Cleveland v. Jefferson Cnty. Bd. of Educ.

CYNTHIA CLEVELAND, Plaintiff, v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, Defendant.

2:15-cv-01538-JEO

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ALABAMA SOUTHERN DIVISION

May 5, 2017

MEMORANDUM OPINION

In this action, Cynthia Cleveland ("Plaintiff") brings claims against her former employer, the Jefferson County, Alabama, Board of Education (the "Board"), alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2601, et seq., and Alabama state law. (Doc.¹ 11-1 ("Amended Complaint" or "Amd. Compl.")²). The cause now comes to be heardon two related motions filed by the Board. One seeks summary judgment under FED. R. CIV. P. 56. (Doc. 14). The other motion requests that the court strike or otherwise decline to consider the respective declarations of Plaintiff and another witness, both filed by Plaintiff in opposition to summary judgment. (Doc. 22). Upon consideration, the court³ concludes that the Board's motion for summary judgment is due to be granted and that its motion to strike is moot.

I. SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARDS

Pursuant to Rule 56 of the FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, party is authorized to move for summary judgment on all or part of a claim or defense asserted either by or against the movant. Under that rule, the "court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(a). The party moving for summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion," relying on submissions "which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986); see also Clark v. Coats & Clark, Inc., 929 F.2d 604, 608 (11th Cir. 1991); Adickes v.S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Once the moving party has met its burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings" and show that there is a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324.

Both the party "asserting that a fact cannot be," and a party asserting that a fact is genuinely disputed, must support their assertions by "citing to particular parts of materials in the record," or by "showing that the materials cited do not establish the absence or presence of a genuine dispute, or that an adverse party cannot produce admissible evidence to support the fact." FED. R. CIV. PROC. 56(c)(1)(A), (B). In its review of the evidence, a court must credit the evidence of the non-movant and draw all justifiable inferences in the non-movant's favor. Stewart v. Booker T. Washington Ins., 232 F.3d 844, 848 (11th Cir. 2000). At summary judgment, "the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 249 (1986).

II. BACKGROUND⁴

Plaintiff began working for the Board in 1995, as an Attendance Clerk at Minor Community School. During the period relevant to her claims, she was stillemployed at that school but as its Office Coordinator. While assisting in the school lunchroom on the morning of August 8, 2014, Plaintiff slipped on some milk and fell, breaking her kneecap in three places. That injury ended up requiring two surgeries, one in August 2014 and another the next month.

It is undisputed that, following the accident, Plaintiff ultimately never resumed her work duties. Rather, she requested and was immediately granted paid medical leave under the Board's written policy authorizing such leave for up to 90 days for an on-the-job injury. (See Doc. 16-1, Deposition of Plaintiff Cynthia Cleveland ("Pl. Dep.") at 72-73; Doc. 16-2 at 8-9; Doc. 16-3 at 17, 38; Doc. 16-5 at 1-2, Affidavit of Craig Pouncey ("Pouncey Aff.") ¶ 3; Doc. 16-5 at 7). The Board also has a written policy authorizing leave under the FMLA (Pouncey Aff. ¶ 2; Doc. 16-5 at 3-6), a federal law requiring qualifying employers to provide eligible employees up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave for, among other things, "a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of [his or her] position." 28 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). Under the Board's policies, however, an employee must utilize available paid leave before taking unpaid FMLA leave, and any such paid leave she takes runs concurrently with, and counts against, her 12-week allotment of, unpaid leave under the FMLA. (Doc. 16-5 at 5, § 5.11.7).

On August 18, 2014, Becky Scott, an employee in the Board's Finance Department, sent an email to Katina Cephus, the Principal of Minor Community School, and copied Plaintiff, referencing deficiencies in the physician certification form that Scott had received for Plaintiff's knee injury. (Doc. 16-2 at 23). In particular, Scott noted that the form she received (see id. at 24), which was completed by an office manager instead of a physician, did not include a return-to-work date and that the Board wanted a form from Plaintiff's orthopedist, Dr. John Featheringill, dated within a week of the accident. (Id. at 23). Thereafter, the Board received another physician certification form, this one filled out and signed by Dr. Featheringill on August 22, 2014. (Id. at 25). On that form, however, Dr. Featheringill still left the expected return-to-work date blank. (Id.) Indeed, he was asked on the form, "Is there a reasonable expectation that the employee should be able to return to work," to which he answered, "no." (Id.)

