Cleary v. Grossman

1

MEGHAN CLEARY, Plaintiff, v. JANE KUPSON GROSSMAN ET AL., Defendants.

No. 3:23-cv-349 (VAB)

United States District Court, D. Connecticut

March 15, 2024

RULING AND ORDER ON MOTIONS TO DISMISS

VICTOR A. BOLDEN UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE.

Meghan Cleary (“Ms. Cleary” or “Plaintiff”) filed this lawsuit pro se against Connecticut Superior Court Judge Jane Kupson Grossman and Attorney William RJP Brown (collectively, “Defendants”) for violations of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.^[1]

Defendants have filed motions to dismiss Ms. Cleary's Complaint. Mot. to Dismiss by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 22 (“Brown Mot.”); Mot. to Dismiss by Judge Grossman, ECF No. 25 (“Grossman Mot.”).

For the following reasons, the motions to dismiss are GRANTED with prejudice.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Factual Allegations

Ms. Cleary is involved in a family matter pending in the New Haven District of Connecticut's superior court regarding the custody of her minor children with Kenneth Thomas. Compl. ¶ 29; Thomas v. Cleary, No. NNH-FA-19-50506110S.^[2] In the state court action, Mr. Thomas allegedly received full custody of the minor children. Id. ¶ 86.

Ms. Cleary alleges that the presiding judge, Judge Grossman, failed to allow evidence, including testimony by Ms. Cleary, that would substantiate her claims that the minor children were abused by their father. Id. ¶¶ 32, 44.

Ms. Cleary alleges that Defendants set her up for constant violations of court orders under false pretenses. Id. ¶ 84.

Ms. Cleary alleges that Judge Grossman continues to make disparaging remarks and unfounded accusations against Ms. Cleary. Id. ¶ 134 (citation and footnote omitted).

Ms. Cleary also alleges that Judge Grossman, refuses to recuse herself despite her and the minor children's grandmother both being adjunct professors at Quinnipiac University School of Law. Id. ¶¶ 15-18.

As to Attorney Brown, the guardian ad litem for the minor children, Ms. Cleary alleges that he and Judge Grossman openly conspired and colluded with each other during the hearings that took place in the pending family matter. Id. ¶ 137.

B. Procedural History

On March 20, 2023, Ms. Cleary filed her pro se Complaint in this case. Compl.

On April 26, 2023, Attorney Brown filed his motion to dismiss and accompanying memorandum of law. Brown Mot.; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 22 (“Brown Mem.”); see also Local Rule 12(a) Not. to Self-Represented Litigant Concerning Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 23.

Also on April 26, 2023, Attorney Brown filed a motion to stay discovery until thirty days following the Court's ruling on his motion to dismiss. Mot. to Stay by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 24.

On April 28, 2023, Judge Grossman filed her motion to dismiss and accompanying memorandum of law. Grossman Mot; Mem. of Law in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by Judge Grossman, ECF No. 25-1 (“Grossman Mem.”); see also Local Rule 12(a) Not. to SelfRepresented Litigant Concerning Mot. to Dismiss, ECF No. 26.

Also on April 28, 2023, Judge Grossman filed a motion to stay discovery until thirty days following the Court's ruling on her motion to dismiss. Mot. to Stay by Judge Grossman, ECF No. 25.

On May 8, 2023, Ms. Cleary filed two substantially similar memoranda of law in opposition to the motions to dismiss and motions to stay. Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 30 (“Opp'n to Brown Mot.”); Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss by Judge Grossman, ECF No. 31 (“Opp'n to Grossman Mot.”).

On May 9, 2023, U.S. District Judge Jeffrey A. Meyer granted Defendants' motions to stay. Order Granting Mots. to Stay, ECF No. 32.

On May 22, 2023, Defendants both filed their replies in support of their respective motions to dismiss. Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 33 (“Brown Reply”); Reply in Supp. of Mot. to Dismiss by Judge Grossman, ECF No. 34 (“Grossman Reply”).

On June 12, 2023, Ms. Cleary filed a second memorandum of law in opposition to Attorney Brown's motion to dismiss, which Attorney Brown objected to on June 16, 2023. Second Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 35 (“Second Opp'n to Brown Mot.”); Obj. to Second Opp'n to Mot. to Dismiss by Att'y Brown, ECF No. 36 (“Obj. to Second Opp'n”).

