Clemmer v. Irving Indep. Sch. Dist.

AKWETA CLEMMER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. IRVING INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 3:13-CV-4997-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS DALLAS DIVISION

June 3, 2014

MEMORANDUM OPINIONAND ORDER

In this action by plaintiffs alleging various federal- and state-law claims against their employer, defendant Irving Independent School District ("IISD") moves under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) for partial dismissal. The principal question presented is whether the amended complaint states a plausible claim for deprivation of a liberty interest, in violation of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Concluding that it does not, the court grants IISD's motion and grants plaintiffs leave to replead.

I

Because IISD has moved to dismiss only one of plaintiffs' claims, the court summarizes only the allegations pertinent to the instant motion.¹ During the 2011-2012 school year, plaintiffs Akweta Clemmer ("Clemmer"), Cristina Chen ("Chen"), and Lesa Hill ("Hill") worked in IISD's Special Education Department. Clemmer was an Educational Diagnostician, Chen was a Bilingual Speech Coordinator, and Hill was a Middle School Special Education Coordinator. They were supervised primarily by Mollie Lusty ("Lusty"), the Special Education Director for IISD.² Clemmer and Hill are African-American, and Chen is of Cuban descent. Broadly stated, plaintiffs allege in their amended complaint³ that they were treated differently from their Caucasian colleagues, and that they were subject to harassment, at least in part, because they complained about IISD's treatment of certain students in the Special Education Department.

In support of plaintiffs' deprivation of liberty claim, they allege in their amended complaint, in pertinent part:

Defendant IISD made false accusations against Plaintiffs and particularly "bad-mouthed" them repeatedly and continuously. For example, Chen was accused of being "toxic" and repeatedly"followed," inferring that she could not be trusted by the IISD. Hill was accused of plagiarism and was also followed by the IISD. Clemmer was accused of selling jewelry during school hours, performing poorly in her job, of being no good at her job, being audited on a continual basis, and of mishandling a student's testing.

Am. Compl. ¶ 172 (internal cross-references to earlier paragraphs omitted). The amended complaint also alleges that "[t]hese false charges could and were intended to seriously damage Plaintiffs' standing and associations in their communities and could foreclose future employment opportunities," id. at ¶ 173; "[t]hese accusations were made in public to persons other than Plaintiffs themselves," id. at ¶ 174; and "Plaintiffs never received a meaningful hearing to clear their names," id. at ¶ 175.

Clemmer and Chen resigned in July 2012, citing, inter alia, intolerable working conditions. Hill took administrative leave at the end of the 2011-2012 school year and returned in January 2013, assuming a new position as Elementary Dean. Plaintiffs initially filed this action in December 2013 and subsequently filed an amended complaint in March 2014, alleging claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution, the Texas Constitution, and various Texas statutes. At the time plaintiffs filed their amended complaint, Hill was still employed by IISD.

IISD moves to dismiss plaintiffs' deprivation of liberty claim for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted. IISD maintains on five grounds that this claim fails to state a claim on which relief can be granted: (1) plaintiffs were not discharged; (2) thestigmatizing charges, to the extent they were made at all, were not made in connection with any discharge; (3) the stigmatizing charges, to the extent they were made at all, were not made public; (4) plaintiffs did not request a name-clearing hearing; and (5) IISD did not deny plaintiffs' request for a name-clearing hearing because a request was never made. IISD also argues that plaintiffs' request for punitive or exemplary damages should be dismissed because such damages are not available against a governmental entity under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, or Texas law. Plaintiffs oppose the motion, but they concede in their response that their request for punitive or exemplary damages should be dismissed.

