Cleveland v. Saul, CASE No. 4:19-cv-00055 PSH

424 F.Supp.3d 547

Evelyn CLEVELAND, Plaintiff

v.Andrew SAUL, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Defendant

CASE No. 4:19-cv-00055 PSH

United States District Court, E.D. Arkansas, Central Division.

Signed December 13, 2019

Stephanie Bartels Wallace, Bartels Sherman & Wallace PLLC, Jonesboro, AR, for Plaintiff.

Stacey Elise McCord, U.S. Attorney's Office Eastern District of Arkansas, Little Rock, AR, Eric B. Tucker, Social Security Administration Office of the General Counsel, Dallas, TX, for Defendant.

ORDER

Patricia S. Harris, UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

Plaintiff Evelyn Cleveland ("Cleveland"), in her appeal of the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration (defendant "Saul") to deny her claim for Supplemental Security Income benefits (SSI), contends the Administrative Law Judge's (ALJ) decision that she is not disabled is not supported by substantial evidence. Specifically, Cleveland contends the ALJ erred in finding that she could perform light work when her residual functional capacity ("RFC") included a limitation to jobs which required the use of a handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation four times a week. The parties have ably summarized the medical records and the testimony given at the administrative hearing conducted on March 29, 2018. The relevant period to be examined is from May 18, 2016, when Cleveland filed her application, through May 9, 2018, the date of the ALJ's decision.

The Administrative Hearing:

Cleveland, who was 54 years old at the time of the administrative hearing, has a high school education with no substantial past relevant work experience. She alleged disability due to osteoarthritis, chronic low back pain, rheumatoid arthritis, high blood pressure, high cholesterol, and carpal tunnel syndrome. She stated these impairments cause daily pain in her hands, legs, feet, ankle, and lower back, and also disturbed her sleep "several times during the week." (Tr. 75). Cleveland said that the pain medication she takes helps "a little" but the pain "doesn't go away." (Tr. 76). She rated her daily pain at 6 on a 1-10 scale, escalating to 8 when aggravated by sitting, standing, walking, lifting, or bending. Cleveland claimed medication side effects of dizziness, headaches, and depression, and indicated that her impairments caused her to perform her daily activities at a slower pace than in the past. She lives alone, and credits her daughter, one of four adult children, with assisting her in a variety of tasks, including cleaning, mopping, laundry, grocery shopping, and lifting milk. Cleveland indicated she sometimes needs help fixing her hair and putting on clothes. Cleveland stated she rarely drives, felt depressed, and did not "want to go different places." (Tr. 82). She stated she frequently uses her cane, which is not prescribed. Cleveland estimated she experienced at least four bad days per week, and used the cane on those days. According to Cleveland, a heating pad and physical therapy provide limited relief. (Tr. 74-85).

Montie Lumpkin ("Lumpkin"), a vocational expert, testified. The ALJ posed a hypothetical question to Lumpkin, asking him to assume a worker of Cleveland's age, education, and experience, who could perform light work except that she could understand, remember, and carry out simple and detailed tasks, attend and concentrate for at least two hours at a time, interact superficially with others, and adapt to routine changes in the work setting. Lumpkin testified that such a worker could perform jobs in the national economy, such as mail handler, gate guard, or shipping checker. The ALJ posed a second hypothetical question, adding as limitations to his first question the ability to frequently handle and finger on a bilateral basis, and use a handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation four times a week. Lumpkin stated that such a worker could work as a power screwdriver operator, can filling and closing machine tender, and compression molding machine tender. On questioning from Cleveland's attorney, Lumpkin stated that there would be no jobs available to her if the hypothetical worker could only occasionally, rather than frequently, handle and finger. The ALJ altered the hypothetical question two more times, adding limitations on the worker's ability to stay on task and on the need for breaks and unscheduled absences. Lumpkin identified no jobs for such a worker. (Tr. 85-90).

ALJ's Decision:

In his May 9, 2018, decision, the ALJ determined that Cleveland had the severe impairments of osteoarthritis and allied disorders, rheumatoid arthritis, carpal tunnel syndrome, essential hypertension, depressive disorder, and obesity. The ALJ then found that Cleveland did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or equaled a Listing. In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ considered Listing 12.04. The ALJ addressed the paragraph "B" criteria, and found that Cleveland had mild limitations in understanding, remembering, or applying information, and in interacting with others; and moderate limitations with regard to concentrating, persisting, or maintaining pace, and in adapting or managing herself.

The ALJ determined that Cleveland had the RFC to perform light work with restrictions which mirrored those posed to Lumpkin in the ALJ's second hypothetical question. This hypothetical included a limitation to jobs requiring the use of a handheld assistive device for prolonged ambulation four times a week.

The ALJ, citing the appropriate factors, assessed Cleveland's subjective allegations, finding her statements "not entirely consistent" with the medical evidence. (Tr. 23). He specifically noted the lack of medical evidence to support Cleveland's description of side effects, the absence of physician imposed restrictions, and the absence of any treating physician's opinion on Cleveland's ability to work. The ALJ also indicated Cleveland was "not entirely compliant" in taking prescribed medications, and that she was encouraged to exercise by her treating physician. (Tr. 24).

The ALJ did not fully embrace the state agency physician opinions that Cleveland could perform the full range of light work.

Instead, he found Cleveland could do less than the full range of light work, and relied upon Lumpkin's testimony that jobs were available to a worker such as Cleveland. The ALJ summarized:

The undersigned considered but granted little probative weight to the claimant's testimony. As discussed above, the paucity of evidence does not support the claimant's ultimate allegation of disability. Again, the claimant's ability to live alone and at times be responsible for her disabled son, drive, shop in stores, manage the household chores and laundry, prepare meals, exercise, attend church and visit family regularly and tend to personal needs in conjunction with the medical evidence demonstrating minimal abnormalities, reflects a significant functional capacity and not an individual unable to sustain regular and continuing work due to medically determinable impairments. The undersigned notes that acts such as cooking, vacuuming, washing dishes, doing laundry, shopping, driving and walking are inconsistent with subjective claims of disabling pain.

In sum, the above residual functional capacity assessment is supported by the opinions of the state agency medical examiners, Dr. McCasland and the medical evidence of record. There is no treating source opinion that the claimant is more limited than as provided in the above residual functional capacity.

(Tr. 25-26).

Accordingly, the ALJ found that Cleveland was not disabled. (Tr. 15-27). The Court now turns to Cleveland's sole argument.

ALJ error in finding Cleveland could...