garden of Life under the District of Columbia Consumer Protection Procedures Act (“CPPA”), D.C. Code § 28-3901 et seq. The CPPA allows a nonprofit organization to bring an action “on behalf of itself or any of its members, or on any such behalf and on behalf of the general public, ” and also allows a “public interest organization” to bring actions “on behalf of the interests of a consumer or a class of consumers.” D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(C), (D). CLP alleges that Garden of Life engaged in unlawful trade practices under the CPPA when it marketed and sold prenatal vitamin products in a manner that misled consumers into believing that the products were free of contaminants and superior to competing products, when in fact they were contaminated with toxic heavy metals, pesticides, and BPA. Compl. ¶¶ 123-31, ECF No. 1-1 (describing alleged violation of D.C. Code § 28-3904). CLP also alleges that the presence of these contaminants, which are “injurious to health, ” render Garden of Life's prenatal vitamins “adulterated” in violation of D.C. Code § 48-103. Id. ¶ 132.

CLP filed this action in the D.C. Superior Court on August 25, 2020. Garden of Life removed to this Court on November 9, 2020, alleging that removal was proper under the Class Actions Fairness Act because “CPPA is a ‘similar State statute' that ‘authorizes' class actions to be brought by one or more representative persons.” Notice of Removal at 3, ECF No. 1 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(1)(B)). A few weeks after removal, Garden of Life filed a motion to dismiss for lack of standing. See Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss (“Def.'s Mot.”), ECF No. 7. On September 23, 2021, this Court granted Defendant's motion. CLP filed the pending motion on October 21, 2021, asking the Court to reconsider that dismissal order. See Mot. for Recons. According to CLP, it has standing under “CPPA, specifically D.C. Code § 28-3905(k)(1)(D) in light of the recent [ALDF] decision in the D.C. Court of Appeals.” Mot. for Recons. at 9-10. Thus, CLP seeks reconsideration or, in the alternative, remand to D.C. Superior Court. Id. Garden of Life opposed, and CLP replied. See Def.'s Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. (“Def.'s Opp.”), ECF No. 17; Pl.'s Reply to Def.'s Opp. to Pl.'s Mot. for Recons. (“Reply”), ECF No. 18.

III. LEGAL STANDARDS

A. Rule 59(e)

Rule 59(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure permits a party to file “[a] motion to alter or amend a judgment” within “28 days after the entry of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e). “[R]econsideration of a judgment after its entry is an extraordinary remedy which should be used sparingly.” Mohammadi v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 782 F.3d 9, 17 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (quoting 11 Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (3d ed. 2012)). “Motions under Rule 59(e) are ‘disfavored' and the moving party bears the burden of establishing ‘extraordinary circumstances' warranting relief from final judgment.” Schoenman v. FBI, 857 F.Supp.2d 76, 80 (D.D.C. 2012) (quoting Niedermeier v. Office of Baucus, 153 F.Supp.2d 23, 28 (D.D.C. 2001)).

Ultimately, “[a] Rule 59(e) motion is discretionary and need not be granted unless the district court finds that there is an intervening change of controlling law, the availability of new evidence, or the need to correct a clear error or prevent manifest injustice.” Ciralsky v. CIA, 355 F.3d 661, 671 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Firestone v. Firestone, 76 F.3d 1205, 1208 (D.C. Cir. 1996)). And in the Rule 59(e) context, “clear error” is “a ‘very exacting standard, '” Bond v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 286 F.R.D. 16, 22 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted), tantamount to a requirement that the judgment be “dead wrong, ” Lardner v. FBI, 875 F.Supp.2d 49, 53 (D.D.C. 2012) (citation omitted)). “Manifest injustice, ” on the other hand, requires a demonstration not only of “clear and certain prejudice to the moving party, but also a result that is fundamentally unfair in light of governing law.” Slate v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 12 F.Supp.3d 30, 35-36 (D.D.C. 2013).