Several days later, Plaintiff began the process of applying for disability retirement with the Retirement Systems of Alabama ("RSA"). Specifically, on August 25, 2014, Plaintiff filled out and signed a "Report of Disability Applicant Authorization" form that granted permission to her long-time personal physician, Dr. Thomas R. Bryant, to release her medical records and information to the RSA. (Doc. 16-2 at 52). Plaintiff indicated on that form that such release was becauseshe was "applying for ... disability benefits from the [RSA]." (Id.) Plaintiff was also seen on that same date, August 25th, by Dr. Bryant. (Id. at 50). For several years, he had treated Plaintiff for anxiety and depression, prescribing her a number of medications for those conditions. (Id.; Pl. Dep. at 92-93). On that visit to Dr. Bryant, Plaintiff also appears to have supplied him with a form requesting that he provide medical findings and an opinion on her disability retirement claim. (Id. at 50-51). The following day, August 26, 2014, Plaintiff went to the Board's central office and completed and signed an RSA "Application for Retirement" form, upon which she indicated she was seeking disability retirement, effective November 1, 2014. (Id. at 49). Plaintiff's signature on that document was notarized, also on August 26th, by Kim Scarvey, an employee in the Board's Human Resources department. (Id.; Doc. 16-8 at 1-2, Affidavit of Kim Scarvey ("Scarvey Aff.")). That same day, Plaintiff also completed and signed an "Insurance Authorization Form" as part of her disability retirement application paperwork. (Doc. 16-2 at 53).

On September 8, 2014, Plaintiff sent a text message to Cephus advising that she, Plaintiff, could not locate an iPad Mini computer that belonged to the Board. (See Doc. 16-2 at 35). Plaintiff explains in her deposition that she borrowed the iPad from a first grade teacher near the end of the 2013-14 school year and took ithome for the summer to download "apps" on it for the teacher's students to use. However, sometime in August 2014 after Plaintiff was injured, she was contacted by the first grade teacher who said she needed the iPad back, but Plaintiff was unable to locate it. (See Pl. Dep. at 114-122, 126). In texting Cephus on September 8th, Plaintiff notified her that she had borrowed the iPad and taken it home, but it was now missing and might have been stolen by her estranged husband. (Id. at 128-129; Doc. 16-2 at 35). Plaintiff also requested until her next paycheck to purchase a replacement. Ultimately, however, Plaintiff never found the iPad nor paid for another one. (Pl. Dep. at 203). Nevertheless, Plaintiff claims that neither Cephus nor anyone else from her school or the Board ever mentioned the missing iPad to her again.⁵ (Pl. Dep. at 130-32, 203).

On September 10, 2014, Gary Evans, the Board's Assistant Director of Human Resources, visited Plaintiff at home. (Pl. Dep. at 79-80, 108-09; Doc. 16-4, Deposition of Gary Evans ("Evans Dep.") at 9-10). It is undisputed that, on that occasion, Evans told Plaintiff that the Board needed additional paperwork on her medical condition and status in order for her to remain on leave and keep in-pay status. (Pl. Dep. 79-80, 108-109, 132, 137, 147; Evans Dep. at 14-16). Evans also delivered a letter to Plaintiff from Brett Kirkham, the Board's Director of Human Resources, which stated as follows:

This letter is to inform you that your on-the-job injury information is not up-to-date. As of today, September 10, 2014, we have not received any additional documentation from your physician regarding your August 8, 2014 injury at Minor Community School; however, you still remain off work. As a result, we are unable to provide the appropriate departments the information to correctly process payroll and benefits information. Please forward any new documentation to Ms. Trish Linley, our new On-the-Job Injury Coordinator in our Human Resources Department. If this documentation is not received by Friday, September 12, 2014 we will begin the termination process.

Thank you for your service to the Board. If I may be of any other assistance, please do not hesitate to contact my office.

(Doc. 16-2 at 48; see also Pl. Dep. at 134, 147; Evans Dep. at 10, 15-17). It is undisputed that, in response to Evans's visit, Plaintiff immediately supplied the Board with additional documentation, and she remained on paid, on-the-job-injury...