II

"In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, the court evaluates the sufficiency of plaintiffs' amended complaint by 'accepting all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Bramlett v. Med. Protective Co. of Fort Wayne, Ind., 855 F.Supp.2d 615, 618 (N.D. Tex. 2012) (Fitzwater, C.J.) (quoting In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted)). To survive IISD's motion, plaintiffs must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). "The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully." Id.; see also Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 ("Factual allegations must beenough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level[.]"). "[W]here the well-pleaded facts do not permit the court to infer more than the mere possibility of misconduct, the complaint has alleged—but it has not 'shown'—'that the pleader is entitled to relief.'" Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679 (quoting Rule 8(a)(2)) (alteration omitted). "Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice." Id. at 678 (citation omitted).

III

A

"Section 1983 provides a civil remedy in federal court for violations, under color of state law, of a person's constitutionally recognized rights, privileges, or immunities." Bledsoe v. City of Horn Lake, Miss., 449 F.3d 650, 653 (5th Cir. 2006) (citing Findeisen v. N. E. Indep. Sch. Dist., 749 F.2d 234, 236-37 (5th Cir. 1984)). "If the government discharges an employee amidst allegations of misconduct, the employee may have a procedural due process right to notice and an opportunity to clear [her] name." Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 573 (1972)). "Neither damage to reputation alone nor the stigma resulting from the discharge itself trigger the protections of due process." Id. (citing Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976); Wells v. Hico Indep. Sch. Dist., 736 F.2d 243, 256 (5th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 473 U.S. 901 (1985)) (footnote omitted). "Rather, a liberty interest is infringed, and the right to notice and an opportunity to clear one's name arises, only when the employee is 'discharged in a manner that creates a false and defamatory impression about [her] and thus stigmatizes [her] and forecloses [her] from other employmentopportunities.'" Id. (quoting White v. Thomas, 660 F.2d 680, 684 (5th Cir. 1981)). "This court employs a seven-element stigma-plus-infringement test to determine whether § 1983 allows a government employee a remedy for deprivation of liberty without notice or the opportunity for a name-clearing hearing." Bellard v. Gautreaux, 675 F.3d 454, 461-62 (5th Cir. 2012). "The plaintiff must show: (1) [she] was discharged; (2) stigmatizing charges were made against [her] in connection with the discharge; (3) the charges were false; (4) [she] was not provided notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the discharge; (5) the charges were made public; (6) [she] requested a hearing to clear [her] name; and (7) the employer denied the request." Bledsoe, 449 F.3d at 653.

B

Assuming arguendo that the comments at issue here are "stigmatizing charges"⁴ that were false when made,⁵ the court holds that the amended complaint fails to plausibly allege a deprivation of a liberty interest. The court first identifies three pleading deficiencies that are common to all three plaintiffs and then identifies a fourth pleading deficiency that pertains only to Hill.

First, the amended complaint does not plead factual content that would permit thecourt to draw the reasonable inference that any of the stigmatizing charges were made public. Although the amended complaint references derogatory comments that Lusty made about each plaintiff, it does not plead any facts suggesting that Lusty (or any other IISD employee) made these comments to anyone outside the workplace. For example, the amended complaint alleges that "Lusty told Hill that Chen was 'toxic' and that Chen was moved from one department to another because of the problems she created." Am. Compl. ¶ 35 (emphasis added). Similarly, the amended complaint alleges that "Lusty told Chen that Hill did not know anything about Special Education and was not good at her job." Id. at ¶ 36 (emphasis added). Finally, the amended complaint alleges that "Lusty constantly bad mouthed Clemmer and her work performance to the Special Education staff members." Id. at ¶ 74 (emphasis added); see also id. at ¶¶ 82, 84, and 135. At best, the amended complaint alleges that "Lusty told people" that Clemmer performed poorly at her job, see id. at ¶ 104 (emphasis added), but the allegations of this type do not specify to whom and under what circumstances the comments were made. These allegations do not satisfy the publicity element of the stigma-plus-infringement test because comments made internally within the workplace—but not publicized outside it—are not "made public."⁶ See Wells v. Doland, 711 F.2d 670, 676 & n.8 (5th Cir. 1983) (holding that deprivation of liberty claim failed because court could not...