Rule 59(e) does not permit a dissatisfied party “to relitigate old matters, or to raise arguments or present evidence that could have been raised prior to the entry of judgment.” Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471, 485 n.5 (2008) (quoting 11 Charles Wright & Arthur Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2810.1 (2d ed. 1995)). The rationale for this rule is that “Rule 59(e) motions are aimed at ‘reconsideration, not initial consideration.'” Leidos, Inc. v. Hellenic Republic, 881 F.3d 213, 217 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (quoting District of Columbia v. Doe, 611 F.3d 888, 896 (D.C. Cir. 2010); see also Patton Boggs LLP v. Chevron Corp., 683 F.3d 397, 403 (D.C. Cir. 2012) (“Rule 59(e) is not a vehicle to present a new legal theory that was available prior to judgment ....”).

B. Rule 60

Rule 60(a) allows a court to correct a “clerical mistake or a mistake arising from oversight or omission ....” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(a). This rule is narrowly construed and may not be invoked to “change the substance or order of a judgment.” Fanning v. George Jones Excavating, L.L.C., 312 F.R.D. 238, 239 (D.D.C. 2015). It only applies when “the record indicates that the court intended to do one thing, but by virtue of a clerical mistake or oversight, did another.” Id. (quoting 12 Moore's Federal Practice § 60.11(1)(a) (3d. ed. 2015)). Unless something in the record suggests that an error of “expression” rather than “substance” was made, the substance of a court order or judgment will be considered a “conscious decision.” Id.

“Rule 60(b) provides a mechanism for relief from a judgment or order by permitting the court to relieve a party or its legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding ....” Oladokun v. Corr. Treatment Facility, 309 F.R.D. 94, 97 (D.D.C. 2015). The burden falls to the party seeking relief to “show[] that he or she is entitled to relief.” Id.; see also Green v. Am. Fed'n of Labor and Cong. of Indus. Orgs., 287 F.R.D. 107, 109 (D.D.C. 2012). The final decision to grant or deny a Rule 60(b) motion is “committed to the discretion of the District Court, ” United Mine Workers of Am. 1974 Pension v. Pittston Co., 984 F.2d 469, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1993), which “balance[s] the interest in justice with the interest in protecting the finality of judgments, ” Summers v. Howard Univ., 374 F.3d 1188, 1193 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The movant “must provide the district court with reason to believe that vacating the judgment will not be an empty exercise or a futile gesture.” Murray v. District of Columbia, 52 F.3d 353, 355 (D.C. Cir. 1995).

IV. ANALYSIS

CLP purports to request that the Court “reconsider its order of dismissal under new controlling intervening law and manifest injustice and error of law and facts.” Mot. for Recons. at 9 (citing Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) & 60). CLP, however, does not point to any manifest injustice or error of law and facts. Instead, CLP repeats its faulty notions about standing under Article III of the Constitution, which the Court addressed and rejected in its previous ruling. See Mem. Op. at 8-13. CLP's argument in the pending motion rests solely on an alleged change in controlling law which has no effect on this Court. See Mot. for Recons. at 11-18. The intervening case that CLP relies on-ALDF, 258 A.3d 174 (D.C. 2021)-does not bestow subject matter jurisdiction as CLP claims. This case does not warrant reconsideration under Rules 59(e) and 60 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and CLP fails to show how ALDF changes or controls federal law regarding subject matter jurisdiction. Thus, the Court denies CLP's motion to reconsider. However, despite CLP's previous failure to request remand in lieu of dismissal, the Court grants remand to D.C. Superior Court.

A. CLP's Motion Fails to Satisfy Rules 59(e) or 60

CLP's mere recital of its previous arguments and the decision in ALDF fail to establish an intervening change of controlling law for subject matter jurisdiction. CLP contends that ALDF, a decision the D.C. Court of Appeals issued on September 2, 2021, provides that “CPPA's standing requirement does not require a showing of injury-in-fact and modifies the ...