On August 10, 2023, Judge Grossman filed a notice of supplemental authority relevant to her pending motion to dismiss. Not. of Supplemental Auth., ECF No. 37 (“Not. of Supplemental Auth.”).

Also on August 20, 2023, this case was transferred from Judge Meyer to this Court. Order of Transfer, ECF No. 38.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Rule 12(b)(5)

A motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5) due to insufficient service of process “must be granted if the plaintiff fails to serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the defendants pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules [of Civil Procedure], which sets forth the federal requirements for service.” Rzayeva v. United States, 492 F.Supp.2d 60, 74 (D. Conn. 2007). “Once validity of service has been challenged, it becomes the plaintiff's burden to prove that service of process was adequate.” Cole v. Aetna Life & Cas., 70 F.Supp.2d 106, 110 (D. Conn. 1999).

B. Rule 12(b)(6)

A complaint must contain a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a). Any claim that fails “to state a claim upon which relief can be granted” will be dismissed. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6). In reviewing a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), a court applies a “plausibility standard” guided by “[t]wo working principles.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).

First, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.; see also Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (“While a complaint attacked by a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss does not need detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff's obligation to provide the ‘grounds' of his ‘entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” (alteration in original) (citations omitted)). Second, “only a complaint that states a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679. Thus, the complaint must contain “factual amplification . . . to render a claim plausible.” Arista Records LLC v. Doe 3, 604 F.3d 110, 120 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Turkmen v. Ashcroft, 589 F.3d 542, 546 (2d Cir. 2009)).

When reviewing a complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the court takes all factual allegations in the complaint as true. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The court also views the allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and draws all inferences in the plaintiff's favor. Cohen v. S.A.C. Trading Corp., 711 F.3d 353, 359 (2d Cir. 2013); see also York v. Ass'n of the Bar of N.Y.C., 286 F.3d 122, 125 (2d Cir. 2002) (“On a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, we construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepting the complaint's allegations as true.”).

A court considering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) generally limits its review “to the facts as asserted within the four corners of the complaint, the documents attached to the complaint as exhibits, and any documents incorporated in the complaint by reference.” McCarthy v. Dun & Bradstreet Corp., 482 F.3d 184, 191 (2d Cir. 2007). A court may also consider “matters of which judicial notice may be taken” and “documents either in plaintiffs' possession or of which plaintiffs had knowledge and relied on in bringing suit.” Brass v. Am. Film Techs., Inc., 987 F.2d 142, 150 (2d Cir. 1993); Patrowicz v. Transamerica HomeFirst, Inc., 359 F.Supp.2d 140, 144 (D. Conn. 2005).

III. DISCUSSION

Attorney Brown argues that Ms. Cleary's Complaint should be dismissed because (1) he is entitled to absolute immunity; (2) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine prevents federal courts from reviewing state court judgments; (3) Ms. Cleary has failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted; and (4) Ms. Cleary failed to serve Attorney Brown with sufficient service. Brown Mem. at 5.

Judge Grossman argues that Ms. Cleary's Complaint should be dismissed under the following doctrines: “(1) the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) the Younger abstention doctrine; (3) the domestic relations abstention doctrine; (4) the abstention principles of O'Shea v. Littleton; (5) Eleventh Amendment immunity; (6) Section 1983; (7) the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283; (8) absolute judicial immunity; (9) failure to state claims on which relief may be granted; and (10) failure to serve Judge Grossman sufficient process under Fed.R.Civ.P. 4.” Grossman Mem. at 1-2.

The Court will address each argument, in turn, beginning with the jurisdictional arguments, to the extent necessary. See Sinochem Int'l Co. v. Malaysia Int'l Shipping Corp., 549 U.S. 422, 430-31 (2007) (“[A] federal court generally may not rule on the merits of a case without first determining that it has jurisdiction over the category of claim in suit (subject-matter jurisdiction) and the parties (personal jurisdiction).”).

A. Improper Service

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(5), a party may file a motion to dismiss due to “insufficient service of process.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(5). “A motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(5) must be granted if the plaintiff fails to serve a copy of the summons and complaint on the defendants pursuant to Rule 4 of the Federal Rules which sets forth the federal requirements for service.” Rzayeva, 492 F.Supp.2d at 74. Once a defendant challenges the validity of service, “it...